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Abstract
Cryptographic primitives are the basic building blocks of various cryptographic sys-
tems and protocols. Their application is based on their well established properties.
The security of a crypto system is proven under the assumption that the underly-
ing cryptographic primitives provide some specific security levels. Therefore it is
critical to use primitives that can meet these requirements. However, there is no
general approach of constructing fast and provably secure primitives. Rather, the
primitives undergo years of thorough cryptanalysis and only after no attacks have
been found, they can be considered for real world applications.
This PhD thesis deals with the two main cryptographic primitives: block ciphers
and cryptographic hash functions. The main contribution lies in presenting attacks
on these algorithms. The analysis ranges from finding ad-hoc differential trails
that are used for collision search and distinguishers on specific hash functions to
automatic search tools that give the optimal differential trails for block ciphers.
Weaknesses are shown for a number of SHA-3 candidates in the framework of
rotational distinguishers and meet-in-the-middle based preimage attacks.
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Introduction
2
3
The information era has started in the second half of the twentieth century and
has stimulated the birth of many scientific disciplines. Cryptology was created to
satisfy one of the basic demands of the information expansion. It is the science of
securely sharing information and data. Some of the concepts of cryptology predate
the information era. The ciphers, probably the most popular abstractions of cryp-
tology, were first used to securely communicate data long before any information
science was known. It is a well documented fact that Caesar used ciphers to send
and receive messages with his generals.
Our modern technological society heavily relies on information interchange.
Whenever the data has to be communicated securely, cryptology is instantiated. To
understand the main contribution of cryptology, the following model is introduced.
Two parties, sending and receiving1, want to communicate, i.e. want to exchange
messages and data. However, the communication channel that they use is insecure,
i.e. there is a malicious party, further called an adversary or an attacker2, who can
possibly eavesdrop or even alter all the communicated data. The main task of
cryptology is to provide algorithms for the sending and receiving parties, such that
the adversary cannot obtain any information about the communicated data, nor can
meaningfully influence or alter this communication other than erasing the data.
The main applications of cryptology include the leading force of the information
exchange – the internet, as well as various communication systems such as phones,
ATM machines and others. However, it is substantial to understand that cryptology
is not only about enciphering data – the area of application of cryptology is much
wider. Usually, its objectives are divided into four main fields:
• Confidentiality - keeping the data secret to all parties except for the intended
receivers. This goal is achieved by enciphering the data using a secret key
which is shared only among the two parties. The enciphered data is unintel-
ligible to anyone who does not have the secret key, hence the information is
confidential. For example, confidentiality plays a crucial role in exchanging
secret messages in the military – a weakness in the enciphering algorithm
might lead to a serious military loss3.
• Data integrity - maintaining the data unaltered. This mechanism provides
the ability to detect manipulation of the original data in a form of insertion,
deletion and substitution of some data characters. This is very useful in some
particular applications where it is much more important to have the data
unaltered than confidential. For example, it is crucial for a bank transaction
statement to maintain its integrity (though it does not have to be secret).
Otherwise, an adversary would be able to change the transaction amount.
• Authentication - identification of the parties that communicate and of the
communicated data. Each of the parties wants to be sure that the other party
is authentic (it is the one it claim it is), and that all the received data is from
1Often in cryptology these parties are called Alice and Bob.
2In cryptology this party is called Eve.
3It has been speculated that one of the greatest British victories in WWII was actually the break of
the German cipher machine Enigma.
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the authenticated party. Otherwise, an adversary can pretend to be a trusted
party and obtain some type of benefit from the other unsuspecting party. For
example, when updating the current operating system (e.g. Windows Up-
dates) the user wants to be sure that the updates are taken from the genuine
vendor site. If the updates are not authentic, they can be malicious, and the
security of the system can be put under a serious threat.
• Non-repudiation - prevention of the party from denying previously taken ac-
tions. Once the party has agreed on something, e.g. has signed a contract,
later, it cannot deny it. If brought to court, a judge can easily decide if the
party has taken the controversial action.
Cryptology can be divided into two main areas: cryptography and cryptanal-
ysis. The cryptography is the part that deals with construction and proposal of
new cryptographic algorithms, primitives and protocols as well as implementation
of these object. Cryptanalysis, on the other hand, examines and evaluates the se-
curity of the cryptographic objects, i.e. it points weaknesses and strengths in the
analyzed objects and presents methods to improve the security. Cryptography and
cryptanalysis are tightly related and often it is not clear the border where the first
ends and the second starts. Moreover, they complement each other – it is virtually
impossible to propose a new primitive (i.e. block cipher or hash function) without
giving a preliminary security analysis of the primitive.
It is critical to understand that the security of a cryptographic primitive is eval-
uated in a framework where the adversary is an intelligent enemy. For example, it
is a general misunderstanding, that codes are cryptographic objects4. Yet, basically
they protect the data only against the laws of nature (some bits of the communi-
cated data are randomly flipped, erased or added). On the other hand, an adversary
can easily undermine the security of a code when used for enciphering, by altering
the "right" rather than random bits. Therefore, when proposing a new primitive,
the cryptographer should evaluate the security against an intelligent enemy – a hu-
man. The primitive has to withstand all the known attacks as well as possible new
attacks.
Cryptography is further divided into symmetric (private-key) and asymmetric
(public-key) cryptography. In symmetric cryptography both trusted parties share
the same secret key - the first party enciphers the data with the secret key, and
the second party deciphers it with the same key. In asymmetric cryptography each
party has two keys, a public key which is known to everyone and used to encipher
data and a private key which only the party knows and which is used to decipher
the data. Hence, everyone can send a message to the party since the public key is
known, but only the party can read the message since the private key is available
only to the party.
There are four main areas of symmetric cryptography:
• Cryptographic hash functions
4This misunderstanding comes from the fact that through history indeed codes were used for confi-
dentiality, i.e. to encipher information.
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• Block ciphers
• Stream ciphers
• Message authentication codes
Cryptography
  Symmetric
(Private-key)
 Asymmetric
(Public-key)
Cryptographic
Hash 
functions
Block
ciphers Streamciphers
Message
authentication
codes
Figure 1: The division of cryptography. This thesis deals with cryptographic hash
function and block ciphers.
This work is devoted to the cryptanalysis of the first two types of symmetric
primitives, i.e. cryptographic hash functions and block ciphers (see Fig. I ). The
thesis is structured as follows. In part I we give the definitions and the security
requirements of hash functions and block ciphers. Part II introduces some of the
basic techniques of cryptanalysis, in particular, the techniques used in the further
attacks. The contribution is presented in parts III, IV, and V.
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Chapter 1
Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions are one of the main four symmetric cryptography
primitives. The notion of a cryptographic hash function is tightly related to the
notion of hash function which does not have any security (cryptographic) proper-
ties. A hash function takes as an input a message of arbitrary length, and produces
an output of fixed length called message digest, hash value, or hash. The process
of producing this output is called hashing. Formally, n-bit hash function h(M) is
defined as:
h(M) : {0, 1}∗→ {0, 1}n.
In order to be cryptographic, a hash function is required to have three security
properties:
1. Collision resistance - it is hard to find two distinct messages that hash to
the same value, i.e. it is computationally infeasible to find M1, M2 such that
h(M1) = h(M2).
2. Preimage resistance - it is hard to find a message that produces some target
hash value, i.e. given H∗, it is computationally infeasible to find M such that
h(M) = H∗.
3. Second-preimage resistance - it is hard to find another (second) message that
produces the same hash as the first message, i.e. given message M , it is com-
putationally infeasible to find M ′ such that h(M ′) = h(M).
Any hash function that satisfies the above three properties can be considered to be
cryptographic. However, in some applications, only a single property is required.
For example, in some protocols it is sufficient the hash function to be only preimage
resistant1. In our further work, we assume that a cryptographic hash function
has all three security properties. Several additional properties such as resistance
against length extension attacks, absence of large input-output correlations, are
usually expected as well from a hash function. We will use the terms hash function
1This type of functions are called non-invertible or one-way functions.
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and cryptographic hash function interchangeably to denote collision, preimage and
second-preimage resistant hash function.
The three security properties, along with the fixed-length output property, dic-
tate the areas of application of cryptographic hash functions:
• Digital signatures are used to provide authentication of data (a message, file
or document). They are the digital equivalents of the conventional handwrit-
ten signatures. The public-key cryptography provides algorithms for digitally
signing data. However, these algorithms are generally considered to be very
slow (several magnitudes slower than private-key algorithms) hence when
applied to the whole message (which can be as long as several megabytes),
they lead to a rather inefficient algorithms. Instead of signing the whole mes-
sage, the user can first produce a hash value of the message and then sign
only the hash of the message. Since the hash is short, the efficiency of the
public-key algorithms becomes irrelevant. The collision resistance property
of the hash function ensures that a potentially malicious user cannot easily
produce two messages that hash to the same value. Otherwise, he can argue
that he has signed the malicious message (instead of the original).
• Data integrity can be achieved using hash functions. The sending party sends
the whole message over a possibly insecure channel, and the hash of the
message over a secure channel. The receiving party gets the message, hashes
it, and checks if the message digest is identical to the one received. If the
hashes are the same, then the data is unaltered. The second-preimage resis-
tance of a hash function guarantees that an adversary cannot easily create a
second malicious message that has the same hash as the original, and hence
he cannot alter the original message.
• Password storing is another important area of application of hash functions.
Instead of storing the original user passwords, a computer system can store
only the hashes of the passwords 2. When a user types his password, the
system compares the hash of the typed password with the stored hash of the
original password. If they match, the user is allowed to log in. Note that
with this solution, the file with the hashes of the original passwords has to
be only write protected (but not read protected). The preimage resistance
of the hash function ensures that a malicious user, even though he has the
file with the hashes, cannot find a password that has some of the hash value
from the file.
So far, we have omitted the exact definition of the terms "hard" and "compu-
tationally infeasible" used in the description of the security properties. The only
parameter of a cryptographic hash function is the length n of the output. There-
fore, the notion of "hardness" is defined as a function of n.
Definition 1 An n-bit hash function h(M) is collisions resistant if the complexity,
measured in the number of invocations of h(M), of finding collisions is 2
n
2 .
2Unix-type systems use this type of password storing.
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Definition 2 An n-bit hash function h(M) is preimage resistant if the complexity,
measured in the number of invocations of h(M), of finding preimage is 2n.
Definition 3 An n-bit hash function h(M) is second preimage resistant if the com-
plexity, measured in the number of invocations of h(M), of finding second preimage is
2n.
The estimates 2
n
2 , 2n, 2n have a theoretical basis. There exist generic attack
algorithms, i.e. algorithms applicable to any hash function, that find collisions and
(second) preimages with these workloads.
The generic collision finding algorithm is based on the so-called birthday para-
dox which states that in a room of 23 people the probability that two of them have
a birthday on the same day is higher than 1/2. Assuming that a year has 365 days,
this probability can be found as:
1− 365
365
· 364
365
· 363
365
· . . . · 343
365
≈ 0.507. (1.1)
This means that if the output has 365 different elements then it is sufficient to pick
23 random inputs to get a collision with a probability higher than 1/2. Let us try
to find the same number of inputs when the output has N elements, i.e. let us try
to find k such that:
1− N
N
· N − 1
N
· N − 2
N
· . . . · N − (k− 1)
N
=
1
2
.
Note that N−s
N
= 1− s/N , and 1− 1/N ≈ e−1/N . Hence (1.1) can be rewritten as:
e−1/N e−2/N . . . e−(k−1)/N = 1/2. (1.2)
With a further reduction, we obtain:
e−k(k−1)/(2N) = 1/2. (1.3)
Since k is a large number, we can replace k − 1 with k. This way we obtain the
solution for (1.3):
k ≈ 1.18pN . (1.4)
For an n-bit hash function the value of N is 2n, and therefore a collision can be
found after 1.18
p
2n ≈ 2n/2 hash function invocations.
The generic (second) preimage attack works as follows. The attacker sequen-
tially produces k hashes of randomly taken input messages. The output space has
2n distinct elements, hence the probability p that some of hash values of these k
inputs coincide with the target value H∗ is given by the formula:
p = 1−

2n − 1
2n
k
. (1.5)
Again, we use the asymptotic approximation (1+ 1/n)n = e, and obtain
p = 1− e− k2n . (1.6)
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Therefore, when k = 2n, with probability p = 0.63 one can find (second) preimage
for an n-bit hash function.
In a hash function, although the input message can be of an arbitrary length,
the output hash value always has a fixed length. To cope with this, hash functions
are built iteratively from smaller primitives called compression functions. The most
popular design that explores this idea is the Merkle-Damgård design [100, 45]. A
compression function f takes as an input a chaining value Hold and a message
block M and produces as an output another chaining value Hnew . Given f , one can
build a hash function h(M) as follows (See Fig. 1):
M1
f
M2 M3 . . .
. . .
Mt
gf f fH0 h(M)
Figure 1.1: Merkle-Damgård Construction
1. Concatenate to the input message M the length of the message3, i.e. produce
M˜ = M ||leng th(M).
2. Split the message M˜ into blocks of equal size, i.e. M˜ = M1||M2|| . . . ||M t ,
where |M i |= m.
3. Fix some initial chaining value H0. Produce consecutively
H i = f (H i−1, M i), i = 1, . . . , t.
4. The hash of M is g(H t), where g is some output transformation4, i.e.
h(M) = g(H t).
Conventionally, the security of a cryptographic hash function is analyzed in a frame-
work where the function is regarded as a whole, indivisible object. However, a
more conservative approach has become a standard in the analysis of functions in
the last 15 years. Rather than the whole hash function, the main target of attack
became the underlying compression function. Some of the attack scenarios on the
compression functions seem highly unlikely to have any effect on the security of the
whole hash function, which afterwards is the final goal. However, it is a common
opinion in the cryptographic community that even a slight weakness in the com-
pression function may be explored and later may lead to a weakness in the hash
function.
3If necessary, add padding to make the length multiple of m.
4Usually, the output transformation is an identity function, a truncation, or some simple non-
cryptographic mapping.
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1.1 Collision Attacks
Collision attacks explore weaknesses in the function that lead to producing col-
lisions faster than 2
n
2 function invocations. The advancement of cryptanalysis in-
creased the number of types of collision attacks on both the hash function as well as
on the compression function. First, let us focus on attacks on the latter (See [86]).
Depending on the freedom to choose the input parameters, the following types of
collision attacks on compression functions can be launched:
• Real collisions - given a chaining value H, find two distinct messages M1, M2
such that f (H, M1) = f (H, M2).
• Pseudo-collisions - find two distinct chaining values H1, H2 and a message M
such that f (H1, M) = f (H2, M).
• Near collisions - find a chaining value H and two distinct messages M1, M2
such that Hw( f (H, M1)⊕ f (H, M2))<< n, where HW is the Hamming weight
function.
• Semi-free start collisions - find a chaining value H and two distinct messages
M1, M2 such that f (H, M1) = f (H, M2).
• Free start collisions - find two distinct chaining values H1, H2 and two distinct
messages M1, M2 such that f (H1, M1) = f (H2, M2).
A collision attack on the compression function can be as well a combination of
some of the above attacks, e.g. semi-free start near collision.
When the output size is n bits, generic attacks can produce the above collisions
with complexity of 2
n
2 compression function invocations. For near collisions, when
the Hamming weight is at most w, i.e. when the output chaining values of the
messages coincide in at least n− w specific bits, near collisions can be produced
generically with an effort of 2
n−w
2 invocations5.
Only a real collision attack on the compression functions directly leads to a
collision attack on the hash functions. For this purpose, the attacker finds real
collisions for the compression function with a fixed input chaining value to the
initial chaining value of the hash function. At the first glance, the importance of
the rest of the collision attacks on the compression functions seems questionable.
However, it is often a practice among the cryptologists to gradually improve the
attack on some function to the point when it becomes a real collisions attack. In
other words, first some simpler attack on the compression function is found, e.g.
pseudo-collisions. Then using more advanced techniques, this attack is extended to
a real collision attack. Also, some of the collision attacks on the hash functions are
actually a combination of various collision attacks on the compression function. For
example, the collision attack on the hash standard SHA-1 [140] is a combination
of a near collision attack and a semi-free start collision attack.
5This estimate is correct when the position of the coincided bits is fixed. Otherwise, the complexity
drops to 2n/2 ·pCwn .
11
1.2 Preimage and Second Preimage Attacks
In the (second) preimage attacks the adversary finds (second) preimages for an
n-bit function with less than 2n invocations. Similarly as in the collision attacks, in
the preimage attacks the adversary can find preimages for the whole hash function
or only for the compression function. In the framework of compression functions,
the following attacks are interesting:
• Real (second) preimage attack - given chaining values H, H∗, find a message
M such that f (H, M) = H∗.
• Pseudo-(second) preimage attack - given a chaining value H∗, find a message
M and a chaining value H such that f (H, M) = H∗.
Obviously, a real (second) preimage attack on the compression function can be
converted to a (second) preimage attack on the hash function by simply fixing the
input chaining value H to the initial chaining value H0. This assumes that the
output transformation g is easily invertible. If this is not the case, the attacker can
still launch a second preimage attack. For that matter, instead for the final hash
value, he finds a real second preimage for the chaining value that is input to g (see
Fig. 1).
When the size of the intermediate chaining value is same as the size of the
hash value, so-called single pipe hash functions, the pseudo preimage attack on
the compression function can be converted to a preimage attack on the hash func-
tion [86]. First the attacker finds a lot of pseudo preimages for H∗, i.e. he builds
a set S2 = {(H2, M2)| f (H2, M2) = H∗}. Then, by taking random messages, he con-
structs a lot of intermediate chaining values from the initial chaining value, i.e. he
builds a set S1 = {(H1, M1)| f (H0, M1) = H1}. When |S1| · |S2| ≥ 2n then there is
a high probability that these two sets intersect in the first element of the pair, i.e.
H1 = H2. Then the preimage for H∗ is the message M1||M2.
1.3 Distinguishers
Modern hash function are often used as building blocks for other cryptographic
primitives. The compression functions alone are sometimes misused for purposes
other than the one they were created for, e.g. by removing the feed-forward some
compression functions can be turned into block ciphers. Therefore, a new type of
security requirements is imposed on hash and compression functions. Besides the
traditional collision and (second) preimage resistance, a hash and its underlying
compression function are supposed to behave as a random oracle6 – a function
that outputs a random value for each input. In this framework, any property that
might distinguish the function from the random oracle is considered to be a security
threat for the function. However, there are properties that hold for any function,
but not for the oracle simply because the oracle does not have a finite definition.
6For a full definition of a random oracle see [14].
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It is interesting to note that an exact definition of a valid distinguisher on
hash/compression functions is still missing. This is mostly due to the fact that
for each function there exist some trivial distinguishers that are applicable since
the attacker knows (and can control) all the input parameters of the function and
the function is public. Intuitively, a distinguisher is valid if it is not trivial.
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Chapter 2
Block Ciphers
Block ciphers are the oldest cryptographic primitives. Their main purpose is to
provide confidentiality, i.e. securely exchange messages and data over an insecure
channel.
A block cipher E(K , P) takes as an input an n-bit string P called a plaintext and
k-bit string K called a key, and produces a n-bit string C called a ciphertext:
E : {0, 1}k × {0,1}n→ {0,1}n.
When the key K ∈ {0,1}k is fixed, the block cipher EK(P) ≡ E(K , P) becomes a
permutation on {0, 1}n. The process of producing the ciphertext from the plaintext
and the key is called encryption. The reverse process, i.e. producing the plaintext
from the ciphertext and the key, is called decryption.
To communicate over an insecure channel (see Fig. 2), the two trusted parties
first fix a secret key K known only to them. Then the first party encrypts messages
with the block cipher using the key K and sends the ciphertext of the messages to
the second party. This party decrypts the ciphertext with the key K and obtains the
initial messages.
plaintext Block
cipher
key
ciphertext insecure
channel
sending party
ciphertext Block
cipher
key
plaintext
receiving party
Figure 2.1: Secure communication with a block cipher
If a malicious user (i.e. an adversary) intercepts this communication (the ci-
phertexts), he cannot produce the initial messages because he does not have the
key used for decryption. Hence, as long as the key is kept secret and the block
cipher is secure, the confidentiality is preserved.
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2.1 Distinguishers and Key-recovery Attacks
A block cipher is secure if an adversary, who does not know the secret key but has
a lot of pairs plaintext-ciphertext, cannot obtain any additional information about
the block cipher or the secret key from these pairs. When the adversary does obtain
information about the block cipher then we say he has constructed a distinguisher
for the cipher. If he can obtain information about the key, which is indeed his
ultimate goal, then he has launched a key-recovery attack on the cipher.
Depending on the attack framework, the adversary can have access to various
types of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In the weakest (but most practical) case, the ad-
versary has a set of only ciphertexts (without the corresponding plaintexts). This
is the ciphertext-only attack. When he has an access to both the plaintexts and the
corresponding ciphertexts then it is called a known-plaintext attack. To test the
robustness of a block ciphers a few more assumptions were introduced. Although
the attacks in these frameworks are highly unrealistic, the resistance of a cipher to
them provides a good sign of security. These are the chosen-plaintext attack, where
the adversary can choose the plaintexts and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts,
and the chosen-ciphertext attack, where he can choose the ciphertexts and get the
plaintexts. In the chosen-type of attacks, if the adversary can choose the next ci-
phertext (or plaintext) that he wants to decrypt (or encrypt) depending on the
previously obtained pairs, then it is an adaptive attack. If he selects all the cipher-
texts (plaintexts) and obtain the corresponding pairs of plaintexts (ciphertext) all
at once, then it is a non-adaptive attack.
Now, let us focus on distinguishers for a cipher E. The main task of the ad-
versary in this type of attacks is to show that he can determine, without knowing
the key, if some cipher is the target E. More specifically, the adversary is given
so-called black box access either to the cipher E with some fixed, but unknown to
the adversary key or to some random permutation. The adversary can query this
black box, i.e. he can fix plaintexts and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts and
vice-versa. After he collects a number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs he is supposed
to decide, with a sufficiently high probability, if the black box is the target cipher
E. In general, to find a distinguisher for E the adversary provides some property
for the cipher that holds for all the keys. Then he collects an amount of plaintext-
ciphertext pairs to confirm the existence of the property. The adversary knows what
is the amount of these pairs sufficient to confirm the property. Hence, after collect-
ing this critical amount (from the black box), if the property has been confirmed,
then the black box is the target cipher E, otherwise it is some random permutation.
The adversary should keep in mind that if the critical amount of pairs is high that
even a random permutation can exhibit this property. Therefore, to be successful
he has to find a property for the cipher which can be confirmed with sufficiently
low number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
In the key recovery attacks the adversary tries to get information about the key,
i.e. he tries to find some or all bits of the key. For a cipher E with a k-bit key, given
only a few pairs of plaintext-ciphertext the adversary can always check all possible
2k keys, and thus find all k bits. This is the so-called brute force of the key space –
it is a generic attack applicable to any cipher and requires around 2k encryptions.
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To launch a key-recovery attack the adversary has to discover a method of finding
the key bits faster than brute force. He can target as well a partial-key recovery,
when he tries to find k0 bits (k0 < k) of the key. Then, the total complexity of the
attack should be lower than 2k0 .
2.1.1 Related-key Attacks and Classes of Weak Keys
In the distinguishers and the key-recovery attacks it is assumed that there is one
single key, fixed randomly and unknown to the adversary. In the related-key at-
tacks this requirement is relaxed, and instead of providing black-box access to
the cipher with a fixed unknown single random key K , the adversary is given
access to the cipher with several fixed unknown keys, but with a known rela-
tion between them. More precisely, the adversary has an access to the ciphers
EK1(P), EK2(P), . . . , EKs(P), where K1 is some fixed unknown key, Ki = fi(K1), i =
2, . . . , s, and the relations fi are chosen by the adversary. The adversary, however,
can choose specific relations fi which would allow him to trivially launch key-
recovery attacks. Therefore, some relations are not permitted. One very commonly
used relation is XOR or modular addition, i.e. s = 2, and K2 = f2(K1) = K1 ⊕∆ (or
f2(K1) = K1 +∆).
The attack frameworks of distinguishers and key recovery assume that the key
is chosen randomly from the set K˜ of all possible keys (in the related-key attacks
the first key is chosen randomly). In some cases, the adversary can find attacks that
are applicable to the cipher only if the key is randomly chosen from some subset
S ⊂ K˜ . The subset S is called a class of weak keys. Let |K˜ | = 2k and |S| = 2s.
To have a valid attack based on the class of weak keys S, the adversary has to take
into account the probability that a randomly chosen key belongs to S, which is 2s−k.
Hence, the complexity of attacks for classes of weak keys has always an additional
factor of 2k−s which is the workload required to get a key from the weak class.
2.2 Open-key Distinguishers
In the open-key distinguishers for block ciphers the adversary knows or chooses the
key for the cipher E. These type of distinguishers are relatively new and were first
introduced in the work of Knudsen and Rijmen [85]. They have presented attacks
on ciphers assuming that the adversary knows the key – these type of distinguisher
are the known-key distinguishers. Later, Biryukov, Khovratovich and Nikolic´ [29]
have shown attacks on ciphers when the adversary can even choose the key used
for encryption – these are the chosen-key distinguishers.
Unlike the traditional distinguishers for block ciphers, where the adversary does
not know the key, in the open-key distinguishers the adversary has the key. There-
fore, the open-key distinguishers are based on the same principe as the distinguish-
ers for hash functions and a formal definition of valid open-key distinguishers is
still missing.
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Part II
Some Techniques for
Cryptanalysis of Hash
Functions and Block Ciphers
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The field of cryptanalysis is constantly growing and new methods and tech-
niques enrich the arsenal of cryptanalysis every once in a while. Listing and de-
scribing all these techniques would require a lot of space and effort, and at the end
some will still be missing. Therefore, we will describe only the techniques that are
used in our attacks as well as the new techniques that appeared in the last few
years. This selection does not include some of the very powerful and widely used
approaches of cryptanalysis. To learn more about these methods, an interested
reader is referred to linear cryptanalysis [92], impossible cryptanalysis [18], high-
order differentials [83], slide attacks [34], multiset attacks [41, 33] and others.
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Chapter 3
Differential Analysis
Differential analysis is one of the most applied and successful technique for analysis
of cryptographic hash functions and block ciphers. It was officially introduced by
Biham and Shamir in 1990 for analysis of DES [21], although indications exist that
the technique was known before to some government agencies such as the U.S.
National Security Agency and IBM.
The idea of differential analysis is to encrypt a pair of plaintexts with a specific
input difference between them and to check if the corresponding pair of ciphertexts
has some specific output difference. If the probability, that a randomly chosen
plaintext pair with the fixed input difference produces a ciphertext pair with a fixed
output difference, is higher than a mere chance, then this leads to a distinguisher
that in some cases can be converted to a key-recovery attack.
Formally, differential analysis can be introduced as follows. Let EK(P) be some
n-bit block cipher with a key size of k bits. Let ∆I ,∆O be the input and the output
differences in the plaintexts, and in the corresponding ciphertexts, i.e.
∆I = P1 ⊕ P2,
∆O = EK(P1)⊕ EK(P2).
A differential ∆ = (∆I ,∆O) is a pair of input difference ∆I and output difference
∆O. The probability P∆ of the differential ∆ is defined as:
P∆ ≡ P(EK(P)⊕ EK(P ⊕∆I) = ∆O)
Note that for a randomly chosen ∆I ,∆O the value of P∆ is around 2−n. On the
other hand, if P∆ > 2
−k then this differential, denoted as ∆I
P−→ ∆O, leads to a
valid distinguisher for the block cipher EK(P).
Although at first glance, launching a differential attack seems a trivial task,
the real problem lies in finding good input and output differences. This problem
is usually reduced to the problem of finding differential characteristics (or trails).
Note that a differential only fixes the values of the differences in the plaintext (∆I )
and in the ciphertext (∆O). One can also fix the values of the differences in some
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intermediate states, e.g. after each round of the cipher, or even after each trans-
formation in the cipher. A differential characteristic ∆˜ = (∆I ,∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆t ,∆O)
is a set of differences in the plaintext, in some t intermediate states, and in the ci-
phertext. Similarly, as in the case of differential, for characteristic we can introduce
probabilities pi that a fixed difference∆i after some round (or transformation) will
evolve to ∆i+1. Then a characteristic ∆˜ can be denoted as:
∆I
p1−→∆1 p2−→∆2 p3−→ . . . pt−→∆t pt+1−−→∆O
The probability of the characteristic is P∆˜ =
∏
pi .
A convenient method of constructing a characteristic for a large number of
rounds for the cipher, was described as well in the work of Biham and Shamir [21].
This is the notion of iterative characteristic – it is on a small number of rounds of
the cipher, but it has the same input and output difference. To produce a long char-
acteristic, the attacker only has to concatenate many such short iterative character-
istics. He can do so, since the input and the output differences of the characteristic
are the same. Therefore, if the iterative characteristic is on k rounds and it has a
probability p, then the attacker can construct a characteristic on t · k rounds with a
probability pt .
A differential can be seen as a collection of characteristics that have common
input and output differences (∆I and∆O). This way, the probability of the differen-
tial increases with each new characteristic found. In practice this rarely happens1,
i.e. the attacker usually finds and uses only one differential characteristic. Hav-
ing a differential ∆I
p−→ ∆O (or a characteristic) with high probability, the attacker
can easily construct a so-called differential distinguisher. He encrypts around 1/p
pairs of plaintexts (P i , P i ⊕∆I), i = 1, . . . , p and produces the corresponding pair
of ciphertexts (C i1, C
i
2). Then, with high probability he can expect that one of the
ciphertext pair has the difference ∆O, i.e. for some j, C
j
1 ⊕ C j2 = ∆O. In a random
permutation the pair of plaintexts/ciphertexts with∆I ,∆O differences can be found
after around 2n encryptions. Hence, when p 2−n, the attacker has a distinguisher
for the cipher.
Although we have defined differential analysis for block ciphers, the notion
of differentials and differential characteristics can easily be transferred to crypto-
graphic hash function. The main application of differential trails to hash functions
is for collision search – a trail for the function that ends with a zero difference
(i.e. ∆O = 0) leads to a collision attack. If ∆O has low Hamming weight then this
can lead to a near collision. On the other hand any trail (with sufficiently high
probability) can be used as differential distinguisher for the function.
3.1 Message Modification for Differential Attacks
In some attack frameworks, e.g. hash (compression) function attacks or chosen-key
attacks on block ciphers, the adversary has the freedom to choose all input param-
1In ciphers with diffusion layer based on MDS matrices, e.g. AES, many characteristics can be found
that compose a round-reduced differential.
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eters. Usually, this permits him to fix the values of one or more intermediate states.
This has a significant impact on differential attacks. The differential characteristics
for some hash function/block cipher specify a set of differences in some interme-
diate states and probabilities that differences will propagate. These probabilities
are evaluated under the assumption that the values of the intermediate states are
random, i.e. in the differential pair, the first state has some random values S, while
the second state has a value S ⊕∆l . However, when the attacker controls all the
inputs, usually he can control the exact values of a number of intermediate states.
Hence, using the message freedom the attacker can fix the required value S for
the state such that the differences will propagate with probability 1 through this
round. In cryptanalysis, the authors refer to the message modification technique
when they use the freedom of the input (not necessarily only the message) to fix
some intermediate states which leads to differential attacks with lower complexi-
ties.
3.2 Truncated Differentials
Truncated differentials, introduced by Knudsen [83], are differential-type of at-
tacks that are usually applied to byte-oriented primitives, i.e. the primitives that
use transformations on bytes (rather than on words or bits). Knudsen noted that
when constructing differential characteristics for these types of primitives, instead
of specifying the exact values of the differences for each separate byte, one can only
indicate if there is a difference in the byte or not – the bytes with differences are
called active bytes, while the bytes without difference are called non-active bytes.
The advantages of considering this type of differentials depend on the actual
underlying transformations used in the primitive. Most of the byte-oriented prim-
itives are substitution-permutation (SP) networks, i.e. in each round they have a
substitution layer which is a byte-wise application of non-linear functions, called
S-boxes, and a permutation layer which is usually some linear transformation of
the bytes of the state. The S-box layer is used to destroy the linearity2, while the
permutation layer is used to introduce diffusion among the bytes, i.e. after a low
number of rounds, each byte of the state depends on all bytes of the input. In
general, for SP primitives it is much easier to build a truncated than a regular char-
acteristic. When the S-boxes are bijective (which usually is the case for most of the
SP primitives) then after the application of the S-boxes each active byte stays active
and vice-versa with probability 1. Hence, to build a truncated characteristic the at-
tacker only has to focus on the permutation layer in each round of the primitive and
only in this layer the probability of the characteristic can be lower than 1. Usually,
the probability of a truncated trail is different for different direction (backward or
forward). An example of a 2-round truncated differential characteristic for AES is
given in Fig. 3.1.
2Otherwise the whole primitive becomes a linear transformation and it can easily be distinguished.
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Figure 3.1: Truncated trail for two rounds of AES with the probabilities in forward
and backward direction
3.2.1 Rebound Attack
The rebound attack [98] was introduced to enhance the efficiency of truncated
differentials3. It can be used in contents where the attacker controls the value of
the state. Therefore, this technique is used in various collision/differential attacks
on hash functions and open-key distinguishers on block ciphers.
As mentioned before, the probability of truncated trails can be less than 1 only
in the permutation layer of the primitive. One can easily apply message modifi-
cation and pass one permutation layer for free (with probability 1). The rebound
attack, on the other hand, is used to pass two consecutive permutation layers for
free. The attacker starts with some difference in the state at the input of the per-
mutation layer in the first round, and a difference in the state at the output of the
permutation layer in the second round. He goes forward in the first permutation
layer and produces the difference ∆I in the state at the end of the first round. Sim-
ilarly, he goes backwards through the second permutation layer and obtains the
difference ∆O at the input of this layer. Since between these two layers lies only on
S-box layer, the attacker now has to match these two differences through the S-box
layer, i.e. to find a value X such that the differential pair (X , X ⊕∆I) at the begin-
ning of the second round satisfies (Sbox(X )⊕Sbox(X ⊕∆I) = ∆O. It is important
to notice that for any value X the trail in the permutation layers in the two rounds
does not change because these layers are linear. The matching of the differences
can be done byte-wise since the S-box layer is byte-oriented. Once the attacker has
fixed the proper value of X , the value of the states becomes fixed as well hence the
attacker can easily produce the values of the initial and final states and check if the
difference in the states is as predicted by the trail. In Fig. 3.2 we give a rebound
attack on 7 rounds of AES [95].
3.2.2 Super S-boxes
The idea of Super S-boxes [58, 87] is closely related to the idea of the rebound
attack. This technique is applicable to primitives that have incomplete one round
3Recently, the rebound attacks has been applied as well to enhance other, non-differential attacks
(See [78]).
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Rebound rounds
20 2-24 20202-24
Figure 3.2: Truncated trail for 7 rounds of AES with the Rebound attack in the
middle two rounds.
diffusion. Depending on the diffusion of the primitive, Super S-boxes can fix good
values in three or even more rounds of the truncated trail. For this purpose, the
attacker first divides 1.5 rounds of the cipher into independent parts – he can do so
since the diffusion is incomplete. Then, as in the rebound attack, he tries to match
the differences but now, instead of going 1-round-forward and 1-round-backward,
he can use 1.5-round-forward and 1.5-round-backward and instead of byte-wise
matching, he uses bigger S-boxes (e.g. word-oriented).
3.3 Local Collisions
The technique of local collisions was first used by Chabaud and Joux in the colli-
sion attack on the hash function SHA-0 [38]. It is a method of building efficiently
differential characteristic that can be used for collisions. The idea is to introduce a
difference in the state of the function at some round through the injected message
word, and then to cancel the further full-state expansion of this difference by in-
troducing differences in the message words of the following few rounds. After the
last local collision round, the state is free of differences.
In SHA-0, Chabaud and Joux considered a 6-round local collision, where in the
first round they put a difference in a single bit of the message word, and in the
next 5 rounds, differences in various bits of the message words. To build the char-
acteristic on the full hash function, they used local collisions starting at different
rounds. Note that is not possible to use only one local collision because of the mes-
sage expansion in SHA-0 – each message word is used a number of times through
the rounds of the function.
The local collision attack technique was applied for the first time to block ci-
phers in the recent attacks on the encryption standard AES [28, 29]. There, the
subkeys played the role of message words with differences. The local collisions for
AES consist of only two rounds.
3.4 Boomerang Attacks
After the invention of differential analysis, the designers of cryptographic primitives
put special attention on proving the resistance of the primitives against differential
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attacks. This was usually done by computing the upper bound on the probability
of the best trail for the cipher. If the upper bound is p, then the complexity of
producing a differential pair is around 1/p, hence when 1/p > 2n, producing the
pair requires more effort than a simple brute force and thus the trail cannot be used
for an attack. Wagner [139] showed that this method is not sufficient to prove the
resistance against differential attacks, and the designer also has to show that not
only the probability of the trail for the whole cipher has to be low, but also the
probability of round-reduced trails.
Let E be the analyzed cipher, and let E0, E1 be two subciphers of E such that
E = E1 ◦E0. Let∆→∆∗ be some differential trail for E0 that holds with probability
p and ∇ → ∇∗ be a trail for E1 with probability q. An attacker starts with a
pair of plaintexts (P1, P2) = (P1, P1 ⊕ ∆) and produces a pair of corresponding
ciphertexts (C1, C2) = (E(P1), E(P2)). By XORing ∇∗ to the pair, he obtains a new
pair of ciphertext (C3, C4) = (C1 ⊕∇∗, C2 ⊕∇∗), decrypts this pair, and gets the
corresponding pair of plaintexts (P3, P4) = (E−1(C3), E−1(C4)) (see Fig 3.3). Then
E0
P1
E1
C1
2
E1
C2
E0
P3
E1
C3
E0
P4
E1
C4
*
*
*
P
p
p
* *
q q
E0
Figure 3.3: The boomerang attack on cipher E = E1 ◦ E0
the difference P3 ⊕ P4 is ∆ with probability at least p2q2 since:
1. the difference E0(P1)⊕ E0(P2) is ∆∗ with probability p;
2. the differences E−11 (C1)⊕ E−11 (C3), E−11 (C2)⊕ E−11 (C4) are both ∇ with prob-
ability q2;
3. when 1), 2) hold, then the difference E−11 (C3)⊕ E−11 (C4) is ∆∗ (with proba-
bility pq2) and E−1(C3)⊕ E−1(C4) is ∆ with probability p2q2.
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The quartet of plaintexts (P1, P2, P3, P4) and corresponding ciphertexts (C1, C2, C3, C4)
such that P1⊕ P2 = P3⊕ P4 =∆ and C1⊕ C3 = C2⊕ C4 =∇∗ is called a boomerang
quartet. Producing such quartet for a random permutation requires around 2n,
hence when p2q2 > 2−n, the attacker has a distinguisher for the cipher.
27
Chapter 4
Preimage Attacks
The (second) preimage resistance of a cryptographic hash function plays a crucial
role in many applications of the function. Most of the so far published (second)
preimage attacks on hash functions, are purely theoretical, i.e. the complexities of
the attacks are lower than 2n function calls, but much higher than some practical
complexities in the range of up to 260 calls.
A common attack technique for finding preimages is the meet-in-the-middle
technique and its advanced variant splice-and-cut technique.
4.1 Meet-in-the-middle attacks
The meet-in-the-middle attacks (MITM) are used to find the values of some of the
inputs of a cryptographic primitive, when the rest of the inputs and the output is
fixed. Let G(x , y) be some cryptographic primitive (a compression function or a
block cipher). The MITM is used to solve the problem:
G(x , A) = B, (4.1)
i.e. to find an input x when the input y is fixed to A and the output is fixed to B.
The MITM can be applied only if G can be represented as a composition of
two primitives G1, G2, each having as an input some independent (of the other
primitive) bits of x , and G2 is invertible. Let x = (x1, x2, x3), where x1 (x2) are the
bits of x that are inputs only to G1(G2), and x3 are inputs to both G1 and G2. Then
(4.1) can be rewritten as:
G2(x2, x3, G1(x1, x3, A)) = B. (4.2)
If we take into account the invertible property of G2, we get:
G1(x1, x3, A) = G
−1
2 (x2, x3, B). (4.3)
Therefore, to find the solution x of (4.1) we have to find a value C such that
C = G1(x1, x3, A) = G
−1
2 (x2, x3, B), i.e. we have to search for a collision between the
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functions G1(x1, x3, A) and G
−1
2 (x2, x3, B). This search can trivially be performed
as follows (see Fig. 4.1). Let the intermediate value C have n bits. First we fix x3 to
some arbitrary value K . Then we generate sets S1 and S2 each as 2
n/2 evaluations
of G1(x1, K , A) and G
−1
2 (x2, K , B) at some arbitrary random points x1 and x2. Since|S1| · |S2| = 2n/2 · 2n/2 = 2n, with probability close to 1/2 the sets S1 and S2 have a
common element, which is the searched value C .
A G1 G2 B
x1 x3 x2
A G1 G2 B
x1 K x2* *
-1... ...C
Figure 4.1: The meet-in-the-middle attack
4.2 Splice-and-cut technique
The splice-and-cut technique [4], proposed by Aoki and Sasaki, has been success-
fully applied to find preimages for various cryptographic hash function [123, 124,
125, 126, 1, 127]. Although this approach has been applied only to hash functions
with compression functions based on block ciphers in the Davies-Meyer mode, i.e.
f (H, M) = EM (H)⊕ H, it can equally well be applied to functions based on some
other modes as well.
Splice-and-cut is built upon the meet-in-the-middle approach. As mentioned
above, one of the requirements of the MITM is the inversion property of G2. Since
f (H, M) is based on the Davies-Meyer mode, any decomposition of f (H, M) into
two functions would lead to the second function being non-invertible because of the
feedforward of H. The splice-and-cut technique divides the r round compression
function f (H, M) into three consecutive round segments: the first r1 rounds, the
next r2 rounds and the last r3 rounds (obviously r1+ r2+ r3 = r). The exact values
of ri are chosen such that the first and the third segment on one side and the
second segment on the other side have some unique independent input message
words (notice the similarity with the MITM requirements). Let M be the input
message and M = (m1, m2, m3), where m1 is being input only to the first and/or
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the third segment, m2 only to the second segment, and m3 to any. Let x be the
value of the internal state of f (H, M) after the first r1 rounds (at the beginning of
the second round segment), and y be the value after the first r1 + r2 rounds (at
the beginning of the third round segment). Let f1(H, m1, m3) be the function of
the first r1 rounds, f1(x , m2, m3) of the next r2 rounds, f3(y, m1, m3) of the last r3
rounds, and H∗ be the target preimage value. Then
x = f1(H, m1, m3) (4.4)
y = f2(x , m2, m3) (4.5)
H∗ = f3(y, m1, m3)⊕H. (4.6)
First we fix any values m˜3, y˜ for m3, and y . For the value of H from (4.6) we get
that H = f3( y˜ , m1, m˜3)⊕H∗. Therefore, from (4.4) and (4.5) we get:
f1( f3( y˜ , m1, m˜3)⊕H∗, m1, m˜3) = x (4.7)
f −12 ( y˜ , m2, m˜3) = x . (4.8)
To find a preimage for H∗ we only have to find a collision in x . Note that each
equation has an independent input – m1 in the first and m2 in the second. There-
fore, we can construct again the sets S1 and S2 as in the MITM attack and get the
required preimage.
30
Chapter 5
Various Distinguishers
The most widely used distinguishers are the differential distinguishers. However,
most of the new hash function/block cipher designs are built to stop these type of
attacks, i.e. after a reduced number of rounds the success probability of the differ-
ential distinguishers becomes negligible. Therefore, the cryptographic community
has found other types of distinguishers. Among them are the rotational and cube
distinguishers.
5.1 Rotational Analysis
Rotational distinguishers exploit the fact that some transformations produce ro-
tated outputs for rotated inputs. Let F be a transformation and (X , X ≪r) be a
pair of inputs for F , where ≪r is a cyclic rotation to the left by r bits. This pair is
called rotational if
F(X )≪r= F(X ≪r).
For this pair we say that F preserves the rotational property. The input and the out-
put of a transform can be a single word or a vector of words, i.e. X˜ = (X1, . . . , Xn).
Then, a rotational input/output pair is defined as (X˜ , Y˜ ), where Yi = X i ≪r , and
i = 1, . . . , n. A system Φ(X˜ ) that consists of the transformations F1, . . . , Fk preserves
the rotational property if it produces a rotational output pair for a rotational input
pair.
Two important issues have to be addressed. The first one – unlike in the differ-
ential analysis, where the adversary may introduce differences only in some part
of the input, in the rotational analysis, all the input pairs of words have to be ro-
tational. The second issue – there are only a few transformations that preserve
the rotational property for any input pair. In the majority of cases, for an arbitrary
input X , the condition F(X )≪r= F(X ≪r) holds with a probability pF . This prob-
ability is further called a rotational probability of F and it depends on the rotation
amount r. If we assume that the outputs of the transformations are independent, a
system Φ composed of transformations F1, . . . , Fk preserves the rotational property
with probability pΦ = pF1 · pF2 · . . . · pFk . Hence, in order to find the probability that a
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system preserves the rotational property, one only has to find the probabilities that
each instance of the underlying transformations preserves this property. For a ran-
dom system with n-bit output, the probability that a rotational input will produce a
rotational output is 2−n. Therefore, if a system Φ with n-bit output, has a rotational
probability pΦ > 2
−n, then this system can be distinguished from a random system.
5.2 Cube Attacks and Cube Testers
A cube attacks [49] is an algebraic method of cryptanalysis targeting block ciphers.
When applicable, it can lead to a key recovery. The main idea of cube attacks is
to find linear terms in the algebraic normal form of the output. If these terms are
bits of the secret key, then the attacker can easily solve the linear system and thus
recover the key bits.
The method works in two phases. In the first, so-called preprocessing phase,
given the description or a black box access to the cipher, the attacker tries to build
the algebraic normal form (ANF) for the output bits (the input variables x1, . . . , xn
are the bits of the key and the plaintext). However, it is reasonable to assume
that the explicit formula of the ANF, i.e. the number of monomials in the ANF, is
exponential in the number of input bits, hence the attacker cannot fully construct
ANF. Given a monomial t I that is a product of variables with indices from I , where
I ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, the ANF of some output bit can be represented as:
p(x1, . . . , xn) = t I · pS(I) + q(x1, . . . , xn), (5.1)
where pS(I) is called a superpoly of I in p and has no common variables with t I , and
q misses at least one variable from t I . The attacker, using various heuristics, tries
to find different t I ’s that have linear non-constant superpolies – these type of terms
are called maxterms of p. Note that if in (5.1) the attacker sums over all possible
values of the variables of t I , it can be shown that the right part of (5.1) becomes
equal to pS(I), while the value of the left part is known to the attacker. Hence,
when enough maxterms are available, the problem of recovering the key bits (the
one in pS(I)) is reduced to the problem of solving a system of linear equations. This
is done in the online phase, when the key is fixed and unknown to the attacker. He
queries the cipher with plaintexts in order to obtain the sum over all possible values
of variables of different maxterms (found previously in the preprocessing phase).
Once he gets the bits of the ciphertexts, he only has to solve the linear system of
equations to recover the key bits included in the maxterms.
Cube testers [6] are distinguishing type of attacks that further exploit some
properties of superpolies. As in the cube attacks, the adversary chooses various
t I ’s and gets their superpolies pS(I). Then he tries to show some distinguishing
property of these superpolies, i.e. the attacker tries to show that these superpolies
have some property that is not (easily) found in superpolies of a random func-
tion/permutation. Usually such properties are balance, constantness, low degree
and other. Cube testers are purely practical type of distinguisher, i.e. the attacker
can present the distinguishing property in feasible time and finding testers with
higher complexity is still an open problem.
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Part III
Differential Attacks on Hash
Functions
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Differential attacks play an important role in the analysis of cryptographic hash
function. The starting point of the attacks is finding a high probability differential
trail for the hash function or the underlying compression function. The search for
these trails is usually ad-hoc, i.e. there is no universal method applicable to any
function. Depending on the properties of the found trail, the attacker can launch
several distinct differential attacks:
1. When the differential trail for n-bit function ends with a zero difference, and
the probability of the trail is higher than 2− n2 , then the attacker can launch a
simple collision attack. Given a trail ∆I
2−t−→ 0 for an n-bit function F(x) the
attacker composes 2t pairs (F(X i), F(X i ⊕∆I). Then with a high probability
he can expect that in one of the pairs he will get a collision. Since t < n/2, he
finds this collision with an effort less than 2
n
2 , i.e. he has launched a collision
attack. Further, we present trails and collision attacks for the compression
functions of SHA-256 and LAKE. The attacks were published in:
• [109] Collisions for Step-Reduced SHA-256, FSE 2008
• [27] Cryptanalysis of the LAKE Hash Family, FSE 2009
2. When the trail has a probability higher than 2−n (but not necessarily higher
than 2− n2 ), then it can be used as a distinguisher for the function. Again
the attacker creates 2t pairs and finds one that follows the trail. On the
other hand, in a random function, he needs around 2n pairs to find one pair
that on the fixed input differences produces the fixed output difference. It
is important to notice that the estimate 2n for a random function holds only
when the input difference is fixed as well – otherwise the complexity drops
to 2
n
2 .
3. Two high probability trails on different halves of the function can be used in a
boomerang-type of attack. When the combined probability of these two trails
is higher than 2− n2 , then the attacker can create a boomerang distinguisher
(a boomerang quartet) with a complexity lower than 2n, which is the com-
plexity in the generic case. Further, we present the details for the boomerang
distinguisher on the SHA-3 proposal BLAKE. The attack is based on the work:
• [32] Boomerang Attacks on BLAKE-32, FSE 2011
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Chapter 6
Collisions for SHA-2
The SHA-2 family of hash functions was introduced to the cryptographic commu-
nity as a new, more complex, and hopefully, more secure variant of the MD4-family
of hash functions. The recent results on the widely used MD4-family hash func-
tions SHA-1 and MD5 [140],[141] show flaws in the security of these functions,
with respect to collision attacks. The question arises, if the most complex member
of MD4-family, the SHA-2 family, is also vulnerable to collision attacks.
Research has been made on finding local collisions for the SHA-2 family. Gilbert
and Handschuh [56] reported a 9-step local collision with probability of the differ-
ential path of 2−66. Later, Mendel et al. [97] estimated the probability of this local
collision to be 2−39. Somitra and Palash obtained a local collision with probability
2−42. Using modular differences Hawkes, Paddon and Rose [64] were able to find
a local collision with probability 2−39. Finding a real collision for SHA-2 was due
to Mendel et al [97]. They studied the message expansion of the SHA-256 and
reported a 19-step near collision.
We find a 9-step differential trail (we use modular differences) that holds with
probability 1
3
if we fix some of the intermediate values and solve the equations that
arise, i.e. if we use a message modification. We show that it is not necessary to
introduce differences in message words on each step of the trail. This helps us
to overcome the message expansion. Using only one instance of this differential
trails we find 20 and 21-step collisions (collisions for the original initial value)
with complexities of 3 and 219 compression function calls, respectively. Also, using
slightly different differential paths we are able to find a 23-step semi-free start
collision (collisions for a specific initial value) with a complexity of 221 calls. Our
final result is a 25-step semi-free start near collision with Hamming distance of 15
bits and 234 calls.
Our results were further improved by Indesteege et al [66]. They reported
24-step collisions for SHA-256 and SHA-512 with complexity of 228.5 and 253 com-
pression function calls, respectively. They were able to find as well free-start near-
collisions for 31-step reduced SHA-256.
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6.1 Description of SHA-2
SHA-2 family consists of iterative hash functions SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512. For our purposes, we will describe only SHA-256. The definitions of the
rest of the functions can be found in [136]. The SHA-256 takes a message of length
less than 264 and produces a 256-bit hash value. First, the input message is padded
so the length becomes a multiple of 512, and afterwards each 512-bit message
block is processed as an input in the Damgård-Merkle iterative structure. Each iter-
ation calls a compression function which takes for an input a 256-bit chaining value
and a 512-bit message block and produces an output 256-bit chaining value. The
output chaining value of the previous iteration is an input chaining value for the
following iteration. The initial chaining value, i.e. the value for the first iteration,
is fixed, and the chaining value produced after the last message block is proceeded,
is the hash value of the whole message. Internal state of SHA-256 compression
function consists of eight 32-bit variables A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, each of which
is updated on every of the 64 steps. These variables are updated according to the
following equations:
Ai+1 = Σ0(Ai) +Ma j(Ai , Bi , Ci) +Σ1(Ei) + Ch(Ei , Fi , Gi) +Hi + Ki +Wi
Bi+1 = Ai
Ci+1 = Bi
Di+1 = Ci
Ei+1 = Σ1(Ei) + Ch(Ei , Fi , Gi) +Hi + Ki +Wi + Di
Fi+1 = Ei
Gi+1 = Fi
Hi+1 = Gi .
The Ma j(X , Y, Z) and Ch(X , Y, Z) are bitwise boolean functions defined as:
Ch(X , Y, Z) = (X ∧ Y )∨ (¬X ∧ Z)
Ma j(X , Y, Z) = (X ∧ Y )∨ (X ∧ Z)∨ (Y ∧ Z).
For SHA-256 Σ0(X ) and Σ1(X ) are defined as:
Σ0(X ) = ROTR
2(X )⊕ ROTR13(X )⊕ ROTR22(X )
Σ1(X ) = ROTR
6(X )⊕ ROTR11(X )⊕ ROTR25(X ).
State update function uses constants Ki , which are different for every step. The
512-bit message block itself is divided in 16 32-bit words: m0, m1, . . . , m16. After-
wards, the message block is expanded to 64 32-bit words according to the following
rule:
Wi =
¨
mi , 0≤ i ≤ 15
σ1(Wi−2) +Wi−7 +σ0(Wi−15) +Wi−16, i > 15
For SHA-256 σ0(X ) and σ1(X ) are defined as:
σ0(X ) = ROTR7(X )⊕ ROTR18(X )⊕ SHR3(X )
σ1(X ) = ROTR17(X )⊕ ROTR19(X )⊕ SHR10(X ).
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Table 6.1: A 9 step differential trail for the SHA-2 family. Notice that only 5 differ-
ences are introduced, i.e. in the steps i, i+ 1, i+ 2, i+ 3, and i+ 8.
step ∆A ∆B ∆C ∆D ∆E ∆F ∆G ∆H ∆W
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
i+1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 δ1
i+2 0 1 0 0 -1 1 0 0 δ2
i+3 0 0 1 0 0 -1 1 0 δ3
i+4 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 1 0
i+5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0
i+6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
i+7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
i+8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 δ4
i+9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The compression function after the 64-th step adds the initial values to the chaining
variables, i.e. the hash result of the compression function is:
h(M) = (A64+A0, B64+B0, C64+C0, D64+D0, E64+E0, F64+F0, G64+G0, H64+H0).
These values become the initial chaining value for the next compression function.
6.2 Technique for Creating Collisions
Differences used in our analysis are subtractions mod 232 differences.
We use the following notation:
∆X = X
′ − X , X ∈ {A, B, D, D, E, F, G, H, W, m},
∆Ma j i(∆a,∆b,∆c) = Ma j(Ai +∆a, Bi +∆b, Ci +∆c)−Ma j(Ai , Bi , Ci),
∆Chi(∆e,∆ f ,∆g) = Ch(Ei +∆e, Fi +∆ f , Gi +∆g)− Ch(Ei , Fi , Gi).
∆Σ0(Ai) = Σ0(A
′
i)−Σ0(Ai)
∆Σ1(Ei) = Σ1(E
′
i)−Σ1(Ei)
∆σ0(mi) = σ0(m
′
i)−σ0(mi)
∆σ1(mi) = σ1(m
′
i)−σ1(mi)
We introduce perturbation (i.e. difference in the message word) on step i and in the
following 8 steps we try to cancel the differences in the internal variables. We use
the differential trail presented in Tbl. 6.1. As you can see from the table (column
∆W ), only the perturbation (the initial input difference of the local collisions) has
been fixed to 1. All the other differences are to be determined.
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6.2.1 Conditions for the Local Collision
From the definition of SHA-2, focusing on registers Ai+1 and Ei+1, we get:
∆Ai+1 −∆Ei+1 =∆Σ0(Ai) +∆Ma j i(∆Ai ,∆Bi ,∆Ci)−∆Di ,
∆Ei+1 =∆Σ1(Ei) +∆Ch
i(∆Ei ,∆Fi ,∆Gi) +∆Hi +∆Di +∆Wi .
We keep in mind that when ∆Ai = ∆Bi = ∆Ci = 0 then ∆Ma j i(0,0, 0) = 0. Also
when ∆Ei =∆Fi =∆Gi = 0 then ∆Chi(0, 0,0) = 0.
We fix the differences for the registers A and E (as shown in Tbl. 6.1). The variables
B, C , D, F, G, H can only inherit the values from A and E. So, for each step we get
some equations with respect to δi and Ai or Ei .
Step i+1. We have that ∆Di = 0, ∆Hi = 0, ∆Σ0(Ai) = 0, ∆Σ1(Ei) = 0. We
require ∆Ai+1 = 1, ∆Ei+1 = 1. So we deduce:
∆Wi = 1 (6.1)
Step i+2. We have that ∆Di+1 = 0, ∆Hi+1 = 0. We require ∆Ai+2 = 0, ∆Ei+2 =−1. We want also ∆Σ0(Ai+1) = 1 to be satisfied. So we deduce:
∆Ma j i+1(1, 0,0) = 0, (6.2)
∆Wi+1 =−1−∆Chi+1(1,0, 0)−∆Σ1(Ei+1). (6.3)
∆Σ0(Ai+1) = 1 (6.4)
Step i+3. We have that ∆Di+2 = 0, ∆Hi+2 = 0, ∆Σ0(Ai+2) = 0. We require
∆Ai+3 = 0, ∆Ei+3 = 0. So we deduce:
∆Ma j i+2(0,1, 0) = 0, (6.5)
∆Wi+2 =−∆Σ1(Ei+2)−∆Chi+2(−1, 1,0). (6.6)
Step i+4. We have that ∆Di+3 = 0, ∆Hi+3 = 0, ∆Σ0(Ai+3) = 0, ∆Σ1(Ei+3) = 0.
We require ∆Ai+4 = 0, ∆Ei+4 = 0. So we deduce:
∆Ma j i+3(0,0, 1) = 0, (6.7)
∆Wi+3 =−∆Chi+3(0,−1, 1). (6.8)
Step i+5. We have that ∆Di+4 = 1, ∆Hi+4 = 1, ∆Σ0(Ai+4) = 0, ∆Σ1(Ei+4) = 0.
We require ∆Ai+5 = 0, ∆Ei+5 = 1. So we deduce:
∆Chi+4(0, 0,−1) =−1. (6.9)
Step i+6. We have that ∆Di+5 = 0, ∆Hi+5 = −1, ∆Σ0(Ai+5) = 0. We require
∆Ai+6 = 0, ∆Ei+6 = 0. We want also ∆Σ0(Ei+5) = 1 to be satisfied. So we deduce:
∆Chi+5(1, 0,0) = 0. (6.10)
∆Σ1(Ei+5) = 1 (6.11)
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Step i+7. We have that ∆Di+6 = 0, ∆Hi+6 = 0, ∆Σ0(Ai+6) = 0, ∆Σ1(Ei+6) = 0.
We require ∆Ai+7 = 0, ∆Ei+7 = 0. So we deduce:
∆Chi+6(0,1, 0) = 0. (6.12)
Step i+8. We have that ∆Di+7 = 0, ∆Hi+7 = 0, ∆Σ0(Ai+7) = 0, ∆Σ1(Ei+7) = 0.
We require ∆Ai+8 = 0, ∆Ei+8 = 0. So we deduce:
∆Chi+7(0,0, 1) = 0. (6.13)
Step i+9. We have that ∆Di+8 = 0, ∆Hi+8 = 1, ∆Σ0(Ai+8) = 0, ∆Σ1(Ei+8) = 0.
We require ∆Ai+9 = 0, ∆Ei+9 = 0. So we deduce:
∆Wi+8 =−1. (6.14)
6.2.2 Solution of the System of Equations
Let us first observe (6.4) and (6.11). From the differential trail we can see that
∆Ai+1 =∆Ei+5 = 1. It means that we want the functions ∆Σ0(Ai+1),∆Σ1(Ei+5) to
preserve the difference 1, in other words:
Σ0(Ai+1 + 1)−Σ0(Ai+1) = 1,
Σ1(Ei+5 + 1)−Σ1(Ei+5) = 1.
The only solution to these equations is Ai+1 = Ei+5 =−1, so we get:
Ai+1 =−1, A′i+1 = 0, (6.15)
Ei+5 =−1, E ′i+5 = 0. (6.16)
Now let us consider the function ∆Ma j i = Ma j(A
′
i , B
′
i , C
′
i )− Ma j(Ai , Bi , Ci). Let
us suppose that B
′
i = Bi , C
′
i = Ci and Ai and A
′
i differ in every single bit, i.e.
Ai ⊕ A′i =0xffffffff. Then:
∆Ma j i = 0⇔ Bi = Ci
Therefore (6.2) gives us Bi+1 = Ci+1, which is Ai = Ai−1. With the same reasoning
we can deduce from (6.5) that Ai+2 = Ai , and from (6.7) that Ai+3 = Ai+2. Hence,
from (6.2),(6.5) and (6.7) we get:
Ai−1 = Ai = Ai+2 = Ai+3 (6.17)
Similarly to what we have done with Ma j, now let us consider ∆Chi and suppose
that F
′
i = Fi , G
′
i = Gi and Ei and E
′
i differ in every single bit. Then:
∆Chi = 0⇔ Fi = Gi
Therefore (6.10) and (6.16) gives us Fi+5 = Gi+5, which is:
Ei+4 = Ei+3 (6.18)
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Solving (6.12) requires slightly different reasoning; if we have Ei+6 = E
′
i+6, Gi+6 =
G
′
i+6 and Fi+6 and F
′
i+6 would differ in every bit (and they do, see (6.16)) then :
∆Chi+6 = 0⇔ Ei+6 = 0. (6.19)
Analogously, from (6.13) we get:
Ei+7 =−1 (6.20)
The only remaining condition is (6.9):
∆Chi+4 = Ch(Ei+4, Fi+4, G
′
i+4)− Ch(Ei+4, Fi+4, Gi+4) =−1, G ′i+4 − Gi+4 =−1.
The words Ei+4, Fi+4, Gi+4 are already determined to satisfy the previous condi-
tions. Therefore, we do not have any degrees of freedom left to control precisely
the solution of this equation. Therefore we will try to find the probability that this
condition holds. We can see that it holds if and only if register Ei+4 has 0’s in the
bits where G
′
i+4 and Gi+4 are different. The G
′
i+4 and Gi+4 can differ in the last
i bits, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 32., and these bits are uniquely determined. So, for the
probability we get:
i=32∑
i=1
P{Last i bits of Ei+4 are zero}× P{Difference in exactly i last bits}=
=
i=32∑
i=1
1
2i
1
2i
≈ 1
3
.
So, the overall probability of our differential trail (when certain conditions are sat-
isfied) is 1
3
= 2−1.58.
The differences in the message words of the differential as in Tbl. 6.1 are the fol-
lowing:
δ1 =−1−∆Chi+1(1,0, 0)−∆Σ1(Ei+1),
δ2 =−∆Σ1(Ei+2)−∆Chi+2(−1, 1,0),
δ3 =−∆Chi+3(0,−1,1)
δ4 =−1
Notice that the condition (6.17) shows us that Ai=Bi has to hold.
6.3 Full, Semi-free and Near Collisions for Step-reduced
SHA-256
Our attack technique is the following:
1. Introduce perturbation (difference) at step i;
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2. Correct the differences in the following 8 steps (probability of success is the
probability of our differential trail, i.e. 1
3
). After the last step of the differen-
tial trail (local collision), the differences in the internal variables are zero;
3. All the message words injected after the last step of the local collision have
to have zero differences;
6.3.1 20-Step Collision
In Tbl. 6.2 we can see that the words m5, m6, m7, m8, and m13 are used only once in
the first 20 steps of SHA-2, i.e. they are not used to compute the values of expanded
words W16, W17, W18, and W19. This means that the message expansion does not
introduce any difference after the last step of the differential trail. Hence, we get
collision for 20 step reduced SHA-2, and these collisions can be found practically
by hand. The complexity of finding a collision is 21.58 compression function calls.
6.3.2 21-Step Collision
From Tbl. 6.2 we can easily see that we have to consider the message expansion
since there are no message words that are used only once in the first 21 steps and
that have the proper indexes for the differential trail.
We will introduce differences in the words m6, m7, m8, m9, and m14. The words
m6, m7, m8 are used only once in the first 21 steps. Therefore the message expan-
sion in the first 21 steps is irrelevant with respect to these words, i.e. differences
in these words do not introduce any other new differences, after the last step of
the differential (step 14). Now, we want to find words m9, m
′
9, m14, m
′
14 such that
after the 14-th step, the message expansion will not introduce any difference in
the following steps. From Tbl. 6.2 we see that the words m9 and m14 are used in
W16, W18, and W20. So, from the definition of Wi we get the equations:
∆W16 =∆σ1(m14) +∆m9 +∆σ0(m1) +∆m0 = 0 (6.21)
∆W17 =∆σ1(m15) +∆m10 +∆σ0(m2) +∆m1 = 0 (6.22)
∆W18 =∆σ1(W16) +∆m11 +∆σ0(m3) +∆m2 = 0 (6.23)
∆W19 =∆σ1(W17) +∆m12 +∆σ0(m4) +∆m3 = 0 (6.24)
∆W20 =∆σ1(W18) +∆m13 +∆σ0(m5) +∆m4 = 0 (6.25)
Obviously if m
′
i = mi (W
′
i = Wi) then ∆σ0(mi) = 0 (∆σ0(Wi) = 0). This means
that ∆W17 =∆W19 = 0. If we can make so that ∆W16 = 0 then ∆W18 =∆W20 = 0.
Therefore, we get the equation:
∆σ1(m14) +∆m9 = 0 (6.26)
Considering that ∆m14 = δ4 = −1, and m9 can take any value, our experimental
results (Monte Carlo method with 232 trials) give us a probability of 2−17.5 that
∆m14 and ∆m9 satisfy this equation. Therefore, the overall probability of the dif-
ferential trail used for the 21-step collision is around 2−19.
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Table 6.2: Message expansion of SHA-2. There is an ’x’ in the intersection of row
with index i and column with index j if Wi uses m j .
W 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 x
1 x
2 x
3 x
4 x
5 x
6 x
7 x
8 x
9 x
10 x
11 x
12 x
13 x
14 x
15 x
16 x x x x
17 x x x x
18 x x x x x x x
19 x x x x x x x
20 x x x x x x x x x x
21 x x x x x x x x x x
22 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
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6.3.3 23-Step Semi-free Start Collision
For 23 step collision we introduce differences in the words m9, m10, m11, and m12.
If we want to follow our differential trail, then we are supposed to introduce dif-
ference in the message word W17. We cannot control W17 directly because it is an
expanded word. From the condition W17 = δ4 =−1 (differential) and the message
expansion, we get:
∆W17 =∆σ1(m15) +∆m10 +∆σ0(m2) +∆m1 =−1.
Since ∆m15 =∆m2 =∆m1 = 0, we get:
∆m10 =−1. (6.27)
In our original differential trail there are no message differences in the word W16.
But for W16 we have:
∆W16 =∆σ1(m14) +∆m9 +∆σ0(m1) +∆m0.
Obviously only ∆m9 6= 0 and therefore ∆W16 = ∆m9 = 1 6= 0. Therefore we shall
use slightly different differential trail – one with a difference in the word W16. To
keep everything else intact, the equations for the step 17 become the following:
∆E17 =∆Σ1(E16) +∆Ch
16(0,0, 1) +∆D16 +∆H16 +∆W16.
From the differential we can see that: ∆E17 = ∆Σ1(E16) = ∆D16 = ∆H16 = 0.
Therefore we get:
∆Ch16(0, 0,1) +∆W16 = 0. (6.28)
Now, let us observe the other words of the message expansion.
For W18 we have:
W18 =∆σ1(W16) +∆m11 +∆σ0(m3) +∆m2 = 0
Since ∆m3 =∆m2 = 0,∆W16 = 1 we get the equation:
∆σ1(W16) +∆m11 = 0. (6.29)
For W19 we have:
W19 =∆σ1(W17) +∆m12 +∆σ0(m4) +∆m3 = 0
Since ∆m4 =∆m3 = 0,∆W17 =−1 we get the equation:
∆σ1(W17) +∆m12 = 0. (6.30)
For W20 we have:
W20 =∆σ1(W18) +∆m13 +∆σ0(m5) +∆m4 = 0
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Since ∆W18 = ∆m13 = ∆m5 = ∆m4 = 0 we get that this equation is satisfied for
all values of W18, m13, m5, m4.
For W21 we have:
W21 =∆σ1(W19) +∆m14 +∆σ0(m6) +∆m5 = 0
Since ∆W19 = ∆m14 = ∆m6 = ∆m5 = 0 we get that this equation is satisfied for
all values of W19, m14, m6, m5.
For W22 we have:
W22 =∆σ1(W20) +∆m15 +∆σ0(m7) +∆m6 = 0
Since ∆W20 = ∆m15 = ∆m7 = ∆m6 = 0 we get that this equation is satisfied for
all values of W20, m15, m7, m6.
For W23 we have:
W23 =∆σ1(W21) +∆W16 +∆σ0(m8) +∆m7 = 0
Since ∆W21 = ∆m8 = ∆m7 and ∆W16 6= 0 we get that this equation has no solu-
tion. That is why we can not get more than 23 step collision.
Let us try to solve (6.27), (6.28), (6.29) and (6.30).
For (6.27) and the value of the register E11 from the trails’ conditions we have:
∆E11 =∆Σ1(E10)) +∆Ch
10(1,0, 0) +∆m10.
Since ∆E11 = m10 =−1 we get:
∆Σ1(E10) +∆Ch
10(1, 0,0) = 0.
We solve this equation by setting ∆Σ1(E10) = 1 and ∆Ch10(1,0, 0) = −1. The first
one has solution:
E10 =−1, E ′10 = 0. (6.31)
The second equation holds for the values:
F10 = G10 + 1. (6.32)
Now let us turn to the solution of (6.28). Using the fact that G16 =−1 and G ′16 = 0,
we get that this equation is satisfied if:
E16 = 0xfffffffe (6.33)
Let us observe the equation (6.30). From the conditions of the differential trail we
have:
∆E13 =∆Σ1(E12) +∆Ch
12(0,−1,1) +∆H12 +∆D12 +∆m12
Since ∆E13 =∆E12 =∆H12 =∆D12 = 0 we get:
∆Ch12(0,−1,1) +∆m12 = 0.
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If we substitute m12 from (6.30) we can get:
∆Ch12(0,−1,1) = ∆σ1(−1).
This equation can be satisfied if we can control E12 and F12.
For E12, from the definition of A12 and E12 we have:
A12 − E12 = Σ1(A11) + Ch(A11, B11, C11)− D11
Considering that A12 = A11 = C11 = D11 from the trails’s conditions, we get:
E12 = A9 −Σ1(A9)
Since A9 can take any value (we consider semi-free start collision) we deduce that
E12 can take any value.
The F12 value, which is E11 can be controlled through H10. Notice that changing
H10, which is G9, does not effect E10, because from (6.31) we can see that E10
always takes the arranged value.
We proved that we can fully control E12 and F12. We can choose some specific value
for ∆σ1(−1) which is possible to get from ∆Ch12(0,−1,1), and set the A9 and G9
so that the equation (6.30) will hold.
The last equation, i.e. (6.29), is satisfied for some specific values of W16 and m11.
Our experimental results show that with probability 2−19.5 W16 and m11 satisfy
(6.29). Therefore the overall probability of semi-free start collision for 23-step
reduced SHA-256 is around 2−21.
6.3.4 25-Steps Semi-free Start Near Collision
Let us assume that we have a semi-free start collision on the 23-rd step. Each fol-
lowing step introduces differences in the chaining variables A and E. The variables
B, C , D, F, G, H can only inherit differences from A and E. Therefore, for each step,
we should try to minimize the differences in A and E. When we say to minimize the
differences we mean to minimize the Hamming distances between A
′
and A, and
between E
′
and E.
Step 24.
min
W
′
23−W23=1
hd(E
′
24, E24) = min
W
′
23−W23=1
hd(C1 + 1, C1) = 1,
where C1 = Σ1(E23) + Ch(E23, F23, G23) +H23 + D23 + K23 +W23.
min
W
′
23−W23=1
hd(A
′
24, A24) = min
W
′
23−W23=1
hd(C2 + 1, C2) = 1,
where C2 = Σ0(A23)+Ma j(A23, B23, C23)+Σ1(E23)+Ch(E23, F23, G23)+H23+K23+
W23.
We have the minimal Hamming distances when C321 = C
32
2 = 0, which means with
probability 2−2.
Step 25.
min
W
′
24−W24=−1+∆σ0(1)
hd(E
′
25, E25) =
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=min hd(Σ1(E
′
24)+Ch(E
′
24, F24, G24)−1+σ0(m9+1)+C1,Σ1(E24)+Ch(E24, F24, G24)+σ0(m9)+C1),
where C1 = H24 + D24 + K24 +σ1(W22) +m8. If F3224 = 1 and G
32
24 = 0 (probability
2−2) then, considering that E ′3224 = 1, E3224 = 0, we have Ch(E
′
24, F24, G24) − 1 =
Ch(E24, F24, G24), and we can rewrite the last expression as:
min hd(Σ1(E
′
24) +σ0(m9 + 1) + C2,Σ1(E24) +σ0(m9) + C2),
where C2 = C1 + Ch(E24, F24, G24).
If no carry occurs due to the differences, then the above minimum is:
min hd(Σ1(E
′
24) +σ0(m9 + 1) + C2,Σ1(E24) +σ0(m9) + C2) = 5.
For Σ1(E
′
24) (difference in three bits) there are no carries with probability 2
−3.
For σ0(m9 + 1) (two differences if m329 = 0) with probability 2
−3. Therefore the
minimum is 5 with probability 2−8.
Using the same methods we can get:
min
W
′
24−W24=−1+∆σ0(1)
hd(A
′
25, A25) = 8,
with probability 2−11. Notice that if minimum holds for A25 then it holds for E25.
So, for the whole hash value, we have:
hd((A
′
25, B
′
25, C
′
25, D
′
25, E
′
25, F
′
25, G
′
25, H
′
25)), (A25, B25, C25, D25, E25, F25, G25, H25)) =
= hd((A
′
25, A
′
24, C25, D25, E
′
25, E
′
24, G25, H25), (A25, A24, C25, D25, E25, E24, G25, H25)) =
= hd(A
′
25, A25) + hd(E
′
25, E25) + hd(A
′
24, A24) + hd(E
′
24, E24) =
= 8+ 5+ 1+ 1= 15
Therefore we get a 25-step semi-free start near collision with the Hamming weight
of 15 bits and complexity of 234 SHA-2 compression function calls. Notice that we
have not investigated all the possible outcomes of the carry effects. Therefore, it is
possible that the real complexity is lower.
Conditions for Collisions and Collision Examples
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Table 6.3: The differences propagation for 20, 21, and 23-step collisions for SHA-
256. Notice that for each collision initial difference is introduced in different steps
(steps 5,6,9 respectively).
20 21 23 ∆A ∆B ∆C ∆D ∆E ∆F ∆G ∆H ∆W
step step step
5 6 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
6 7 10 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 δ1
7 8 11 0 1 0 0 -1 1 0 0 δ2
8 9 12 0 0 1 0 0 -1 1 0 δ3
9 10 13 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 1 0
10 11 14 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 -1 0
11 12 15 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
12 13 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 δ5
13 14 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1
14 15 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 6.4: The values of the word differences in 20, 21, and 23-step collisions for
SHA-256. Notice that 23-step semi-free start collision has a word difference in δ5.
That is why its collision path is slightly different than the one used for 20 and
21-step collisions.
20-step δ1 =−1−∆Ch6(1, 0,0)−∆Σ1(E6)
δ2 =−∆Σ1(E7)−∆Ch7(−1, 1,0)
δ3 =−∆Ch8(0,−1,1)
δ5 = 0
21-step δ1 =−1−∆Ch7(1, 0,0)−∆Σ1(E7)
δ2 =−∆Σ1(E8)−∆Ch8(−1, 1,0)
δ3 =−∆Ch9(0,−1,1)
δ5 = 0
23-step δ1 =−1
δ2 =−∆Σ1(E11)−∆Ch11(−1,1, 0)
δ3 =−∆Ch12(0,−1,1)
δ5 = 1
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Table 6.5: The additional conditions that have to hold in order to get a 20, 21, and
23-step collisions for SHA-256.
20-step A4 = A5 = A7 = A8 E9 = E8, E10 =−1, E ′10 = 0 ∆Ch9(0, 0,−1) =−1
A6 =−1, A′6 = 0 E11 = 0, E12 =−1
21-step A5 = A6 = A8 = A9 E10 = E9, E11 =−1, E ′11 = 0 ∆Ch10(0,0,−1) =−1
A7 =−1, A′7 = 0 E12 = 0, E13 =−1 ∆σ1(−1) +δ3 = 0
23-step A8 = A6 = A9 = A10 E13 = E12, E14 =−1, E ′14 = 0 ∆Ch13(0,0,−1) =−1
A10 =−1, A′10 = 0 E15 = 0, E16 =0xfffffffe ∆σ1(−1) +δ3 = 0
E9 = E8 + 1, E10 =−1, E ′10 = 0 ∆σ1(1) +δ2 = 0
Table 6.6: A 21-step collision for SHA-256
M0 0004024f 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 2c51fd8d b83daf3c bc852709
ae18a3e7 1d11dbc7 21d06175 ab551b5f
a48e9a8b 00000000 19000000 00000000
M
′
0 0004024f 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 2c51fd8d b83daf3d 7c652ab7
b238a344 1d11dac8 21d06175 ab551b5f
a48e9a8b 00000000 18ffffff 00000000
H 73f5fcd2 682f578e 8d9c3d05 f93ad865
662b0636 a5a5d4c2 32091775 04ac6dae
Table 6.7: A 23-step semi-free start collision for SHA-256
H0 cb518aaa 55d8f4ad 231e476a 89ac8889
f29c30cc 2e1f63c5 cf4f2366 75367200
M0 b5c16a2d 6da1708b 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 a9d5faeb 54eb8149 085be1ce
b9e61e60 9380ae01 efa5a517 cdc5da00
M
′
0 b5c16a2d 6da1708b 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 a9d5faec 54eb8148 085c0205
b9e61d61 9380ae01 efa5a517 cdc5da00
H 6682cc14 9c825293 bc17ea6d d89770cf
a69ac7ed cfa5ee3e e35c0091 7249d71e
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Table 6.8: A 25-step semi-free start near collision with Hamming distance of 17
bits for SHA-256.
H0 8e204f9e bca27aea 42da63d7 00f2f219
fd1db715 6389ae13 c6f57538 de4e655c
M0 c63714eb 13d5fa9c 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 d51b4dba aeb6f738 61dce9b7
0ab5c01a 83406f01 df65666b cdc5da00
M
′
0 c63714eb 13d5fa9c 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 d51b4dbb aeb6f737 71dd499a
0ab5bf1b 83406f01 df65666b cdc5da00
H 2e2fcb73 8192d3a4 f85b5a7d 801c4583
9307e51c cf57fb61 11c48b0d 7131ccd2
H
′
6c478ef3 8192d3a5 f85b5a7d 801c4583
9127a49c cf57fb62 11c48b0d 7131ccd2
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Chapter 7
Pseudo-Collisions for LAKE
The most widely used hash function construction – the Merkle-Damgård construc-
tion, has some undesirable security properties such as the long message second-
preimage attack found by Dean [47] and Kelsey-Schneier [73], and the herding
attack by Kelsey and Kohno [71]. Therefore, alternative methods for designing
hash functions from compression functions are greatly appreciated. One of these
methods is the HAIFA construction [19]. The hash function LAKE [10] was the
first hash based on the HAIFA design. It is a software-orientated hash that supports
256-bit and 512-bit outputs. It is supposed to be flexible, i.e. by increasing the
number of internal rounds of the compression function the security should also in-
crease. Important point is that LAKE is faster than SHA-2, which was considered to
be the unofficial new standard after the attacks of SHA-1 and MD5 [140, 141].
The first analysis of LAKE, collisions for 4 out of 8 rounds with complexity of
2109, was published by Mendel and Schläffer [99]. The main idea used in the
attack is the non-injectivity of one of the internal updating functions. This property
allows to introduce difference in message words which is canceled immediately
when the difference goes through the non-injective function. The authors show
that in slightly modified version of LAKE, where all constants are the same (not
necessary equal to zero), or the constants have some different but specially chosen
values, it is possible to find collisions for all 8 rounds. However, the unmodified
version of LAKE, cannot be attacked on more than 5 of the 8 rounds, when this
technique is applied.
Our attacks focus on finding pseudo-collisions in the compression function of
LAKE. In both of our attacks, we attack the full, unmodified compression function.
In the first attack we introduce differences in the chaining value and the block in-
dex, but not in the message words. In the second attack we introduce differences
only in the chaining values. These differences are canceled right after the first
round of the internal processmessage procedure, so the attack is applicable to any
number of rounds and its complexity stays the same. To cancel the differences, a
few equations with very similar structure are obtained. We were able to find good
algorithms for solving these equations and additionally decrease the total complex-
ities of the attacks. For finding a pseudo collision for LAKE-256, with differences
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in the initial value and the block index, the complexity of our algorithm is about
233 compression function calls. Our second algorithm finds pseudo collisions in
LAKE-224 with difference only in the initial value, with complexity of 299 calls and
can be trivially extended to a pseudo collision attack on the whole hash design.
A pseudo collision attack on the compression function of LAKE was as well
presented in [27]. The attack utilizes differences in the chaining values and salt
and yields collisions with complexity 242 calls.
7.1 Description of LAKE
The hash function family LAKE supports two basic variants: LAKE-256 and LAKE-
512. Other digest variants are obtained by truncation of the basic variants. Further,
we will describe only LAKE-256; the definition of LAKE-512 can be found in [10].
The variants differ only in the word size, constants used and rotation parameters.
LAKE is based on HAIFA design. It takes a message and a salt as an input, and
outputs 256-bit hash. First, the standard padding is applied to the message, then
the message is divided into 512-bit blocks, and each block is processed, iteratively,
by the compression function of LAKE. This function takes the previous chaining
value hl−1, the current message block Ml , the salt S, and the current block index t l
and outputs a new chaining value hl , i.e. hl = compress(hl−1, Ml , S, t l). The initial
chaining value is fixed. The output of the compression function processing the last
block of the message is the hash of the whole message.
Basically, all the transformations in the compression function are done by two
non-linear functions:
f (a, b, c, d) =[a+ (b ∨ C0)] + ([c+ (a ∧ C1)]≫ 7) + ([b+ (c⊕ d)≫ 13)
g(a, b, c, d) =[(a+ b)≫ 1]⊕ (c+ d)
All the operations are on 32-bit words. With + is denoted addition mod 232, ⊕ is
bitwise XOR, ≫ is cyclic rotation to the right, and Ci are constants.
The compression function itself, can be divided into three parts: initialization
(saltstate), internal round function (processmessage), and finalization (feedforward).
Further, you can find the pseudo-code of all three parts.
Initialization - Saltstate
input h= H0 ‖ H1 ‖ . . . H7, S = S0 ‖ . . . ‖ S3, t = t0 ‖ t1
1. for i = 0, . . . , 7 do
Li ← Hi
2. L8← g(H0, S0 ⊕ t0, C8, 0)
3. L9← g(H1, S1 ⊕ t1, C9, 0)
4. for i = 10, . . . , 15 do
Li ← g(Hi , Si , Ci , 0)
output L = L0 ‖ L1 ‖ . . . L15
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saltstate processmessage
8 rounds of
feedforward
hl−1
hl−1
S t M hl−1S t
Figure 7.1: The compression function for LAKE. Starting from left to the right, are
the three procedures: initialization, round function and finalization.
Round function - Processmessage
input L = L0 ‖ L1 ‖ . . . L15, M = M0 ‖ M1 ‖ . . . ‖ M15, σ
1. F ← L
2. for i = 0, . . . , 15 do
Li ← f (Li−1, Li , Mσ(i), Ci)
3. for i = 0, . . . , 15 do
Li ← g(Li−1, Li , Fi , Li+1)
output L = L0 ‖ L1 ‖ . . . L15
Finalization - Feedforward
input L = L0 ‖ . . . L15 h= H0 ‖ H1 ‖ . . . H7, S = S0 ‖ . . . ‖ S3, t = t0 ‖ t1
1. H0← f (L0, L8, S0 ⊕ t0, H0)
3. H1← f (L1, L9, S1 ⊕ t1, H1)
4. for i = 2, . . . , 7 do
Hi ← f (Li , Li+8, Si , Hi)
output h= H0 ‖ H1 ‖ . . . H7
In the processmessage procedure, σ(x) is a permutation. The exact definition of
this permutation, as well as the values of the constants can be found in [10]. The
additions in the indexes for Li , Hi , and Si are done mod 16, 8, and 4 respectively.
In short, first the chaining value is expanded, by the saltstate procedure, from 8
words to 16 words. This becomes the internal state. After that, the round function
is applied to the internal state 8 times (in the above algorithm of the round func-
tion, only one round is defined). At the end, the feedforward procedure is applied,
and the internal state is reduced into 8 words chaining value.
7.2 Analysis of LAKE
The input of the compression function of LAKE is the previous chaining value hl−1,
the message Ml , the block index t i , and the salt S. Our first pseudo collision attack,
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further referred as PSA1, finds two different chaining values h1 and h2 and two
different block indexes t1 and t2 such that:
compress(h1, M , S, t1) = compress(h2, M , S, t2), (7.1)
for some message block M and salt S. Notice that there are no differences in the
message words. The salt can be chosen freely.
Our second attacks, further referred as PSA2, finds two different chaining val-
ues h1 and h2 such that:
t runcr(compress(h
1, M , S, t)) = t runcr(compress(h
2, M , S, t)), (7.2)
where t runcr(x) is function that returns the last 224 bits of x (truncation to the
right) and M , S, t are some values. Hence, the second attack finds a near pseudo
collisions for the compression function with differences only in the first word of the
output. In a truncated version, like LAKE-224, this would mean a collision1.
The rest of the analysis has the following outline. First, we will point out some
properties of the non-linear functions used in LAKE. Using these properties we will
launch the first pseudo collision attack PSA1 for the middle building block of the
compression function, the processmessage function, and then we will extend the
attack to the saltstate and feedforward functions as well. Further, we will find the
solutions for the equations we get in the meantime, and we will estimate the total
complexity of the attack. In a similar way as the first attack PSA1, we will present
the second pseudo collision attack PSA2.
7.2.1 Simple Observations
From the design of LAKE, few simple observations follow. These observations are
directly used in the attacks of the compression function.
Observation 1 Function f (x , y, z, t) is non-injective by the first three arguments
x , y, z.
For example, for x there exist different values x1,x2 such that f (x1, y, z, t) =
f (x2, y, z, t) for some y, z, t. The same property holds for y and z.
This observation was mentioned by Lucks at FSE’08. Mendel and Schläffer
independently found and used this property to successfully attack four out of eight
rounds of LAKE-256. Non-injectivity of the function f can be used to cancel a
difference in one of the first three arguments of f , when the rest of the arguments
are properly fixed.
Observation 2 There is some non-symmetry when updating the state variables.
It is important to notice when the internal variables are updated one by one, by
the functions f and g, there are no temporary variables that store their previous
values. This is supposedly done in order to increase the diffusion. Yet, it leads to
1In the submission paper the truncation is to the left.
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some rather non-symmetrical situations. For example, when Li is being updated by
the function f , its new value depends, particularly, of the new value of the previous
variable Li−1. In other words, first Li−1 is computed, and then this value is used
to calculate the new value of Li . But, when L0 is updated by the function f , it
depends on the "old" value of L15, because L15 is updated last. Same holds when
the function g is used as an updating function. When Li is being updated by the
function g, its value depends, particularly, on the new value of previous variable
Li−1 and the old value of the next variable Li+1. But, when L15 is updated, it takes
the new value of the next variable, which is L0. This implies that the first and the
last variables are updated according to slightly different rules.
7.2.2 PSA1 on Processmessage Procedure
First, let us try to attack only the middle procedure of the compression function,
i.e. processmessage function. It consists of 8 rounds (10 rounds for LAKE-512).
In every round, first all of the 16 internal variables are updated by the function f ,
and then all of them are updated by the function g.
Let Ti be the updated, by the function f , value of the variable Li .
Let Ni be the updated, by the function g, value of the variable Ti (or same as up-
dated value of Li by both f and g).
Our attack strategy is the following (Fig. 7.3):
1. Let only L0 contain some specially chosen non-zero difference.
2. After the application of the function f we require zero differences in all the
variables except T0.
3. After the application of the function g we require zero differences in all the
variables.
Let us show that this scenario is possible. First let us prove that step 2 is achiev-
able. Considering that Ti = f (Ti−1, Li , Mi , Ci) we get that in Ti a difference can be
introduced only through Ti−1 and Li (message words do not have differences (7.1),
Ci are simply constants).
For ∆T0 we require non-zero difference:
∆T0 = f (L15, L
2
0, M0, C0)− f (L15, L10, M0, C0) 6= 0 (7.3)
Although in observation 1 we mentioned that the function f is non-injective by the
second argument, it is still easy to find different values for L0 that lead to different
values for f . The first argument of f is not T15 but L15 (as mentioned in the
observation 2).
For ∆T1 we require zero difference:
∆T1 = f (T
2
0 , L1, M1, C1)− f (T 10 , L1, M1, C1) = 0 (7.4)
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Figure 7.2: Differences in the variables for the PSA1 on processmessage. The
zero differences coming from Mi and Ci , as well as zero differences coming from
Fi(i > 0) are not shown.
By observation 1 it follows that it is possible to get zero for ∆T1.
For all other variables we require zero difference:
∆Ti = f (Ti−1, Li , Mi , Ci)− f (Ti−1, Li , Mi , Ci) = 0
Note that all the variables are the same, there are no differences in Ti , thus these
equations trivially hold.
Now, let us take a look at step 3. Again, considering that Ni = g(Ni−1, Ti , Li , Ti+1),
we get that in Ni a difference can be introduced by any of Ni−1, Ti , Li and Ti+1.
For ∆N0 we require zero difference, so we get:
∆N0 = g(T15, T
2
0 , L
2
0, T1)− g(T15, T 10 , L10, T1) = 0 (7.5)
Note that there are differences in two variables, T0 and L0, and even though g is
an invertible function, it is still possible to solve this equation.
For the indexes i = 1..14 we get:
∆Ni = g(Ni−1, Ti , Li , Ti+1)− g(Ni−1, Ti , Li , Ti+1) = 0 (7.6)
All the equations hold because there are no difference in any of the arguments.
For N15 we get:
∆N15 = g(N14, T15, L15, N0)− g(N14, T15, L15, N0) = 0
Notice that the last argument is not T0 but rather N0. This is where the observa-
tion 2 is applied. Non-symmetry allows us to get that this equation also holds if the
previous equations hold.
So, after only one round we can obtain an internal state with all-zero differ-
ences in the variables. But then, all the following rounds can not introduce any dif-
ference because there are zero differences in the internal state variables and zero
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differences in the message words (7.1). So, if we are able to solve the equations
that we got then this means that the attack is applicable to any number of rounds,
i.e. increasing the number of rounds does not improve the security of processmessage
function of LAKE.
Now let us take a closer look at the equations that we got.
Equation (7.3) can be rewritten as:
∆T0 = f (L15, L
2
0, M0, C0)− f (L15, L10, M0, C0) =
= (L20 ∨ C0)− (L10 ∨ C0) + [L20 + (M0 ⊕ C0)] 13− [L10 + (M0 ⊕ C0)] 13
Here and further we will use that (A+B) r = (A r)+(B r) with probability
around 1
4
(same holds when shift to the left is used). Therefore the above equation
can be rewritten as:
∆T0 = (L
2
0 ∨ C0)− (L10 ∨ C0) + L20  13− L10  13 (7.7)
Equation (7.4) can be written as:
∆T1 = f (T
2
0 , L1, M1, C1)− f (T 10 , L1, M1, C1) =
=T 20 − T 10 + [M1 + (T 20 ∧ C1)] 7− [M1 + (T 10 ∧ C1)] 7=
=T 20 − T 10 + (T 20 ∧ C1) 7− (T 10 ∧ C1) 7= 0
Equation (7.5) can be written as:
∆N0 =g(T15, T
2
0 , L
2
0, T1)− g(T15, T 10 , L10, T1) =
=[(T15 + T
2
0 ) 1g]⊕ (L20 + T1)− [(T15 + T 10 )≫ 1]⊕ (L10 + T1) = 0
The details of solving these equations are presented in Section 7.2.4.
7.2.3 PSA1 for the Full Compression Function
The designers of LAKE specifically stated that any attack on LAKE should be on the
whole design and not on the separate parts of the compression function. This way
the good properties of the HAIFA design are brought to the forefront. Therefore let
us try to attack the whole design. So far, if we assume that we can solve the previous
equations, we can get a pseudo-collision attack on processmessage function. Let us
try to extend the attack to the whole compression function. First, let us deal with
the initialization (function saltstate).
From the initialization of LAKE it can be seen that the variables H0 through H7
are straightforward copied into L0 through L7. The variable L8 depends on H0 and
t0. Similarly, L9 depends on H1 and t1. The rest of the variables do not depend
on the t0 or t1. Again, we can see some additional non-symmetry apart from the
already mentioned in the observation 2. Since we need a difference in L0 (for the
previous attack on processmessage function), we will introduce difference in H0.
Further we can follow our previous attack on the processmessage block and get
a collisions after the processmessage function. The only difficulty is how to deal
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with L8 since it does depend on H0 which now has a non-zero difference. To our
help comes the block index t0. By introducing a difference in t0 we can cancel the
difference from H0 in L8. So we get the following equation:
∆L8 = g(H
2
0 , S0 ⊕ t20, C0, 0)− g(H10 , S0 ⊕ t10, C0, 0) =
= ((H20 + (S0 ⊕ t20))≫ 1⊕ C0)− ((H10 + (S0 ⊕ t10))≫ 1⊕ C0) = 0
Let t˜20 = t
2
0⊕S0 and t˜10 = t10⊕S0. Then, the above equation gets the following form:
∆L8 = H
2
0 −H10 + t˜20 − t˜10 = 0
Now, let us deal with the last building block of the compression function, the final-
ization (feedforward). We keep in mind that we have differences only in H0 and
t0. If we take a glance at the feedforward procedure, we can see that H0 and t0
can be found in the same equation, and only there, which defines the new value
for H0. Since, we require zero difference in all of the output variables, we get the
following equation:
∆H0 = f (L0, L8, H
2
0 , S0 ⊕ t20)− f (L0, L8, H10 , S0 ⊕ t10) =
= t˜20  7− t˜10  7+ ( t˜20 ⊕H20) 13− ( t˜10 ⊕H10) 13= 0
This concludes our attack. We have shown that if we introduce a difference only in
the chaining value H0 and the block index t0, it is possible to reduce the problem
of finding pseudo collisions for the compression function to the problem of solving
a system of equations.
7.2.4 Solution of the System of Equations
To find a pseudo collision for the full compression function of LAKE, we have to
solve the equations that were mentioned in the previous sections. As a result, we
get the following system:
T 20 − T 10 + (T 20 ∧ C1) 7− (T 10 ∧ C1) 7= 0 (7.8)
T 20 − T 10 = (H20 ∨ C0)− (H10 ∨ C0) +H20  13−H10  13 (7.9)
[(T15 + T
2
0 ) 1]⊕ (H20 + T1)− [(T15 + T 10 ) 1]⊕ (H10 + T1) = 0 (7.10)
H20 −H10 + t˜20 − t˜10 = 0 (7.11)
t˜20  7− t˜10  7+ ( t˜20 ⊕H20) 13− ( t˜10 ⊕H10) 13= 0 (7.12)
Let us analyze (7.8). By fixing T 20 − T 10 = R, this equation can be rewritten as:
R+ [(T 10 + R)∧ C1] 7− (T 10 ∧ C1) 7= 0 (7.13)
If we rotate everything to the left by 7 bits we get:
[(T 10 + R)∧ C1]− (T 10 ∧ C1) = (−R) 7 (7.14)
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Figure 7.3: Differences in the variables for PSA1 on the full compression function.
The zero differences coming from Mi and Ci , as well as zero differences coming
from Fi(i > 0) are not pictured.
As a result, we get an equation of the following form:
(X + A)∧ C = X ∧ C + B (7.15)
where X = T 10 , A= R, B = (−R) 7, C = C1.
Now, let us analyze (7.9). Again, let us fix T 20 − T 10 = R and H20 − H10 = D. Then
(7.9) gets the following form:
R= ((H10 + D)∨ C0)− (H10 ∨ C0) + D 13 (7.16)
This equation can be rewritten as:
(X + A)∨ C = X ∨ C + B (7.17)
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where X = H10 , A= D, B = R− (D 13), C = C0.
In (7.10), if we regroup the components, we get:
[(T15 + T
2
0 )⊕ (T15 + T 10 )]≫ 1= (H20 + T1)⊕ (H10 + T1)
Then, the above equation is of the following form:
((X + A)⊕ X )≫ 1= (Y + B)⊕ Y, (7.18)
where X = T15 + T 10 , A= T
2
0 − T 10 , Y = T1 +H10 , B = H20 −H10 .
Now, let us analyze (7.11) and (7.12). Let us fix H20 − H10 = D. Note that then
from (7.11) we have t˜20 − t˜10 = −D. If we rotate everything by 13 bits to the left in
(7.12) we get:
(−D) 6+ ( t˜20 ⊕H20)− ( t˜10 ⊕H10) = 0 (7.19)
t˜10 = [( t˜
2
0 ⊕H20)− D 6]⊕H10 (7.20)
If we put this expression for t˜10 in (7.11) we get:
D+ t˜20 − [( t˜20 ⊕H20)− D 6]⊕H10 = 0 (7.21)
t˜20 = [( t˜
2
0 ⊕H20)− D 6]⊕H10 − D (7.22)
If we XOR the value of H20 to the both sides:
t˜20 ⊕H20 = ([( t˜20 ⊕H20)− D 6]⊕H10 − D)⊕H20 (7.23)
Let us denote t˜20 ⊕H20 = X . Then we get:
X = [(X − D 6)⊕H10 − D]⊕H20 (7.24)
X ⊕H20 = (X − D 6)⊕H10 − D (7.25)
Finally, we get an equation of the following form:
(X ⊕ K1) + A= (X + B)⊕ K2 (7.26)
where K1 = H20 , A= R, B =−R 6, K2 = H10 .
There exist efficient algorithms (we call them Al1,Al2,Al3,Al4) for finding so-
lutions for equations of type (7.15),(7.17),(7.18),(7.26). In the following lemmas
we prove there existence.
Lemma 1 There exist an algorithm (Al1) for finding all the solutions for the equation
of type (7.15). The complexity of Al1 depends only on the constant C.
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Lemma 2 There exist an algorithm (Al2) for finding all the solutions for the equation
of type (7.17). The complexity of Al2 depends only on the constant C.
Proof. The proofs for the two facts are very similar with some minor changes, so
we will prove only Lemma 1.
Let X = x31 . . . x1 x0, A= a31 . . . a1a0, B = b31 . . . b1 b0, C = c31 . . . c1c0. Then for each
i we have:
(x i ∧ ci)⊕ ai ⊕ t i = (x i ⊕ bi ⊕ ri)∧ ci , (7.27)
where t i = m(x i−1∧ci−1, ai−1, t i−1) is the carry at the (i−1)th position of (X∧C+A),
ri = m(x i−1, bi−1, ri−1) is the carry at the (i−1)th position of X+B, and m(x , y, z) =
x y ⊕ xz⊕ yz.
The equation (7.27), when ci = 0, gets the following form:
ai ⊕ t i = 0. (7.28)
When ci = 1, we get:
ai ⊕ t i = bi ⊕ ri (7.29)
Let us assume that we found the values for t i and ri for some i. We find the smallest
j > 0 such that ci+ j = 0. Then from (7.28) and the definition of t i we get:
ai+ j =t i+ j = m(x i+ j−1, ai+ j−1, t i+ j−1) =
=m(x i+ j−1, ai+ j−1, m(x i+ j−2, ai+ j−2, t i+ j−2)) = . . .
=m(x i+ j−1, ai+ j−1, m(x i+ j−2, ai+ j−2, m(. . . , m(x i , ai , t i)) . . .))
In the above equation, only x i , x i+1, . . . x i+ j−1 are unknown. So we can try all the
possibilities, which are 2 j , and find all the solutions. Let us denote by X˜ the set of
all solutions.
Now, let us find the smallest l > 0 such that ci+ j+l = 1. Notice that we can easily
find t i+ j+1 if considering ci+ j+l0 = 0 for l0 ∈ (0, l) and using (7.28):
t i+ j+1 =m(0, ai+ j , t i+ j) = m(0, ai+ j , ai+ j) = ai+ j
t i+ j+2 =m(0, ai+ j+1, t i+ j+1) = m(0, t i+ j+1, t i+ j+1) = m(0, ai+ j , ai+ j) = ai+ j
. . .
t i+ j+l =m(0, ai+ j+l−1, t i+ j+l−1) = ai+ j
From (7.29) and definition of ri we get:
ai+ j+l ⊕ t i+ j+l ⊕ bi+ j+l = ri+ j+l = m(x i+ j+l−1, bi+ j+l−1, ri+ j+l−1) =
=m(x i+ j+l−1, bi+ j+l−1, m(x i+ j+l−2, bi+ j+l−2, ri+ j+l−2)) = . . .
=m(x i+ j+l−1, bi+ j+l−1, m(. . . , m(x i , bi , ri) . . .))
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In the above equation, only x i , x i+1, . . . , x i+ j+l−1 are unknown. Hence we check
all the possibilities by taking (x i , x i+1, . . . , x i+ j−1) from the set X˜ and the rest of
the variables take all the possible values. If the equation has a solution, then this
means we have fixed another t i+ j+l , ri+ j+l , and we can continue searching using
the same algorithm.
The complexity of the algorithms is 2q, where q is size of the longest consecutive se-
quence of ones followed by consecutive zero sequence (in the case above q = j+ l)
in the constant C . Taking into consideration the value of the constant C1 used in
the compression function of LAKE-256, we get that complexity of our algorithm for
this special case is 28. Yet, the average complexity can be decreased additionally if
first the necessary conditions are checked. For example, if we have two consecutive
zeros in the constant C1 at positions i and i + 1 then it has to hold ai+1 = ai . If
we check for all zeros, then only with probability of 2−10 a constant A can pass this
sieve. Therefore, the math expectancy of the complexity for a random A is less than
21.
Note that when ∨ function is used instead of ∧, than 0 and 1 change place. There-
fore, our algorithm has a complexity of 26 when C0 is used as a constant. Yet, same
as for ∧, early break-up strategies significantly decrease these complexities for the
case when solution does not exist. Again, the average complexity is less than 21.
Lemma 3 There exist an algorithm (Al3) for finding a solution for the following
equation:
((X + A)⊕ X ) 1= (Y + B)⊕ Y (7.30)
Proof. Instead of finding a solution with respect to X and Y we split (7.30) into a
system:
(X + A)⊕ X =−1 (7.31)
(Y + B)⊕ Y =−1 (7.32)
We can do this because the value of −1 is invariant of any rotation. We may loose
some solutions, but further we will prove that if such a solution exist then our al-
gorithm will find it with probability 2−2.
We will analyze only (7.31); obviously the second equation can be solved analo-
gously.
Let X = x31 . . . x1 x0, A= a31 . . . a1a0. Then for ith bit we get:
(x i ⊕ ai ⊕ ci)⊕ x i = 1,
where ci is the carry at (i − 1) position of X + A, i.e. ci = m(x i−1, ai−1, ci−1).
Obviously, the above equation can be rewritten as:
ai = ci ⊕ 1 (7.33)
For the (i+ 1)th bit we get:
ai+1 =ci+1 ⊕ 1= m(x i , ai , ci)⊕ 1= m(x i , ai , ai ⊕ 1)⊕ 1= (7.34)
=x iai ⊕ x i(ai ⊕ 1)⊕ ai(ai ⊕ 1)⊕ 1= (7.35)
=x i ⊕ 1 (7.36)
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So, we can easily find the value of x i for each i. When i = 31, x31 can be any. For
the case when i = 0, considering that c0 = 0, from (7.33) we get:
a0 = 1
Therefore, if a0 = 1 then (7.31) is solvable in constant time. The solutions are
X = A 1+ i232, i = 0, 1. Finally, for the whole system, we have that solution exist
if a0 = b0 = 1, which means with probability 2−2. 
Lemma 4 There exists an algorithm (Al4) for finding all the solutions for equations
of the following type:
(X ⊕ C) + A= (X + B)⊕ K (7.37)
Proof. We base our algorithm fully on the results of [115]. There, Paul and
Preneel show, in particular, how to solve equations of the form:
(x + y)⊕ ((x ⊕α) + (y ⊕ β)) = γ.
Let us XOR to the both sides of (7.37) A⊕ B ⊕ C and denote K˜ = K ⊕ A⊕ B ⊕ C .
Then, the equation gets the following form:
((X ⊕ C) + A)⊕ A⊕ B⊕ C = (X + B)⊕ K˜ .
For the (i+ 1)th bit position, we have:
k˜i+1 = si+1 ⊕ t i+1,
where si is the carry at the ith position of (X ⊕ C) + A, and t i is the carry at ith
position of X + B. From the definition of si we get:
si+1 =(x i ⊕ ci)ai ⊕ (x i ⊕ ci)si ⊕ aisi =
=(x i ⊕ ci)ai ⊕ (x i ⊕ ci ⊕ ai)si =
=(x i ⊕ ci)ai ⊕ (x i ⊕ ci ⊕ ai)(k˜i ⊕ t i)
From the definition of t i we get:
t i+1 = x i bi ⊕ x i t i ⊕ bi t i
This means that k˜i+1 can be computed from x i ,ai ,bi ,ci ,t i , and k˜i .
Further, we apply the algorithm demonstrated in [115]. The only difference is
that for each bit position we have only two unknowns x i and t i , whereas in [115]
have three unknowns. Yet, this difference is not crucial, and the algorithm can be
applied.
Our experimental results (Monte-Carlo with 232 trials), show that the probability
that a solution exists, when A, B, C and K are randomly chosen is around 2−12. 
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Now, we can present our algorithm for finding solutions for the system of equa-
tions. With Al1 we find a difference R (and values for T 10 , T
2
0 ) such that equation
(7.8) holds. Actually, for the same difference R many different solutions (T 10 , T
2
0 )
exist (experimental results show that when (7.8) is solvable then there are around
25 solutions). Then, we pass as an input to Al2 the difference R and we find a
difference D (and values for H10 , H
2
0) such that (7.9) holds. Again for a fixed R
and D many (H10 , H
2
0) exist. Experimentally for each random R and "good" D there
are around 210 solutions. Using Al3 we check if we can find solutions for (7.10),
i.e. we try to find T1 and T15. Notice, the input of Al3 are the previously found
T 10 , T
2
0 , H
1
0 , H
2
0 . If Al3 can not find a solution then we get another pair H
1
0 , H
2
0 (or
generate first new difference D and then generate another 210 pairs H10 , H
2
0). If Al3
finds a solution to (7.10), then with Al4 we try to find solutions for (7.11),(7.12)
where the input to Al4 are already found H10 , H
2
0 . If Al4 can not find a solution,
then we can take different pair H10 , H
2
0 (or generate first new difference D and then
generate H10 , H
2
0) and then apply first Al3 and then Al4.
7.2.5 Complexity of PSA1
Let us try to find the total complexity of the algorithm. We keep in mind that
when analyzing the initial equations we have used the assumption (A+ B) r =
(A r) + (B r), which holds with probability 1
4
(see [46]). In total, we used this
assumption 5 times. In the equation for ∆T0 we can control the exact value of M1,
so in total we have used the assumption 4 times. Therefore the probability that a
solution of the system is a solution for the initial equations is 2−8. This means that
we have to generate 28 solutions for the system. Let us find the cost for a single
solution.
The average complexity for both Al1 and Al2 is 21 steps. We confirmed ex-
perimentally that, for a random difference R, there exists a solution for Equation
(7.8) with the probability 2−27. So this takes 227 · 21 = 228 steps using Al1 and it
finds 25 solutions for Equation (7.8). Similarly, for a random difference D, there is
a solution for Equation (7.9) with the probability 2−27. Therefore, this consumes
227 · 21 = 228 steps and finds 210 pairs (H0, H0) for Equation (7.9). The probability
that a pair is a good pair for Equation (7.10) is 2−1 and that it is a good pair for
Equations (7.11) and (7.12) is 2−12. Thus, we need 21 · 212 = 213 pairs, which
we can be generated in 228 · 23 = 231 steps. Since we need 28 solutions, the total
complexity is 239. Note that this complexity estimate (a step) is measured by the
number of calls to the algorithms that solve our specific equations. If we assume
that a call to the algorithms is four times less efficient than the call to the functions
f or g (which on average seems to be the case), and consider the fact that the
compression function makes a total of around 28 calls to the functions f or g, then
we get that the total complexity of the collision search is around 233 compression
function calls.
Notice that when a solution for the system exists, then this still does not mean
that we have a pseudo collision. This is partially because we cannot control some
of the values directly. Indeed we can control directly only H10 , H
2
0 , t
1
0, t
2
0. The rest of
the variables, i.e. T 10 , T
2
0 , T1, T15 we will control through the message words Mi or
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with the input variables Hi , where i > 0. Since we pass these values as arguments
for the non-injective function f we may experience situation when we can not get
the exact value that we need. Yet, with overwhelming probability we can find the
exact values. Let us suppose we have a solution (H10 , H
2
0 , T
1
0 , T
2
0 , T1, T15, t
1
0, t
2
0) for
the system of equations. First we find a message word M0 such that f (L15, H10 , M0, C0) =
T 10 . Notice that L15 can be previously fixed by choosing some value for H7. Then
f (L15, H20 , M0, C0) = T
2
0 . We choose M1 such that [M1 + (T
2
0 ∧ C1)]  7− [M1 +
(T 10 ∧ C1)]  7 = (T 20 ∧ C1)  7− (T 10 ∧ C1)  7. This way the probability the
previous identity becomes 1. Then we find H1 such that f (T 10 , H1, M1, C1) = T1. At
last, we find M15 such that f (T14, L15, M15, C15) = T15. If such M15 does not exist,
then we can change the value of T14 by changing M14 and then try to find M15. An
example of a colliding pair found with PSA1 is given in Tbl. 7.1.
Table 7.1: Colliding pairs for the compression function of LAKE found with PSA1.
h0 63809228 6cc286da 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000540
h
′
0 ba3f5d77 6cc286da 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000540
M 55e07658 00000009 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000002 5c41ab0e
t0 0265e384 00000000
t1 aba71835 00000000
S 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
H 79725351 e61a903f 730aace9 756be78a
b679b09d de58951b f5162345 14113165
7.2.6 PSA2 on Processmessage Procedure
In PSA2 we introduce difference only in the chaining value H0. Hence, this differ-
ence after the saltstate procedure, will produce differences in L0 and L8. In the
first application of the processmessage procedure the following differential is used
(Fig. 4):
1. Let L0 have some specially chosen difference. Also, L8 has some difference
that depends on the difference in L0.
2. After the application of the function f only T0, T1, . . . , T8 have non-zero dif-
ferences
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3. After the application of the function g all Ni have zero differences
Again, we should prove that this differential trail is possible. Basically, we should
check only for the updates with non zero input differences and zero output differ-
ence (other updates hold trivially). Hence, we should prove that we can get zero
difference in T9 and Ni , i = 0, . . . , 8. Since f is non-injective it is possible to get a
zero difference in T9. For N0, . . . , N8 is also possible to get zero differences because
their updating functions g always have at least two arguments with differences
(check Fig. 4). Therefore, this differential is valid.
Now, let us write the system of equations that we require. Note that T 1i − T 2i =
δi , i = 0, . . . , 8.
f (L15, L
j
0, M0, C0) = T
j
0 , j = 1, 2 (7.38)
f (T j0 , L1, M1, C1) = T
j
1 , j = 1, 2 (7.39)
f (T ji−1, Li , Mi , Ci) = T
j
i , i = 2, . . . , 6, j = 1, 2 (7.40)
f (T7, L
j
8, M8, C9) = T
j
8 , j = 1, 2 (7.41)
f (T j8 , L9, M9, C9) = T9, j = 1, 2 (7.42)
g(T15, T
j
0 , L
j
0, T
j
1) = N0, j = 1, 2 (7.43)
g(Ni−1, T ji , Li , T
j
i+1) = Ni , i = 1, . . . , 7, j = 1, 2 (7.44)
g(N7, T
1
8 , L
1
8, T9) = g(N7, T
2
8 , L
2
8, T9) (7.45)
Let us focus on (7.44). This equation can be rewritten as:
(Ni−1 + T 1i )≫ 1⊕ (Li + T 1i+1) = (Ni−1 + T 2i )≫ 1⊕ (Li + T 2i+1) (= Ni)
Similarly, as in PSA1, we get the following equation:
((X + A)⊕ X )≫ 1= (Y + B)⊕ Y, (7.46)
where X = Ni−1 + T 2i , A = T 1i − T 2i , Y = Li + T 2i+1, B = T 1i+1 − T 2i+1. In Al3, we
have explained how to split this equation into two equations, ((X + A) ⊕ X ) =
−1,(Y +B)⊕Y=-1, and solve them separately. The solution X = A 1, Y = B 1
exists when LSB of A and B are 1. Hence, for Ni−1 and Li we get:
Ni−1 = (T 1i − T 2i ) 1− T 2i = δi  1− T 2i (7.47)
Li = (T 1i+1 − T 2i+1) 1− T 2i+1 = δi+1 1− T 2i+1 (7.48)
If we put these values in the equation for Ni we get:
Ni = (Ni−1 + T 2i )≫ 1⊕ (Li + T 2i+1) = δi  1≫ 1⊕δi+1 1 (7.49)
This means that we can split the equations of type (7.44) into two equations and
solve them separately. Also, from (7.47) and (7.48) we get that Ni = Li .
Now let us explain how to get two pairs that satisfy the whole differential. First,
by choosing randomly L10, L
2
0, L15, M0, L1, and M1, we produce a solution for the
67
0 ∆2000∆1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0000
f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f
δ2 δ8δ7δ3δ1δ0 0 0 0δ6δ5δ4 0 0 0 0
g g g g g g g g g g g g g g g g
0 00000 0 0 0000 0 0 0 0
L
T
N
Figure 7.4: Differences in the variables for the PSA2 on processmessage. Some of
the arrows that come from words with zero differences are not shown.
equations (7.38),(7.39), (7.43) and the split (7.44). Actually, we need to satisfy
only the split (7.44), i.e. N0 = (T 11 − T 21 ) 1− T 21 = δ1 1 − T 21 , because the
values of T j0 , T
j
1 , j = 1, 2 can be any, and finding a solution for (7.43) is trivial.
Then, by taking some M2 and L2 we produces T
j
2 = f (T
j
1 , L2, M2, C2), j = 1, 2.
Having the values of δ1 and δ2 we can find the new value of L1:
L1 = N1 = δ1 1≫ 1⊕δ2 1
Since we have changed the value of L1, then the values of T
1
1 and T
2
1 might change.
Therefore, we find another value of M1 such that the old values of T
1
1 , T
2
1 stay the
same. Note, that is is not always possible. Yet, with probability 2−2 this value can
be found. As a result, we have fixed the values of M1, L1, T
1
2 , and T
2
2 . Using the
same technique, we can fix the values of M2, . . . , M6, L2, L6, T
j
3 , T
j
7 , j = 1, 2 such that
(7.44) would hold for i = 2, . . . , 6. In short, the following is done. Let the values
of Ni−1, Mi , Li , T 1i , and T 2i be fixed. First we generate any T 1i+1 and T 2i+1. Then we
find the value of Li from (7.48). Then, we change the value of Mi . This way, the
values of T 1i , T
2
i stay the same, but now Ni+1, T
j
i , Mi , Li , T
j
i+1, j = 1,2 satisfy (7.44).
Now let us fix the right T 18 , T
2
8 such that:
f (T 18 , L9, M9, C9) = f (T
2
8 , L9, M9, C9) (7.50)
We try different M8, S0 (notice that the values of L
1
8, L
2
8 depend on L
1
0, L
2
0, and
S0), and create different pairs (T 18 , T
2
8 ). If this pair satisfies (7.50) and (7.47)
then we change M7 and L7 as described previously. Finally, we change M9 and
L9 so that (7.45) will hold. First, we find the good value of T9 from the equation
T9 = ∆2 1− L28 and than change M9 and L9 to achieve this value. As a result,
we have fixed all the values such that all equations hold.
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7.2.7 PSA2 on Full Compression Function and Its Complexity
After the Processmessage procedure, there are no differences in any of the state
variables. The feedword procedure, which produces the new chaining value, de-
pends on the initial chaining value, the internal state variables, the salt, and the
block index. Since there is difference only in the initial chaining value (only in H0),
it means that there has to be a difference in the new chaining value H0 (and only
there). If we repeat the PSA2 on processmessage with different input difference
∆1, we can produce a near collision with a low Hamming difference. Also, if we
attack the truncated digest LAKE-224, with first 32 bits being truncated, we can
find a real collisions for the compression function of LAKE-224.
Now, let us estimate the complexity of PSA2. For finding good random L10,
L20, L15, M0, L1, and M1 that satisfies the first set of equations we have to try 2
32
different values. For successfully fixing the correct Li , Mi , i = 1, . . . , 7, we have to
start with (22)7 = 214 different δ1. For finding a good pair (T 18 , T
2
8 ) that satisfies
(7.50) and (7.47) we have to try 227 · 232 = 259 different M8, S8. Hence, the total
attack complexity is around 2105 computations. If we apply the same reasoning
for computing the complexity in the number of compression function calls (instead
of computations) as it was done in the previous attack, we will get that the near
collision algorithm requires around 299 calls to the compression function of LAKE-
256. An advanced technique that successfully finds the values of Mi , can reduce
the complexity by factor of 214, hence the attack complexity will drop to 285 calls.
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Chapter 8
Boomerang Attacks on
BLAKE-32
The SHA-3 competition [105] will soon enter the third and final phase, by select-
ing 5 out of 14 second round candidates. The hash function BLAKE [8] is among
these 14 candidates, and it is one of the few functions that has not been tweaked
from the initial submission in 2008. Being an addition-rotation-xor (ARX) design,
BLAKE is one of the fastest functions on various platforms in software. Indeed,
among the fastest candidates, BLAKE has the highest published security level, i.e.
the best published attacks work only on a small fraction of the total number of
rounds. Few attacks, however, were published on the round-reduced compression
function and keyed permutation of BLAKE-32 (which has 10 rounds). In [67] Ji
and Liangyu present collision and preimage attacks on 2.5 rounds of the compres-
sion function of BLAKE-32. Su et al. [133] give a near collisions on 4 rounds with
a complexity of 221 compression function calls. However, one can argue that the
message modification they use, requires an additional effort of 264 (see Sec. 8.3).
Aumasson et al. [7], among other, present near collisions on 4 rounds of the com-
pression function with 256 complexity, and impossible differentials on 5 rounds of
the keyed permutation.
We show various boomerang distinguishers on round-reduced BLAKE-32. Our
analysis is based on the fact that BLAKE-32, being a keyed permutation, has some
high probability differential trails on two, three and four rounds. First, we use these
trails to build boomerang distinguishers for the round-reduced keyed permutation
of BLAKE-32 on up to 8 rounds. Then we extend the concept of boomerang distin-
guishers to compression functions. As far as we know, this is the first application of
the standard boomerangs to compression function. An amplified boomerang attack
applied to hash functions was presented in [69], however it was used in addition
to a collision attack. Our boomerang attacks, on the other hand, are standalone
distinguishers, and work in the same way as for block ciphers – by producing the
quartet of plaintexts and ciphertexts (input chaining values and output chaining
values). We also show how to obtain a simpler zero-sum distinguisher from the
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boomerang and present such distinguishers for 4, 5, 6 rounds of BLAKE-32. Our
final result is a boomerang distinguisher for 7 rounds of the compression function
of BLAKE-32. The summary of our results is given in Tbl. 8.
Although in this paper we focus on BLAKE-32, our attacks can be easily ex-
tended to the other versions of BLAKE. The attacks do not contradict any security
claims of BLAKE.
Table 8.1: Summary of the attacks on the compression function (CF) and the keyed
permutation (KP) of BLAKE-32.
Attack CF/KP Rounds CF/KP calls Reference
Free-start collisions CF 2.5 2112 [67]
Near collisionsa CF 4 221 [133]
Near collisions CF 4 256 [7]
Impossible diffs. KP 5 - [7]
Boomerang dist. CF 4 267 Sec. 8.3
Boomerang dist. CF 5 271.2 Sec. 8.3
Boomerang dist. CF 6 2102 Sec. 8.3
Boomerang dist. CF 6.5 2184 Sec. 8.3
Boomerang dist. CF 7 2232 Sec. 8.3
Boomerang dist. KP 4 23 Sec. 8.4
Boomerang dist. KP 5 27.2 Sec. 8.4
Boomerang dist. KP 6 211.75 Sec. 8.4
Boomerang dist. KP 7 2122 Sec. 8.4
Boomerang dist. KP 8 2206 Sec. 8.4
aThe attack assumes that message modification can be used anywhere in the trail.
8.1 Description of BLAKE32
The compression function of BLAKE-32 processes a state of 16 32-bit words repre-
sented as 4× 4 matrix. Each word in BLAKE-32 has 32 bits. In the Initialization
procedure, the state is loaded with a chaining value h0, . . . , h7, a salt s0, . . . , s3,
constants c0, . . . , c7, a counter t0, t1 as follows:
v0 v1 v2 v3
v4 v5 v6 v7
v8 v9 v10 v11
v12 v13 v14 v15
←−

h0 h1 h2 h3
h4 h5 h6 h7
s0 ⊕ c0 s1 ⊕ c1 s2 ⊕ c2 s3 ⊕ c3
t0 ⊕ c4 t0 ⊕ c5 t1 ⊕ c6 t1 ⊕ c7

After the Initialization, the compression function takes 16 message words m0, . . . , m15
as inputs and iterates 10 rounds. Each round is composed of eight applications of
the G function. A column step:
G0(v0, v4, v8, v12),G1(v0, v4, v8, v12),G2(v0, v4, v8, v12),G3(v0, v4, v8, v12)
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followed by the diagonal step:
G4(v0, v5, v10, v15),G5(v1, v6, v11, v12),G6(v2, v7, v8, v13),G7(v3, v4, v9, v14)
Gi , i ∈ {0, . . . , 7} depend on their indices , message words m0, . . . , m7 , constants
c0, . . . , c15 and round index r. At round r, Gi(a, b, c, d) is described with following
steps:
1 : a← a+ b+ (mσr (2i) ⊕ cσr (2i+1))
2 : d ← (d ⊕ a)≫ 16
3 : c← c+ d
4 : b← (b⊕ c)≫ 12
5 : a← a+ b+ (mσr (2i+1) ⊕ cσr (2i))
6 : d ← (d ⊕ a)≫ 8
7 : c← c+ d
8 : b← (b⊕ c)≫ 7,
where σr belongs to the set of permutations as specified in [8]. The Finalization
procedure in BLAKE-32 is depicted as:
h
′
0← h0 ⊕ s0 ⊕ v0 ⊕ v8
h
′
1← h1 ⊕ s1 ⊕ v1 ⊕ v9
h
′
2← h2 ⊕ s2 ⊕ v2 ⊕ v10
h
′
3← h3 ⊕ s3 ⊕ v3 ⊕ v11
h
′
4← h4 ⊕ s0 ⊕ v4 ⊕ v12
h
′
5← h5 ⊕ s1 ⊕ v5 ⊕ v13
h
′
6← h6 ⊕ s2 ⊕ v6 ⊕ v14
h
′
7← h7 ⊕ s3 ⊕ v7 ⊕ v15,
where h0, . . . , h7 is the initial chaining value and v0, . . . , v15 is the state value after
ten rounds, and h′0, . . . , h′7 are the words of the new chaining value.
8.2 Boomerang Attacks on Block Ciphers and Com-
pression Functions
The boomerang attack [139] is a differential-type attack that exploits high prob-
ability differential trails in each half of a cipher E. When successful, it outputs a
quartet of plaintexts and corresponding ciphertexts with some fixed particular dif-
ferences between some of the pairs. This property can be used to distinguish the
cipher from a random permutation, and in some cases, to recover the key.
Let us decompose the initial cipher E into two ciphers E0, E1, i.e. E = E1 ◦
E0. Let ∆ → ∆∗ be some differential trail for E0 that holds with probability
p and ∇ → ∇∗ be a trail for E1 with probability q. We start with a pair of
plaintexts (P1, P2) = (P1, P1 ⊕∆) and produce a pair of corresponding ciphertexts
(C1, C2) = (E(P1), E(P2)). Then we produce a new pair of ciphertexts (C3, C4) =
(C1 ⊕∇∗, C2 ⊕∇∗), decrypt this pair, and get the corresponding pair of plaintexts
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(P3, P4) = (E−1(C3), E−1(C4)). The difference P3 ⊕ P4 is ∆ with probability at least
p2q2: 1) the difference E0(P1)⊕ E0(P2) is ∆∗ with probability p; 2) the differences
E−11 (C1)⊕ E−11 (C3), E−11 (C2)⊕ E−11 (C3) are both ∇ with probability q2; 3) when 1),
2) hold, then the difference E−11 (C3) ⊕ E−11 (C4) is ∆∗ (with probability pq2) and
E−1(C3)⊕ E−1(C4) is ∆ with probability p2q2.
We would like to address a couple of issues. First, the boomerang distinguisher
can be used even in the case when it returns a pair (P3, P4) with a difference P3⊕P4
specified only in certain bits (instead of the full plaintext). When the difference
is specified in t bits (t < n), then the probability of the boomerang (in order to
be used as a distinguisher) should be higher than 2−t , i.e. p2q2 > 2−t . Second,
the real probability of the boomerang is pˆ2qˆ2, where pˆ, qˆ are so-called amplified
probabilities, defined as:
pˆ =
r∑
∆∗
P[∆→∆∗]2, qˆ =
r∑
∇
P[∇→∇∗]2. (8.1)
Since finding these values is hard, in some cases, we try to get experimental results
for the probability of the boomerang. We run a computer simulation, start the
boomerang with a number of pairs with some prefixed difference ∆, and count the
number of returned pairs that have the same difference ∆. Obviously the ratio of
the returned pairs to the launched pairs is the probability of the boomerang.
The main obstacle for applying the boomerang attack to compression functions,
is that in general, the compression functions are non-invertible. Hence, after ob-
taining the pairs (C3, C4) from (C1, C2), one cannot go backwards and obtain the
pair (P3, P4). One way to deal with this is to switch to amplified boomerang at-
tacks [72]. However, this type of boomerang requires internal collisions, hence in
the case when the underlying compression functions are double pipes, the attack
complexity becomes too high.
Indeed, the standard boomerang attack can be used as a differential distin-
guisher for a compression function F . The idea is to start the attack in the middle
of F and then go forward and backwards to obtain the quartets, thus escaping
the feedforward. Let F(H) be obtained from some invertible function f (H) with
a feedforward, for example Davies-Meyer mode F(H) = f (H) ⊕ H1. As in the
attack on block ciphers, the first step is to decompose f into two functions f0, f1
and to find two differential trails for f0 and f1 (further we use the same nota-
tion as in the attacks on block ciphers). We start with four states S1, S2, S3, S4 at
the end of the function f0 (beginning of f1) such that S1 ⊕ S2 = S3 ⊕ S4 = ∆∗ and
S1⊕S3 = S2⊕S4 =∇. From these states we obtain the initial states (input chaining
values) Pi
2 and the final states (output chaining values without the feedforward)
Ci , i.e. Pi = f
−1
0 (Si), Ci = f1(Si), i = 1, . . . , 4. Then with probability at least p
2q2
we have:
P1 ⊕ P2 =∆, P3 ⊕ P4 =∆
C1 ⊕ C3 =∇∗, C2 ⊕ C4 =∇∗.
1Indeed, F(H, M) = EM (H)⊕H, further we use f (H) = EM (H).
2The inputs Pi are vectors, i.e. Pi = (Hi , Mi).
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Extending the following attack to the whole compression function F is trivial – we
just have to take into account that Ci = f (Pi) = F(Pi) ⊕ Pi . For the boomerang
quartet (P1, P2, P3, P4) we get:
P1 ⊕ P2 =∆, P3 ⊕ P4 =∆ (8.2)
[F(P1)⊕ P1]⊕ [F(P3)⊕ P3] =∇∗, [F(P2)⊕ P2]⊕ [F(P4)⊕ P4] =∇∗ (8.3)
For a random n-bit compression function F , the complexity of finding a quartet
(P1, P2, P3, P4) with the above relations (8.2),(8.3), is around3 2n . Hence when
p2q2 > 2−n one can launch a boomerang attack and thus obtain a distinguisher
for F . The distinguisher becomes even more powerful if the attacker finds several
boomerang quartets with the same differences ∆,∇∗.
A zero-sum distinguisher, can be obtained based on the boomerangs. If in (8.3),
we XOR the two equations, we get:
0=[F(P1)⊕ P1]⊕ [F(P3)⊕ P3]⊕∇∗ ⊕ [F(P2)⊕ P2]⊕ [F(P4)⊕ P4]⊕∇∗ =
=F(P1)⊕ F(P2)⊕ F(P3)⊕ F(P4)⊕ (P1 ⊕ P2)⊕ (P3 ⊕ P4) =
=F(P1)⊕ F(P2)⊕ F(P3)⊕ F(P4)⊕∆⊕∆=
=F(P1)⊕ F(P2)⊕ F(P3)⊕ F(P4)
Finding a zero-sum distinguisher for a random permutation requires 2n/4 encryp-
tions. However, since we have the additional conditions on the plaintexts (the
XORs of the pairs are fixed), the complexity rises to 2n/2.
It is important to notice that to produce the quartet (for the boomerang or
the zero-sum boomerang) one has to start not necessarily from the middle states
(S1, S2, S3, S4). For example, one can start from two input chaining values (P1, P2) =
(P1, P1 ⊕∆), produce the values (S1, S2) = ( f0(P1), f0(P2)), then obtain the values
for the two other middle states (S3, S4) = (S1 ⊕∇, S2 ⊕∇), and finally get the two
input chaining values (P3, P4) = ( f
−1
0 (S3), f
−1
0 (S4)) and the four output chaining
values ( f1(S1)⊕ P1, f1(S2)⊕ P2, f1(S3)⊕ P3, f1(S4)⊕ P4). Clearly, the probability of
the boomerang stays the same. Starting from the beginning (or from some other
particular state before the feedforward) can be beneficial in the cases when one
wants to use message modification or wants to have some specific values in one of
the four states (as shown further in the case of BLAKE-32).
Round-reduced Differential Trails in BLAKE-32
Our attacks are based on the following round-reduced differential trails for BLAKE-
32.
Observation 1 A 2-round differential trail can be obtained in BLAKE-32 with prob-
ability 2−1.
3This holds only when the difference between the messages is fixed as well. Otherwise, the complex-
ity is only 2n/2.
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Table 8.2: Differential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 4 rounds of BLAKE-
32. On the left is the top trail, while on the right is the bottom trail of the
boomerang. ∆M is the message difference, while ∆Vi are the differences in the
state. In the left trail (top trail), ∆V0 is the starting difference of the trail, i.e.
∆V0 = ∆, and ∆V2 is the ending difference, i.e. ∆V2 = ∆∗. In the right trail (bot-
tom trail), ∆V2 is the starting difference of the trail, i.e. ∆V2 = ∇, and ∆V4 is
the ending difference, i.e. ∆V4 = ∇∗. The numbers 0,1,2, and 2,3,4, indicate the
rounds covered by the boomerang – the top trail starts at round 0 and ends after
round 1, while the bottom trail starts at round 2 and ends after round 3.
∆m ∆m
00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
R. ∆Vi R. ∆Vi
0 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 2 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1 1
1 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−1 2−1
2 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 4 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000
00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000 00010000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000
00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00000000
Observation 2 A 3-round differential trail may be obtained from the above described
two round differential trail with probability 2−s, where s = 6,7 or 8
The probability of the trails is proven in [32].
8.3 Boomerang Attacks on the Compression Function
of BLAKE-32
The high probability round-reduced differential trails in the permutation of BLAKE-
32 can be used to attack the compression function and find boomerang distinguish-
ers. However, due to the Initialization procedure, there are a few requirements on
the trails. First, since the block index is copied twice, the initial differences in v12
and v13, as well as the differences in v14 and v15, have to be the same. Second,
even in the case when the attacker has a trail with initial differences consistent to
the above requirement, if he uses message modification techniques in the higher
rounds of the trail, he might end up with inconsistent initial states. For example, if
the attacker uses some k-round trail and starts fixing the values of the state and the
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Table 8.3: Differential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 5 rounds of BLAKE-
32.
∆m ∆m
00000000 00000000 40000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
R. ∆Vi R. ∆Vi
0 00000000 40000000 00000000 00000000 2 00000800 80008000 80000000 80000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000800 80008000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 80808080 80000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00800080 80008000 80000000
2−1 2−7
1 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−2 1
2 00000000 40000000 00000000 00000000 4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00008000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00400000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00400000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−1
5 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000
00010000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00800000 00000000
messages at round k, and then goes backward, he can obtain two states with some
predefined difference (as the one predicted by the trail). However, the probabil-
ity that these two states are consistent with the Initialization procedure is 2−64 (if
v12⊕v13 = c4⊕c5 and v14⊕v15 = c6⊕c7). Note that if one of the states is consistent,
then the other one is consistent as well (if the attacker used trails with appropriate
initial difference). Therefore, using message modification techniques in later steps
of the trail is not trivial (without increasing the complexity of the attack). On the
other hand, the modification can still be used at the beginning because the attacker
starts with two states consistent with the Initialization procedure.
For the boomerang attack on 4 rounds of the compression function of BLAKE-32
we can use two trails each on 2 rounds (see Tbl. 8.2). Since the probability of these
trails is 2−1, the probability of the boomerang is 2−4. To create a quartet of states,
consistent with the Initialization procedure, we start with a pair of states (P1, P2)
that have a difference∆ (note that∆ does not have a difference in the "block index"
words) and consistent with the Initialization words v12, v13, v14, v15 in both of the
states, then go two rounds forward and obtain the pair (S1, S2). Then we produce
the pair (S3, S4) = (S1 ⊕∇, S2 ⊕∇) and go backwards two rounds to get the pair
of initial states (P3, P4). The probability that P3 (and therefore P4) is consistent
with the Initialization is 2−64. Also, from S1, S2, S3, S4 we go forward two rounds,
produce the outputs and apply the Finalization to get the new chaining values.
Note that Finalization is linear, hence the differential trail (with XOR difference)
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Table 8.4: Differential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 6 rounds of CF of
BLAKE-32.
∆m ∆m
00080008 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
R. ∆Vi R. ∆Vi
4 80088008 00000000 00080008 00000000 7 80008000 00000000 00000000 00000800
80088008 00000000 00000000 00000000 80008000 00000000 00000000 80000800
00080008 00000000 00080008 00000000 80808080 80000000 00000000 80000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800080 00008000 00000000 80000000
2−21 2−6
5 00000000 00000000 00080008 00000000 8 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−2 1
6 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 9 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−11 2−1
7 00880088 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 11011101 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 80088008 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000
00000000 00000000 00000000 80008000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
holds with probability 1. Therefore, we can produce the boomerang quartet with a
complexity of 4 · 24+64 = 270 calls to the 4-round reduced compression function of
BLAKE-32.
The boomerang attack on 5 rounds is rather similar. We only need one of the
trails to be on 3 rounds, instead of 2 (see Tbl. 8.3). Such a trail has a probabil-
ity of 2−8, hence the boomerang has a probability of 2−18 and the whole attack
(taking into account the Initialization) has a complexity of around 4 · 218+64 = 284
compression function calls.
For the boomerang attack on 6 rounds we will use two 3-round trails (see
Tbl. 8.4). However, we cannot use the optimal trails (the ones that hold with
around 2−7) because the starting difference in each such trail is inconsistent with
the Initialization procedure. Therefore, for the top trail of the boomerang we will
use a trail which has lower probability 2−34 but has no differences in any of the
"block index" words (v12, v13, v14, v15). For the bottom trail we can use an opti-
mal trail. The complexity of this boomerang distinguisher on 6 rounds becomes
4 · 22·34+2·7+64 = 2148 calls.
Note, for the bottom trail for 5 and the top trail for 6 round boomerangs (see
Tbl. 8.3,8.4), we did not use the best trails with probability 2−7, 2−21, but instead
used trails with lower probability (2−8, 2−34). We found that if we use the best
trails, then the boomerang does not work, most likely because of the slow diffusion.
We cannot get four states in the middle (after the third round), that have pairwise
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Table 8.5: Differential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 6.5 and 7 rounds of
CF of BLAKE-32.
∆m ∆m
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
80008000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
R. ∆Vi R. ∆Vi
0.5 00000000 80008000 00000000 00000000 3.5 00800880 c8088848 80440044 00008000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 80800880 488c0888 80040804
00000000 00000000 00000000 80008000 00000800 00008080 80808080 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80048040 08408840 00800000 80000000
2−3 2−43
1 00000000 80008000 00000000 00000000 4 80000000 00000000 80000800 80008000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000800 80008000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 80000000 80808080
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80008000 00000000 80000000 00800080
2−1 2−6
2 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 5 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−3 1
3 00000000 00000000 00000000 80008000 6 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00010001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00800080 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00800080 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−33 2−1
3.5 00010001 08000800 08000800 80088008 7 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
02000200 10111011 11111111 11101110 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000
00010001 00880088 80888088 88008800 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00080008 80088008 08000800 00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000
2−24
7.5 00000800 08000000 80000008 00110010
10010010 01101001 10110101 22222022
00800008 80080080 08808080 11001101
00000008 80080000 08800080 11001100
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∆∗ and ∇ difference (∆∗ is the end difference of the top trail). However, if we take
other trails, as the ones we have taken, the boomerang quartet can be obtained –
we confirmed this experimentally, by producing a boomerang quartet.
Each of the above attacks can be improved if we take into account the amplified
probabilities for the boomerang attack and if we use message modification. We can
obtain the amplified probabilities (and the total probabilities) of the boomerang
experimentally: we start with a number of plaintext pairs with the required differ-
ence ∆, and then check how many of the returned (by the boomerang) differences
are∆. Also, in the first round, for one side of the boomerang we use message mod-
ification, i.e. we pass this round with probability 1. Using these two approaches,
we got the following results: the boomerang on 4 rounds has a probability 2−1, on
5 rounds 2−5.2, and on 6 rounds 2−36. Hence, the attack complexity for 4 rounds
drops to 4 · 21+64 = 267, for 5 rounds to 4 · 25.2+64 = 271.2, and for 6 rounds to
4 · 236+64 = 2102 compression function calls. An example of boomerang quartet
for 6 rounds, with the first pair of plaintext consistent to the Initialization, while
only the difference in the second is consistent, and therefore obtained with around
4 · 236 compression function calls, is given in Tbl. 8.9. The complexities of the
boomerang distinguishers for 4,5, and 6 round are bellow 2128, therefore they can
be used as zero-sum boomerang distinguishers, i.e. P1 ⊕ P2 = P3 ⊕ P4 = ∆ and
F(P1)⊕ F(P2)⊕ F(P3)⊕ F(P4) = 0.
For the boomerang on 6.5 rounds, we use a top trail on 3 rounds (from 0.5 to
3.5) with 2−40, and a bottom trail on 3.5 rounds (from 3.5 to 7), with 2−50 (see
Tbl. 8.5). The complexity of producing the boomerang quartet is 4 · 22·40+2·50+64 =
2246 compression function calls. The probability of the first round in the top trail is
2−3, hence using message modification does not lower significantly the attack com-
plexity. However, computing the amplified probabilities can improve the attack.
Obviously, we cannot do this experimentally, as the probability of the boomerang is
too low – 2−2·40−2·50 = 2−180. Therefore, we cannot test for the whole 6.5 rounds,
but we can do it for a reduced number of rounds. We tested for only half round
at the end of the first trail (round 3 to round 3.5). We start with a pair of states
with a difference specified by the top trail at round 3 and go half round forward to
obtain a new pair of states. Then, to each element of the pair, we XOR the same
difference (the one specified by the bottom trail at round 3.5), and produce a new
pair states. Finally, we go backwards a half round, and check if the difference in
the pair is at the one we have started with. Note that the half round can be split
into four G functions, and for each of them the amplified probabilities can be found
independently. By doing so, we found that the amplified probability for this half
round of the boomerang is 2−26 instead of twice 2−33, i.e. 2−2·33 = 2−66. Another
low probability part of the boomerang is the top half round of the second trail –
round 3.5 to round 4 holds with 2−43. In this part we can use message modifica-
tion. We start at round 3.5 with four states that have pairwise differences ∆∗ and
∇. We go half round forward and obtain four states with pairwise differences as
specified by the bottom trail at round 4. To obtain such states we need 4 · 22·43 =
288. Once we have this half round boomerang, we can freely change the message
words that are not taken as inputs in this half round without altering the input
and the output values of the half round. Hence, we have 28·32 = 2256 degrees of
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freedom. From the middle states we can obtain the initial and final states (and the
chaining values). Therefore, the total complexity of the boomerang on 6.5 rounds
becomes 288 + 4 · 22·(3+1+3)+26+2·(6+1)+128 = 2184 calls. Note that unlike as in the
case of the boomerangs on 4 and 5 rounds, now the probability that the initial
states are consistent to the Initializationis 2−128 because we use message modifi-
cation in the middle rather than in the beginning. The bottom trail can easily be
extended for additional half round (see Tbl. 8.5) with probability 2−24. Therefore,
the boomerang on 7 rounds requires around 2184+2·24 = 2232 compression function
calls.
8.4 Boomerang Attacks on the Keyed Permutation of
BLAKE-32
Further we present boomerang attacks on the keyed permutation of BLAKE-32,
assuming that the key is unknown to the attacker. These attacks can be seen as
distinguishers for the internal cipher of BLAKE-32. The cipher takes 512-bit plain-
texts and 512-bit key, and after 10 rounds, outputs 512-bit ciphertext (we discard
the Initializationand Finalization procedures). Switching from the boomerangs for
Table 8.6: Differential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 6 rounds of KP of
BLAKE-32.
∆m ∆m
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
R. ∆Vi R. ∆Vi
0 80008000 80000000 80000000 00000800 3 80008000 00000000 00000000 00000800
80008000 00000000 00000000 80000800 80008000 00000000 00000000 80000800
80808080 80000000 00000000 80000000 80808080 00000000 00000000 80000000
00800080 80008000 00000000 80000000 00800080 00000000 00000000 80000000
2−6 2−6
1 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 4 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1 1
2 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 5 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−1 2−1
3 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 6 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00010000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00001000 00000000
00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000
00000000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
the compression function to the boomerangs for the keyed permutation has advan-
tages and disadvantages for the attacker. On one hand, the attacker is not con-
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cern any more about the Initialization procedure, and he can use any trails for the
boomerang. On the other hand, since the key is unknown, he cannot use message
modification techniques to improve the probability of the boomerang.
The boomerangs on 4 and 5 rounds of the keyed permutation of BLAKE-32 have
the same probability as in the case of compression function: 2−4 for 4 rounds, and
2−18 for 5 rounds. For 6 rounds, we can use two high probability trails (2−7, 2−7,
see Tbl. 8.6), and therefore, the probability of the boomerang is 2−28. If we take
into account the amplified probabilities, and fix the returning difference only in
128 bits (the words v1, v5, v9, v13) instead of in 512 bits, for the total complexity of
the boomerang attack we get 23 encryptions for 4 rounds, 27.2 for 5 rounds, and
211.75 for 6 rounds. These results were confirmed on a PC and a boomerang quartet
for 6 rounds is presented in Tbl. 8.8.
Table 8.7: Differential trails used in the Boomerang Attack on 7 and 8 rounds of KP
of BLAKE-32.
∆m ∆m
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
R. ∆Vi R. ∆Vi
1.5 80440044 00008000 80800880 48088848 5.5 80808000 80888080 c80c8008 80440044
488c0888 00040804 80000000 80800880 80040804 80800000 80888000 c8880088
80808080 80000000 00000880 00008080 80000000 00000800 00808080 80000080
00800000 80000000 00040040 88c00840 00800000 00048000 08408840 80800000
2−42 2−44
2 00000800 80008000 80000008 80000000 6 00008000 80000000 00000000 80000800
80000800 80008000 00000000 00000000 80008000 00000000 00000000 00000800
80000000 80808080 80000000 00000000 00808080 80000000 00000000 00000080
80000000 00800080 80008000 80000000 80808080 80008000 00000000 80800000
2−6 2−7
3 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 7 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
1 1
4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−1 2−1
5 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 9 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00010000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000
00000000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
2−24 2−30
5.5 00110010 00000800 08000000 80000008 9.5 08000000 80000008 80110018 00000800
22222022 10010010 01101001 10110101 01101001 10110101 32332123 10010010
11001101 00800008 80080080 08808080 80080080 08808080 19809181 00800008
11001100 00000008 80080000 00880080 80080000 08800080 19801180 00000008
The boomerangs for 7 and 8 rounds, are rather similar: for 7 rounds we use
two trails on 3.5 rounds (the first from round 2 to round 5.5, and the second from
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round 5.5 to round 9), and for 8 rounds, we just extend these trails for additional
half round (see Tbl. 8.7). The complexity of the boomerangs is 4 · 22·31+2·52 = 2168
for 7 rounds and 4 · 22·55+2·82 = 2276 for 8 rounds. Again, as in the case of 6.5-
round boomerang on the compression function, we can compute experimentally
the lower bounds on the amplified probabilities, by only testing the probability of
the first half round of the bottom trail. We get 2−48 instead of 2−2·44. Also, we can
fix the returning difference only in 256 bits, instead of 512 bits, and thus increase
the probability in the first half round of the top trail by a factor of 2−6 for 7 rounds,
and 2−30 for 8 rounds. Hence, the boomerang on 7 rounds requires at most 2122,
and on 8 rounds at most 2206 encryptions.
Examples of Boomerang quartets
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Table 8.8: Example of a boomerang quartet for 6 round-reduced keyed permutation
of BLAKE-32.
P1 7d8a1 f 02 206849ad 42413a50 d702 f a14 f acc9c67 11306e7c eba852eb 4 f 31 f 62 f
993e3958 bc426 f cc 55033261 b2ac26a9 6d f c2edd 32163c44 e f 989577 2d6d6bb4
P2 f d8a9 f 02 a06849ad c2413a50 d702 f 214 7acc1c67 11306e7c eba852eb c f 31 f e2 f
19beb9d8 3c426 f cc 55033261 32ac26a9 6d7c2e5d b216bc44 e f 989577 ad6d6bb4
P3 de971194 ae012c6a 4422 f 8ea f f f 2d41b 80a79b50 b1d61b36 f e8c23 f e a883 f a f 9
e1dab487 e4971a f 1 51d b f 40b 6e32 f b27 7c797796 19b156e9 16e0ac52 a12ee f cb
P4 5e979194 2e012c6a c422 f 8ea f f f 2dc1b 00a71b50 b1d61b36 f e8c23 f e 2883 f 2 f 9
615a3407 64971a f 1 51d b f 40b ee32 f b27 7c f 97716 99b1d6e9 16e0ac52 212ee f cb
P1 ⊕ P2 80008000 80000000 80000000 00000800 80008000 00000000 00000000 80000800
80808080 80000000 00000000 80000000 00800080 80008000 00000000 80000000
P3 ⊕ P4 80008000 80000000 80000000 00000800 80008000 00000000 00000000 80000800
80808080 80000000 00000000 80000000 00800080 80008000 00000000 80000000
M1 a0a28e67 1 f d77849 83d86d19 4a72bc82 3704 f 04d bb57c994 37612239 0 f 7ad68a
d f 14386d 4e2e05c7 55d1a87 f 187d8225 f cc527c5 96071c3e 4ae251d8 52de23 f 2
M2 a0a28e67 1 f d77849 83d86d19 4a72bc82 b704 f 04d bb57c994 37612239 0 f 7ad68a
d f 14386d 4e2e05c7 55d1a87 f 187d8225 f cc527c5 96071c3e 4ae251d8 52de23 f 2
M3 a0a28e67 1 f d77849 83d86d19 4a72bc82 3704 f 04d 3b57c994 37612239 0 f 7ad68a
d f 14386d 4e2e05c7 55d1a87 f 187d8225 f cc527c5 96071c3e 4ae251d8 52de23 f 2
M4 a0a28e67 1 f d77849 83d86d19 4a72bc82 b704 f 04d 3b57c994 37612239 0 f 7ad68a
d f 14386d 4e2e05c7 55d1a87 f 187d8225 f cc527c5 96071c3e 4ae251d8 52de23 f 2
M1 ⊕M2 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
M1 ⊕M3 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
M2 ⊕M4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
C1 928c1 f 77 3aa097 f 2 4d5589bb f 307e618 c8ea4ebc c63769d f 64e2b7ba f 2c76b2b
c909808a 672bcd f 3 260608d6 7de7ba36 749c4e7d ae f 2de f d b7d3318a 5080389e
C2 9948791c 21c19a0 f 8804e f ac d56588e4 c6 f 6b101 32456224 20c423d5 d f 0105 f e
33ee8883 23bde21d bed b2451 2c673c2 f b f 7d194d c f c78321 5ec259 f 9 a9c8786b
C3 928c1 f 77 baa097 f 2 4d5589bb f 307e618 c8ea4ebc c63769d f 64e3b7ba f 2c76b2b
c909808a 672bcd f 3 260608d6 7d67ba36 741c4e7d ae f 2de f d b7d3318a 5080389e
C4 9948791c a1c19a0 f 8804e f ac d56588e4 c6 f 6b101 32456224 20c523d5 d f 0105 f e
33ee8883 23bde21d bed b2451 2ce73c2 f b f f d194d c f c78321 5ec259 f 9 a9c8786b
C1 ⊕ C3 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
C2 ⊕ C4 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
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Table 8.9: Example of a boomerang quartet for 6 round-reduced compression func-
tion of BLAKE-32. Note that the initial states P1, P2 are consistent with the Initial-
ization.
P1 30841585 41abc330 447466d0 17ae8472 b94 f c56d e9cb678a 1d9d6e9e eb558123
66d322c2 23cbae19 52e9bb2a dd6b8 f 2b ea1cd197 678ad865 6594bdd4 81 f 42bc5
P2 b08c958d 41abc330 447c66d8 17ae8472 39474565 e9cb678a 1d9d6e9e eb558123
66d b22ca 23cbae19 52e1bb22 dd6b8 f 2b ea1cd197 678ad865 6594bdd4 81 f 42bc5
P3 f 3383666 710 f c071 1990 f 347 34475dd7 7d41ddc9 68e231ed ea9bba79 a4990860
d7ede8b5 f 1c0b054 1c754989 a0e95ceb 3d259 f 5 f 878b f f ae f 511b0 f d de f 26a26
P4 7330b66e 710 f c071 1998 f 34 f 34475dd7 f d495dc1 68e231ed ea9bba79 a4990860
d7e5e8bd f 1c0b054 1c7d4981 a0e95ceb 3d259 f 5 f 878b f f ae f 511b0 f d de f 26a26
P1 ⊕ P2 80088008 00000000 00080008 00000000 80088008 00000000 00000000 00000000
00080008 00000000 00080008 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
P3 ⊕ P4 80088008 00000000 00080008 00000000 80088008 00000000 00000000 00000000
00080008 00000000 00080008 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
M1 7670ae70 c6539713 373c66b6 3d4522c3 b66689d0 37ee4 f 5d 467de620 9aabd357
b6b3b13c c6d41a4c cb994b4c b79e16 f a 8a9d8079 9914ccb1 9c68b051 86d41e1e
M2 7678ae78 c6539713 373c66b6 3d4522c3 b66689d0 37ee4 f 5d 467de620 9aabd357
b6b3b13c c6d41a4c cb994b4c b79e16 f a 8a9d8079 9914ccb1 9c68b051 86d41e1e
M3 7670ae70 c6539713 373c66b6 3d4522c3 b66689d0 37ee4 f 5d 467de620 9aabd357
b6b3b13c c6d41a4c cb994b4c b79e16 f a 8a9d8079 9914ccb1 1c68b051 86d41e1e
M4 7678ae78 c6539713 373c66b6 3d4522c3 b66689d0 37ee4 f 5d 467de620 9aabd357
b6b3b13c c6d41a4c cb994b4c b79e16 f a 8a9d8079 9914ccb1 1c68b051 86d41e1e
M1 ⊕M2 00080008 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
M1 ⊕M3 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
M2 ⊕M4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 80000000 00000000
C1 3 f 432e f 6 5 f 89 f b80 7283d8c f 13731945 344d16 f 8 2203b3b5 74b3637e 52ed9169
e f cea8d b 32b84 f f c 57c f a772 2258156c 22696e f 4 53cb7ac6 3ab6294a ce58038c
C2 f 284e034 f 866e60d 1e52775 f f 6 f 764cb e f 09e2e8 da83b2d1 a4a869d1 f 22ee f b0
821c38c2 6da245e0 7b52665c 0 f 8ce3ba 7ed4c20c e f 76217d 77835c6d 184a17e3
C3 3 f 432e f 6 d f 89 f b80 7283d8c f 13731945 344d16 f 8 2203b3b5 74b2637e 52ed9169
e f cea8d b 32b84 f f c 57c f a772 22d8156c 22e96e f 4 53cb7ac6 3ab6294a ce58038c
C4 f 284e034 7866e60d 1e52775 f f 6 f 764cb e f 09e2e8 da83b2d1 a4a969d1 f 22ee f b0
821c38c2 6da245e0 7b52665c 0 f 0ce3ba 7e54c20c e f 76217d 77835c6d 184a17e3
C1 ⊕ C3 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
C2 ⊕ C4 00000000 80000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00010000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00800000 00800000 00000000 00000000 00000000
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Part IV
Tools for Automatic Search of
Related-Key Differential
Characteristics in Block
Ciphers
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It is hard to overestimate the importance of differential attacks to the analysis of block ci-
phers. The complexity of these attacks is tightly related to the probability of the differentials
used in the attack – the higher the probability of the differential, the lower the complexity
of the attack. Although a differential is a collection of differential characteristics (trails),
in practice, the attacker finds a single characteristic and uses it in the differential attacks
while assuming that the probability of the differential is the same as the probability of the
characteristic. Therefore, the task for the attacker is to find a high probability characteristic.
Quite often these characteristics are found by hand. When the attacker considers related-
key attacks, as opposite to the simple single-key attacks, then the search space increases
significantly. Therefore, it seems that automatizing the search of related-key characteristics
is beyond the reach.
In this part of the contribution, we show that for some large classes of block ciphers, au-
tomatic search algorithms can be built. We focus in particular on byte-oriented ciphers (such
as AES) and on DES-like ciphers. Although the underlying transformations in these primi-
tives are very distinct (the first type being byte-oriented, while the second is bit-oriented),
we show that a similar approach can be used to build tools that find the best (i.e. with the
highest probability) related-key differential characteristics in the ciphers. Interestingly, the
task of finding the best characteristics can be reduced to the following graph problem. First
the attacker builds, according to the underlying round transformation of the cipher, a di-
rected graph G where each edge has a weight. Then the task of finding the best related-key
characteristic on k rounds for the cipher is equivalent to the problem of finding a path in the
graph G of length k with a minimal weight. The graph problem can be solved using several
approaches:
1. Dynamic programming. First take all paths of length 1. If an end vertex (of a path)
has a degree greater than one, keep only the paths (incident to the vertex) that have
the lowest weight. Extend each such path for an additional edge and repeat the
process, i.e. for each end vertex with degree greater than one, keep only the paths
with lowest weight. After k iterations, all paths that are left have length k. Among all
such paths, take the one that has the lowest weight – this is the path of length k with
the minimal weight. The dynamic programming approach has a time complexity and
memory complexity (to store the intermediate paths) linear in the number of edges of
the graph G. The memory requirement is a big drawback for using this approach for
our purposes – the feasibility of dynamic programming is limited to the cases where
the number of edges does not exceed 232.
2. Matsui’s approach. Given the minimal weights w1, . . . , wk−1 of the paths with lengths
1,2, . . . k − 1, and some path with a weight w∗k of length k, one builds the minimal
weight path with length k by the following method. First, he takes a path of length 1
and checks if the weight does not exceed w∗k − wk−1. If it is less, then he extends the
path for an additional edge, i.e. he builds a path of length 2 with a weight w∗2. Again,
he checks if w∗2 < w∗k − wk−2. This process is repeated until the path with length k is
built. If the weight of this path is less than w∗k, then w∗k is updated with the weight of
the built path. If this method is repeated for all paths of length 1, then it will always
find the minimal weight path of length k. The weight check is introduced to cut off
the unnecessary extension of some paths. For example, if a path with length t has a
weight more than w∗k−wk−t , then to extend it to a path of length k one would need to
concatenate it with a path with a length k− t, hence add a weight of at least wk−t , and
therefore the total weight of the path on all k rounds would be greater than w∗k. The
time complexity of Matsui’s approach in the worst case is exponential in the number
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of edges. In practice, this approach can be feasible as shown further. It is important
to notice that the memory requirement is negligible (when the graph is built on the
fly).
3. The split approach. If the path of length k, has a minimal weight w, then there is an
edge in the path of a weight at most d w
k
e. Hence, when building the path one can
start with all possible edges that have a weight at most d w
k
e, and try to add k − 1
more edges such that the total weight of the path would not exceed w. Note that the
position of the minimal edge in the path is unknown, hence one should try all possible
positions. The time complexity of the split approach in the worst case is exponential
in the number of edges, while the memory complexity is negligible (when the graph
is built on the fly).
Further we show how to apply Matsui’s and the split approach, as well as a combina-
tion of the two approaches to the search of related-key differential characteristics in the
mentioned above ciphers. The results presented in this contribution were published in the
following papers:
• [30] Automatic Search for Related-Key Differential Characteristics in Byte-Oriented
Block Ciphers: Application to AES, Camellia, Khazad and Others, EUROCRYPT
2010
• [108] Tweaking AES, SAC 2010
• [31] Search for Related-key Differential Characteristics in DES-like ciphers, FSE
2011
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Chapter 9
The Search in Byte-oriented
Ciphers
Proving the security of modern block ciphers against differential [22] and linear cryptanaly-
sis [92], i.e. finding the best differential and linear characteristics, has become a well under-
stood and relatively simple task. Many of the modern ciphers are constructed as so-called
substitution-permutation networks (SPN) — they consist of layers of non-linear substitution
boxes (S-boxes) and diffusion layers built from linear or affine functions. The designer sim-
ply has to use diffusion layers with high (or maximal) branch number which is typically
achieved by using maximum distance separable matrices [43]. Using such diffusion layers
one can prove lower bounds on the number of active S-boxes for a certain number of inter-
nal rounds. The designer then picks the number of rounds for which the probability of the
best differential or linear characteristic is lower than 2−k where k is the key size of a cipher.
The resultant cipher is then provably secure against standard differential and linear attacks.
Such reasoning however holds only in the single key model, and does not extend to the
case of related-key attacks [16]. In this class of cryptanalytic attacks the attacker knows
or chooses the relation between several keys and is given access to encryption/decryption
functions with all these keys. The goal of the attacker is to find the actual keys. The relation
between the secret keys is a function chosen by the attacker with some extra care taken
to avoid trivial attacks, and quite often it is just a XOR with a chosen constant. Security
of most modern block ciphers against related-key attacks still relies on heuristic and ad hoc
arguments. This situation is very similar to the heuristic security that we have for the modern
hash functions, which is due to a lack of proper tools and methodologies for the analysis of
differentials of non-bijective functions.
We make a step in the direction of provable security of modern block ciphers (and by
analogy of modern hash functions), by presenting an efficient tool that can evaluate and
help to prove bounds for the security of block-ciphers (hash functions) against differential
related-key (open-key or chosen message) attacks.
Automatic search for best differential characteristics and linear approximations in a sin-
gle key scenario was first performed by Matsui [93] for DES. Algorithms for automatic search
of differential characteristics for MD4 were presented in [128, 54], and for MD5 in [132].
De Cannière and Rechberger in [37] described a method that finds characteristics in SHA-
1 in an automatic way and produced the best known collision trails for SHA-1. A typical
problem that arises when trying to construct a tool for automatic search of characteristics
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is the size of the search space. The search space is exponential in the size of the block and
the key which makes straightforward approaches infeasible for 128-bit block 128-256 bit
key ciphers1. Therefore often the most important task for producing an efficient tool is the
reduction in the size of the internal state by using some equivalent representation of the
state, but with smaller size.
In that respect it is natural to look at byte (or word)-oriented ciphers which constitute
a large fraction of modern ciphers. A natural compact (sometimes known as truncated)
representation would shrink each byte into a single bit, representing by 0 a byte without
difference and by 1 a byte with a difference. In such a representation a 16-byte block state,
16-32 byte key would translate into 16 and 16-32 bits respectively. These numbers are low,
and give hope that a search of the whole 232 – 248 space of related-key differential char-
acteristics might be possible. The main problem with this representation is a very heavy
branching which will happen in the linear diffusion layers and on the XORs. Such repre-
sentation alone will only allow to search for the most basic and short characteristics which
happen with probability close to 1.
Our goal is to perform a full search for related-key differential characteristic and to be
able to find or to prove the non-existence of characteristics similar to those that were used
in the recent attack on AES-256 [29]. In this paper we achieve this goal for all versions of
AES and for several other ciphers. At the basis of our related-key search algorithm, further
denoted as a tool, lies Matsui’s approach for search of the best differential characteristics,
with several important modifications. Depending on the key schedule of a cipher, we dif-
ferentiate three classes of block ciphers. This is done to improve the efficiency. For each of
the classes we introduce a special modification to Matsui’s algorithm to obtain the final tool.
The internal representation of the difference in a cipher (state and subkeys) plays a very im-
portant role for constructing a feasible tool. Using only compact representation may lead to
a high branching (caused by XORs or other linear-diffusion transforms such as MixColumns
in AES) when trying to build all possible one round characteristics. We completely eliminate
the branching in the state of a cipher by using a special representation that takes into account
the properties of the matrix used in the linear-diffusion layer. The related-key differential
characteristics produced by our tool, fix only the positions of the active bytes2. To produce
standard differential characteristics, i.e. characteristic with exact values of the differences in
the active bytes, one has to fix the byte differences corresponding to the possible transitions
of the differences trough the S-boxes.
We apply the tool to different byte-oriented block ciphers. The tool finds related-key
characteristics for the full-round ciphers, or if such characteristics do not exist, for the max-
imal number of rounds for which they exist. We provide the best possible differential char-
acteristics for all the versions of AES. For AES-128 it is on 5 rounds out of 10 (this also
means that AES-128 is secure against straightforward related-key attacks after 6 rounds).
For AES-192 it is on 9 rounds – three rounds short of the total 12 rounds. The characteristic
for AES-256 is on all 14 rounds, and it is the same characteristic (and the only one on 14
rounds) that was given in [29]. Then we present boomerang attack on AES-128 reduced
to 7 rounds, and improve the complexity of the best attack on AES-192 by a factor 27. We
analyze the version of Camellia without the FL functions, and where the rotation constants
in the key schedule are multiplies of 8. For this "byte-Camellia", the best related-key dif-
ferential characteristic is on 8 rounds (out of 18). Additionally, we launch a chosen-key
1Note that full search was feasible for 64-bit block cipher DES, due to its Feistel structure, which
reduces the search space to about 232.
2Note that while our characteristics allow certain flexibility in the values due to the compact rep-
resentation of differences – they are not truncated differentials since our goal is to find fully specified
differential characteristics, rather than just truncated characteristics.
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attack and find a characteristic on all 18 rounds of byte-Camellia. For Khazad first we find
a related-key characteristic on 7 rounds (out of 8), and then we show a boomerang attack
on 7 rounds, and a chosen-key attack on the full-round Khazad. For the ciphers FOX and
Anubis, we show that related-key differential characteristics cannot exist on more than 4-5
rounds. The summary of our results is given in Tables 9.1,9.2. Due to space limitations, we
will not describe the ciphers that we analyze, we refer the reader to [43, 2, 13, 70, 12], and
will use the original notation proposed by the designers in these papers.
Table 9.1: Summary of attacks on the ciphers examined in the paper
Cipher Attack/Result Rounds Data Workload Reference
AES-128 Collisions 7 232 2128 [57]
Partial sum 7 2128 − 2119 2120 [52]
Impossible diff. 7 2112.2 2117.2 [90]
Boomerang - RK 7 297 297 Sect. 9.2.2
AES-192 Rectangle - RK 9 264 2143 [62]
Rectangle - RK 10 2125 2182 [81]
Boomerang - RK 12 2123 2176 [28]
Boomerang - RK 12 2116 2169 Sect. 9.2.3
AES-256 Rectangle - RK 10 2114 2173 [20, 81]
Subkey Diff. 10 248 249 [26]
Differential - RK 14 2131 2131 [29]
Boomerang - RK 14 299.5 299.5 [28]
Camellia-128 Impossible 11 2118 2126 [91]
byte-Camellia-128 Chosen-key dist. 18 26·17 26·17 Sect. 9.3.2
Khazad Slide attacka 5 298 2104 [24]
Integral 5 264 291 [103]
Boomeranga - RK 7 250 250 Sect. 9.4.2
Chosen-key dist. 8 255 255 Sect. 9.4.3
aThe attack works for a weak key class, and the workload includes the effort to find related keys
from the class.
Table 9.2: The upper bounds on the probabilities of the related-key differential
characteristics for full or round-reduced ciphers examined in the paper. The prob-
abilities for a higher number of rounds are below 2−k, where k is the key size.
Cipher Rounds Workload Section
AES-128 5 2−6·17 9.2.2
AES-192 9 2−6·25 9.2.2
AES-256 14b 2−131 9.2.2
byte-Camellia-128 8 2−6·19 9.3.1
Khazad 7 2−5·19 9.4.1
bThe same characteristics as in [29].
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9.1 A Tool for Search of Related-Key Differential Char-
acteristics in Byte-oriented Ciphers
Related-key differentials, introduced by Biham in [16], unlike the traditional single-key
differentials that have a difference only in the plaintext, have a difference in the key as
well. A related-key differential is specified with two input differences: ∆P in the plain-
text and ∆K in the key, and an output difference ∆C in the ciphertext. A pair of plaintexts
(P1, P2) and a pair of keys (K1, K2) follow the related-key differential in the cipher EK(P), if
P1 ⊕ P2 =∆P , K1 ⊕ K2 =∆K and EK1(P1)⊕ EK2(P2) = ∆C . A popular technique to find lower
bounds on the probability of differentials is via finding probabilities of the best differential
characteristics. A related-key differential characteristic besides the differences in the key,
plaintext and ciphertext, also fixes the differences in the state and the subkeys after each
round of the cipher.
There are a couple of approaches to construct a tool for search of the best round-reduced
(related- or single-key) differential characteristics. One approach is using dynamic program-
ming. Let ∆X i ,∆Yj ,∆Zk be the differences only in the plaintext in the case of single-key,
or in both the plaintext and the subkeys in case of related-key differentials. First, all one
round characteristics ∆X i → ∆Yj are built, i.e. the attacker tries all possible starting dif-
ferences X i , and for each of them goes through one round of the cipher and obtains the
differences Yj . Distinct starting differences X i1 , X i2 can produce the same difference Yj . For
each Yj only the characteristics, that have the highest probability are left. Next, the attacker
builds again all one round characteristics Yj → Zk, for different Yj (but only those Yj that
were obtained in the first step). Again, for each Z j he selects only the characteristics that
have the highest probability. As a result, he had built the optimal two-round characteristics
X i → Yj → Zk. This procedure is repeated until the target n-round differential characteristic
is built. The time complexity of the dynamic programming approach is linear in the number
of one round characteristics, but it requires a lot of memory for storing the intermediate
round values ∆Y,∆Z , etc. That is why we will use the second approach, similar to the one
used by Matsui in [93] for finding the best differential and linear characteristics in DES. It
requires relatively small memory and the time complexity highly depends on the probability
of the best round-reduced differential characteristics. The algorithm works by induction: to
find the best n-round characteristic first it finds the best 1,2, . . . , n−1 round characteristics.
However, Matsui’s approach at some stage requires building all one round characteristics
– their number depends on the size of the search space. Thus a straightforward applica-
tion of Matsui’s search to modern ciphers would immediately fail but there is some hope
for byte-oriented ciphers if one switches to compact3 representations in which each byte is
replaced by a single bit: a byte with a difference, also called an active byte, is replaced by 1,
a byte without a difference — by 0. This means that the difference in n-byte cipher can be
represented as n-bit vector.
The compact representation seems optimal, yet several improvements to Matsui’s al-
gorithm are still required. Almost all byte-oriented ciphers are designed as substitution-
permutations networks (SPN), i.e. they have a layer of S-boxes (S-layer) and a linear diffu-
sion layer – a simple multiplication of the input by a matrix A (P-layer). When the S-boxes
are bijective (a property common to most ciphers developed in the last 15 years), then an
active byte stays active (and vice-versa) before and after the S-box. Hence, the S-layer
does not alter the compact representation. On the other hand, the P-layer can change the
number of the active bytes as well as their positions (depending on the exact values of the
3Often, this is called a truncated representation. We use the term compact to avoid confusion with
truncated differentials, since our tool finds standard differential characteristics, rather than truncated.
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differences in the active bytes, and the branch number of the matrix A) and therefore it
introduces a branching. Thus, besides the traditional compact representation, further de-
noted as S-value, we will introduce additional representation, called P-value. Indeed, the
difference in n-byte cipher will be represented as 2n-bit vector, where the first n coordinates
(bits) are the S-value coordinates, and the next n are the P-value coordinates. The P-value
of a difference is obtained when S-value goes through a P-layer and it is the same as the
previous S-value (see Fig.9.1 for clarification). For example, in AES, if the value of a dif-
ference of some column is (0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0) (i.e. there is a difference only in the second
byte of the column, the difference is of a type (0, x , 0, 0)T ) before the MixColumn, then af-
ter the MixColumn it is (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) meaning: A(0, x , 0, 0)T , where A is the MixColumn
matrix and x is an arbitrary non-zero byte value (i.e. it is a four-byte difference, obtained
when some column with a difference only in the second byte was multiplied by the MixCol-
umn matrix). Note that the representation can always be reduced to only S-value (although
often not uniquely). For example, the above vector (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) can be represented as
(1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0). The P-values reduce the branching as well: it is better to XOR two P-values,
then to reduce them to only S-values and then XOR them. For example, if we XOR two dif-
ferences (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) and (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) then the result can be (0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0) or
(0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0). On the other hand, if we first reduce them to only S-values, then we will
get the values (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0) and (1,1,1,1,0,0,0,0). Obviously, XOR of these two values
gives 24 possible outputs. In the states of the ciphers, after each transform, we will have
either only non-zero S-value or only non-zero P-value of a difference (but never both), and
hence we can effectively eliminate any branching in the state (the branching goes into the
key). However even in such representations the search space of 128-bit block, 256-bit key
cipher would be 16+32 bits, i.e. 248. Another complication is that if one would like to
search for differential characteristics rather than truncated differentials one will need to pay
in heavy branching at every XOR operation both in the state and in the key-schedule, which
makes the search completely infeasible. Hence, depending on the key schedule, we would
like to propose different variants of the tool to solve these problems:
1. The first variant is the original Matsui’s approach itself. It applies to ciphers that have
minimal branching4 in the key schedule, with subkeys consecutively obtained one from
another. This means that once the difference in the subkey Ki is fixed, the difference
in the subkey Ki+1 can easily and almost uniquely be determined. Let ∆X → ∆Y
be one round differential characteristic, where ∆X is the input difference in both
the state and the subkey, and ∆Y is the output difference, and let W (∆X → ∆Y )
be the weight function of this characteristic – the probability cost required to pro-
duce a pair that follows the characteristic (the exact definition of W is given later).
Let W1, W2, . . . , Wn−1 be the weights of the best 1,2, . . . , (n− 1)-round characteristic
found previously with the algorithm and let W˜n be the weight of some (not necessarily
optimal) n-round characteristic Dn. The search for the best n-round characteristic in
pseudo code is described in Alg. 13. In short, first the algorithm builds all possible
one round characteristics with a weight at most W˜n −Wn−1. This constraint is intro-
duced to filter some of the one round characteristics: if the weight of the first round
is more than W˜n −Wn−1 then it can not be extended to an n-round characteristic be-
cause the weight of n−1 rounds is at least Wn−1 so in total it will have a weight more
than the previously found characteristic of weight W˜n. Each of the good one round
characteristics (the one that pass the filter) is extended (when possible) to n rounds
by the NextRound procedure. One call of this procedure extends the characteristic by
one additional round. Again, it extends only the characteristics that satisfy the weight
4With regards to our representation.
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condition, by checking if the sum of the weights of the r and n− r characteristics is
not greater than the weight W˜n of the already known differential Dn.
2. The second variant of the tool is for ciphers that have possibly high branching in the
key schedule, with subkeys consecutively obtained one from another. A good example of
this type of key scheduling is the one in AES (subkey Ki+1 is obtained from Ki in one
iteration, but due to XORs in the key schedule, there is a lot of branching). If we try
to apply the variant 1 of the tool to this type of ciphers we would have to build all
one round characteristics (with differences in the state and the subkey). Yet, the high
branching in the subkey, blows the number of characteristic out of proportion, and
the search becomes infeasible. That is why we have to modify the tool for this special
case of ciphers. Let ∆Sr be the difference in the state of round r after the XOR of the
subkey Kr and let∆Kr be the difference in this subkey. To add one more round to this
characteristic one can proceed as follows:
• take ∆Sr and go through all one round transformations of the state to build
∆S˜r+1 which is the difference in the state of round r + 1 just before the XOR of
the subkey Kr+1
• take any ∆Sr+1
• XOR ∆S˜r+1 and ∆Sr+1 to produce ∆Kr+1
• check if ∆Kr+1 can be obtained from ∆Kr in one round.
This way, instead of building all one round characteristics in the subkey, we only
have to check if some subkey difference can be transformed to another difference
in one subkey round (see Fig. 9.1). The number of these transitions that has to be
checked is related to the size and branching of the state. Usually the state has smaller
size than the subkey, and with the right representation it can have minimal or no
branching, leading to a feasible search. Let ∆P be the plaintext difference, ∆Sr ,∆Kr
be the difference in the state and the subkey of round r, ∆S˜r the difference in the
state of round r just before the subkey XOR, W (∆Sr → ∆S˜r+1) the probability of
the characteristic ∆Sr → ∆S˜r+1. The notions of Wi are the same as in the previous
variant. For the sake of clarity we assume there is no whitening key. The variant 2 of
our search tool is described in Alg. 2.
011101
S-value P-value
000000
S-layer
011101 000000
P-layer
011101000000
110000 000000
S-value P-value
Sr
˜Sr+1
Sr+1
Kr+1 011101110000
Figure 9.1: The variant 2 of the tool with S- and P-value representations
3. The third variant of the tool applies to ciphers that have key schedule with subkeys
that are not successively obtained one from another. Usually, the key schedule of these
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ciphers applies heavy transformations to the master key to obtain another key, and
then combines these two keys (often with linear transformations) to get all subkeys.
To build the tool we will use the following strategy: 1) from the master key, obtain all
the subkeys, and 2) apply the first variant of the tool – build the characteristics for the
state, but use the obtained subkeys (instead of building characteristics for subkeys).
Let∆X
∆K−→∆Y denote one round characteristic where∆X ,∆Y are the differences in
the initial and final states, and ∆K is the subkey used in that round. The rest of the
notions are the one used in variant 1. The pseudo code of the third variant is given in
Alg. 3.
Algorithm 1 Search of n-round differential characteristics - Variant 1
for all {∆X →∆Y |W (∆X →∆Y ) +Wn−1 ≤ W˜n} do
Call NextRound(∆Y , W (∆X →∆Y ), 2)
end for
NextRound(∆Y , w, r)
for all {∆Z |∆Y →∆Z and W (∆Y →∆Z) +w+Wn−r ≤ W˜n} do
if r = n then
Update Dn
W˜n← w+W (∆Y →∆Z)
else
Call NextRound(∆Z , w+W (∆Y →∆Z), r + 1)
end if
end for
Now, let us determine the weight function W (∆1→∆2) of the one round characteristics
∆1 → ∆2. In the attacks on AES [29, 28], the attacker pays only for the active S-boxes
(active bytes that go through S-boxes) in the state and the subkey in each round of the
cipher. Hence, we will use the same definition: W (∆1 → ∆2) is defined as the number of
active S-boxes in the state and the subkey in the one round characteristic ∆1→∆2.
When searching for n-round differential characteristic, the upper bounds on the weight
of these characteristics are limited by the maximal number of active S-boxes that a charac-
teristic can have. These upper bounds depend on the key size and the difference propagation
probability of the S-boxes which is usually 2−7 (sometimes 2−6 or even 2−5). The weight of
the n-round differential characteristic for a cipher with k-bit key, and S-boxes with maximal
difference propagation probability 2−l is upper bounded by b k
l
c. The related-key differential
characteristics produced by the tool have fixed positions of the active bytes, while the exact
values are undefined. To produce standard differential characteristics, one has to find the
exact values of the active bytes (the differences in the active bytes). The probability of the
standard characteristics may be lower than the one predicted by the tool, but never higher,
because the tool assumed that all active S-boxes hold with maximal differential probability,
while in practice (in the case of standard characteristic) some S-boxes may hold with lower
probability.
A new class of attacks, presented in [85, 29], called open-key attacks, gives the attacker
the full freedom of knowing or even choosing the key. In return, the attacker has to demon-
strate some non-trivial property of the cipher which differentiates it from an ideal cipher.
The motivation behind these attacks is that ciphers are often used as building blocks for
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Algorithm 2 Search of n-round differential characteristics - Variant 2
for all ∆P,∆S1 do
Obtain ∆S˜1 from ∆P
∆K1 =∆S˜1 ⊕∆S1
Call NextRound(∆S1,∆K1, W (∆P →∆S˜1), 2)
end for
NextRound(∆Sr−1,∆Kr−1, w, r)
Obtain ∆S˜r from ∆Sr−1
if W (∆Sr−1→∆S˜r) +w+Wn−r ≤ W˜n then
for all ∆Sr do
∆Kr =∆S˜r ⊕∆Sr
if r = n then
Update Dn
W˜n← w+W (∆Sr−1→∆S˜r)
else
Call NextRound(∆Sr ,∆Kr , w+W (∆Sr−1→∆S˜r), r + 1)
end if
end for
end if
Algorithm 3 Search of n-round differential characteristics - Variant 3
for all master ∆K | obtain subkeys ∆K1, . . .∆Kn with weight WK do
for all {∆X
∆K1−→∆Y |W (∆X ∆K−→∆Y ) +WK +Wn−1 ≤ W˜n} do
Call NextRound(∆Y , W (∆X
∆K−→∆Y ), 2)
end for
end for
NextRound(∆Y , w, r)
for all {∆Z |∆Y ∆Kr−→∆Z and W (∆Y ∆Kr−→∆Z) +w+WK +Wn−r ≤ W˜n} do
if r = n then
Update Dn
W˜n← w+W (∆Y ∆Kr−→∆Z) +WK
else
Call NextRound(∆Z , w+W (∆Y →∆Z), r + 1)
end if
end for
some other cryptographic primitives, such as hash functions. There, the attacker has a full
freedom of choosing all input parameters. An interesting approach is applicable to all ciphers
in the chosen-key attack model. We call this approach divide-and-conquer technique. Let us
have some related-key differential characteristic for a cipher. Since we control both the key
and the state (it is a chosen-key attack), we can find a good pair of keys and states that fol-
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low the characteristic by the following method: 1) first find a good pair of keys that follow
the differential characteristic only in the key, 2) once the subkeys are fixed, find a good pair
of plaintexts that follow the differential characteristic in the state. It means we can split the
whole characteristic in two halves: the one in the key, and the one in the state, and instead of
multiplying their probabilities, we can add them. We will launch chosen related-key differen-
tial attacks on the full-round ciphers, in the cases when (secret) related-key characteristics
do not exist. Note that proving the resistance against the chosen related-key differential
attacks is still an open problem because it is unclear how to estimate the upper bound on
the weighs of these characteristics since the number of rounds that can be covered for free
varies from 1 in the rebound attack [98], 2 in the Super-Sbox [58, 87], and even more in
the tool of Khovratovich et al [74].
9.2 AES
The 128-bit block version of Rijndael[43] has been standardized by NIST as Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES) in November 2001 [106]. It supports three different key sizes:
128, 192, and 256 bits, denoted as AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256, respectively. Various
cryptanalytic results were published on AES, and until recently, the best attacks presented
non-random properties of 7/10/10 rounds (out of 10/12/14 rounds) of AES-128/192/256
[52, 57, 85, 62, 81]. A breakthrough in analysis of AES have been the results [29, 28]. In
[29] a related-key attack on all 14 rounds of AES-256 was presented. In [28], boomerang
attacks on full-round AES-192 and AES-256 were shown.
AES is an SPN cipher. The subkeys are generated consecutively one from another, but
there is a lot of branching caused by the XORs of columns in the key schedule. Hence,
we will use variant 2 of the tool. The state goes through four transformations: S-box layer,
ShiftRows, linear-diffusion layer called MixColumns, and XOR of the key. In the tool we will
use the following optimal representation of the state trough one round: the beginning state
(before the S-boxes) can have non-zero only S-value (but zero P-value), after the S-box layer
and after ShiftRows has again only non-zero S-value, after the MixColumns has non-zero
only P-value, and after the subkey XOR again it has only non-zero S-value. This way, there
is no branching in the state. The subkeys then can be determined as a XOR of a state of only
P-value (the one after MixColumns) and a state of only S-value (the next round state, just
before the S-boxes), hence they have columns that can have both non-zero S- and P-values.
To use variant 2 of the tool we would have to be able to determine if the difference in the
subkey Ki+1 can be obtained from the difference in Ki . One subkey round consists of XOR
of columns, application of S-boxes, and rotation of a column. If we represent the columns
of the subkeys simply with only S-value, all of the above transforms can be easily checked.
Therefore, each column of the subkeys is reduced only to S-value: 1) convert P-value into
S-value, 2)XOR the obtained S-value with the initial S-value. Note, reduction to S-value as
well as the XOR introduce branching, but the search is still feasible.
9.2.1 Best Characteristics for AES
We have applied the tool to all three versions of AES. The maximal difference propagation
of the S-box in AES is 2−6. Since the key sizes are 128,192, and 256, we can allow no
more than 21, 31, and 42 active S-boxes in the characteristics for AES-128, AES-192, and
AES-256, respectively. For AES-128 we found differentials characteristics on 4 rounds with
13 active S-boxes, and on 5 rounds with 17 active S-boxes. In AES-128 there are no 6-round
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related-key differential characteristics. For AES-192 we found that the best related-key differ-
ential characteristics is on 9 rounds out of 12. The characteristic on 9 rounds has 25 active
S-boxes (14 in the state, and 11 in the key). For AES-256 we found unique differential char-
acteristic on all 14 rounds, but this is the same characteristic that was presented in [29]. The
characteristic from [29] is optimal for 9-14 rounds, but we have found better characteristic
on 8 rounds (10 active S-boxes instead of 14). The 5-round differential characteristic for
AES-128, and 9-round for AES-192 are presented in Fig. 9.2. Regarding chosen-key attacks,
in all versions of AES, there are no differential characteristic on 10 rounds with 21 or less
active S-boxes in the state.
9.2.2 Related-key Boomerang Attack on 7-round AES-128
Let us show a boomerang attack on 7 rounds of AES-128. We will use two 3-round dif-
ferential characteristics: a top 3-round truncated differential characteristic (4-1-4-16) with
no key difference, and a 3-round related-key bottom differential characteristic with 5 active
S-boxes in the state and 1 in the subkeys. They are presented in Fig. 9.3. Note that if we
extend the bottom characteristic for one additional round then the difference in the cipher-
texts is fixed in 9 bytes, 4 bytes have equal difference and 3 bytes have a random difference.
The difference δ between these two ciphertexts can have 24·7 = 228 distinct values (1-bit of
freedom is lost for each of the 4 active S-boxes, since given a fixed input difference only 27
output differences are possible). Let ∆ be the difference between K4 and let the key sched-
ule transform this difference into∆′ in K7. Instead of guessing 228 possibilities of the bottom
difference for each ciphertext (which would increase the pressure on our filters) we guess
31 bit of the key: seven bits of k61,3 and full k
7
1,1, k
7
1,2, k
7
1,3. This guess allows us to work on
both faces of the bottom characteristic, since unlike in most related-key boomerang attacks
our boomerang has only two related keys, instead of four.
The attack works as follows: For each guess of 231 bits of the key
1. Prepare a structure of plaintexts Pi with all the possible 2
32 four byte values on the
main diagonal and the other bytes fixed.
2. Encrypt all the plaintexts Pi with the secret key K and obtain ciphertexts Ci .
3. For each ciphertexts Ci compute the correct difference δ using the 31-bit key guess,
and obtain Di = Ci ⊕δ.
4. Decrypt all Di with the key which is computed from the last subkey: K
7 ⊕∆′ and
obtain plaintexts Q i .
5. Sort all Q i by 12 non-diagonal bytes. Pick only the pairs (Q i ,Q j) that have zero
difference in these 12-bytes. If none are found then goto 1.
6. Check the candidate quartet against 8 active S-boxes at the top (four on both sides of
the boomerang) which gives an 8-bit filter.
7. Do the key counting step with the remaining quartet candidates.
Let us calculate the data and time requirements of the attack. A pair of plaintexts passes the
first round with a probability 2−22 (MixColumns from four to one active byte, the position
and the value of the active byte is irrelevant). The next two rounds are passed with proba-
bility 1, so in the third round with have a pair of states with all bytes active. In the second
characteristic, from the bottom up assume that the initial 31-bit guess was correct, then in
the next three rounds we have five active S-boxes which hold with probability 2−30 (when
each is 2−6). Yet for the two pairs of ciphertexts we only need the same difference after the
fourth round (from bottom up) and therefore the two S-boxes of this round can be counted
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Figure 9.3: Two characteristics for the related-key boomerang attack on AES-128
reduced to seven rounds.
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only once (on the one side of the boomerang the pair passes the layer of S-boxes with one
of the 214 possible differences, on the parallel side of the boomerang the pair matches this
difference with probability 2−14). So the two pairs of ciphertexts pass the second charac-
teristic with a probability of 2−(3·6+3·6+2·7) = 2−50. Now that we have passed with low cost
the 4th round layer of S-boxes where the top-down characteristic had 16 active S-boxes we
switch to the last phase of the boomerang attack, where the effect of the mixing of the third
round can be undone for free because are guaranteed to have the same difference as in
the forward direction. In the second round we pay again 2−24 for four to one active byte
of MixColumns(2−22 if we do not require the boomerang to return in exactly the same 4
bytes). The next round is done for free so we obtain two plaintexts with a difference only
in four diagonal bytes. Hence the total probability of the boomerang is 2−22−50−24 = 2−96.
Each structure of 232 plaintexts contains 263 pairs with a difference in the four diagonal
bytes. Hence, to find two good boomerang quartets we need 296−63+1 = 234 structures or
234+32 = 266 chosen plaintexts and 231 · 266 = 297 adaptive chosen ciphertexts. The average
amount of false quartets for all 231 key guesses which satisfy our 96+8 = 104-bit filtering
condition is 231+34+63−104 = 224. Note that each boomerang quartet suggest 31-bit value for
the key guess at the bottom as well as 16 guesses for 64 bits at the top (corresponding to
4 active S-boxes in the plaintext at each side). Since we requested two good boomerang
quartets they will vote together for the correct keys while the remaining 224 false quartets
would vote randomly. We expect that none of the false quartets survive this 91-bit key voting
step.
At this point the attacker can either finish the attack with an exhaustive search of about
296 steps or by repeating the boomerang attack starting from another 4 active S-boxes in the
plaintext.
9.2.3 Related-key Boomerang Attacks on AES-192 and AES-256
We tweaked our tool to produce the optimal differential characteristics for a boomerang
attack on AES-192. The tool produced a top differential characteristic other than the one
presented in [28], with the same bottom characteristic. The two characteristics are shown
in Fig.9.4. The ladder switch between the two characteristics in round 6 is simpler: due to
the switch there are no active S-boxes in this round. The top characteristic has 2 active in
round 3, and 1 in round 4, while the bottom characteristic has 1 active in round 7, 8, and 10,
and 2 active in round 9. Hence, the probability of the boomerang is 2−6·(2+1+1+1+2+1) = 2−48
compared to the boomerang in [28] with a probability 2−55. A rough estimate between these
two attacks gives us a speed-up of 27: the new boomerang attack requires 2116 data, and
2169 time.
For AES-256, on 6 and 7 rounds there are only two characteristics with 5 active S-boxes
(and no characteristics with less active S-boxes), and these are the exact characteristics used
in the boomerang attack on AES-256 in [28]. On the other hand, 8-round characteristic has
at least 10 active S-boxes, hence using it in a boomerang attack will blow up the complexity
above the best known attack. Therefore, we believe that the characteristics used for the
attack on AES-256 in [28] are optimal.
9.3 Camellia
Camellia [2] is a 128-bit SPN block cipher with 128, 192, and 256-bit keys. We will analyze
Camellia with 128-bit keys, without the FL functions. This version has 18 rounds, and so far,
the best cryptanalytical results are truncated differential of 8 rounds [89], and impossible
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Figure 9.4: A related-key boomerang attack on AES-192. The bottom characteristic
is the same as in [28].
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differential on 11 rounds [91]. The key schedule of Camellia is not byte oriented because
the rotation constants are not a multiple of 8. In order to test our tool we will make it byte
oriented, by using the following rotation constants for rounds 1-18: 0, 0, 16, 16, 16, 16, 48,
48, 48, 64, 64, 64, 96, 96, 96, 96, 112, 112. We call this version — byte-Camellia. Note
that, since we choose the rotation constants as close as possible to the original constants,
a differential characteristic in the key schedule of byte-Camellia, may be suitable for the
original Camellia. For that to happen, the positions of the active bits in an active byte have
to be invariant of small rotations. On the other hand, trying all possible combinations of
active bits, i.e. building all possible differential characteristics in the key schedule for the
original version of Camellia, seems too much time consuming. Hence, we will analyze only
byte-Camellia.
The key schedule of Camellia-128 applies transforms (4 rounds) to the master key KL ,
to produce another key KA and it uses these two values to generate the subkeys in a linear
way. Therefore, we will use variant 3 of the tool. Internally in the tool, in all steps we will
use only the S-type representation.
9.3.1 Best Characteristics for byte-Camellia
The maximal difference propagation probability of the S-boxes in Camellia is 2−6. Therefore,
we can allow no more than b 128
6
c = 21 active S-box in the characteristic of the key and
the state. With this type of limitations, the tool produced the best related-key differential
characteristic. It is on 8 rounds, and it has 20 active S-boxes.
9.3.2 Chosen-key Attack on Full-round byte-Camellia
When searching for chosen related-key characteristics in byte-Camellia, we can spend 21
active S-box in each, the key and the state (using the divide-and-conquer technique). With
these weight limitations our tool was able to produce a good characteristic on all 18 rounds
of byte-Camellia. The characteristic has 17 active S-boxes in the key, and 15 in the state
(see Fig. 9.5). The characteristic can be used to show that Davies-Meyer hash function
construction initiated with byte-Camellia-128 cipher, can be distinguished from a random
function.
9.4 Khazad
Khazad [13] is a 64-bit block cipher with a key size of 128 bits. It is an SPN with 8 rounds.
The best attacks go only up to 5 rounds: an integral attack [103] with 291 complexity and a
class of 264 weak keys which can be attacked in 240 steps using a slide attack [24].
The subkeys in the key schedule of Khazad are obtained consecutively from one another
using a Feistel function. Therefore, we will use variant 2 of the tool. The small key and block
sizes, in addition to the low branching in the key schedule allows to use the variant 1 as
well. The optimal representation is similar to the one used in the tool for AES. In the state,
after the S-boxes (γ) we will have non-zero only S-value, and after the linear-diffusion layer
(θ) only P-value.
9.4.1 Best Characteristics for Khazad
The maximal difference propagation of the S-boxes in Khazad is 2−5. Hence, a differential
characteristic for Khazad cannot have more than 25 active S-boxes, at most 12 can be in
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Figure 9.5: The related-key differential characteristic (left in the state, right in
the key) on full-round byte-Camellia-128 for the chosen-key distinguisher. The
characteristic has compact representation, the actual differences are to be fixed.
The key XOR is depicted separately from the function F .
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the state. With this type of limitations, the tool was able to produce interesting results. The
best related-key differential characteristics for 4,5,6, and 7 rounds have 9, 10, 19, and 20
active S-boxes, respectively. The related-key attacks based on such characteristics would be
the new best attacks on Khazad up to 7 rounds. The 7-round characteristic is presented at
Fig.9.6.
9.4.2 Related-key Boomerang Attacks on 7 rounds of Khazad
Let us improve the probability of the 7-round attack by using a boomerang attack. We will
use two 4 round characteristics (See Fig.9.7). The four related keys KA, KB , KC , and K D,
are obtained as follows: 1) fix any KA, i.e. (KA−2, KA−1), 2) produce (KA0 , KA1 ) from KA, and
fix KB such that KB = (KA0 , K
A
1 )⊕ (∆K0,∆K1), 2) obtain (KA6 , KA7 ) and (KB6 , KB7 ) and then fix
KC = (KA6 , K
A
7 )⊕ (∆K6,∆K7), K D = (KB6 , KB7 )⊕ (∆K6,∆K7). The pink difference was chosen
such that after γ and θ it could produce gray difference with a probability 2−5. Let us find
the complexity of the attack. We start with the same one byte difference (the pink byte) in
the plaintext and the subkey K0, hence there are no active bytes in the state in round 1 and
2. The difference in the subkey K3, as well as in the state, (denoted with the grey bytes)
is obtained when the pink byte goes through γ and θ , and hence it happens with 2−5. At
the end of round 4 we can switch to the bottom characteristic. The ciphertext difference
is fully determined. We pay 2−5 in round 7 so the blue byte in the state after the inverse
S-box will become pink (and then cancel with the pink difference in the key). To get a
zero difference in the subkey K5 we pay additional 2
−5. In round 4 we switch the state
to the top characteristic. An important moment is the switch in the keys. When the gray
difference in the top characteristic between KA and KB in the subkey K3 is the same as the
gray difference in the bottom characteristic between KA and KC (and KB and K D) in the
subkey K3, then the switch in the key is for free (this is due to the Feistel switch
5, See [28]).
Then not only the difference in K3 between K
C and K D will be the same as between KA
and KB , but their value will be equal to the values of KA3 and K
B
3 and hence will go through
the S-boxes producing the same values. Therefore, we pay additional 2−5 for each of the
differences in subkey K3 (instead of a switching cost of 2
−64!). After the switch to the top
characteristic, we pay 2−5 in the state of round 3 to get the same pink difference which
will cancel after the key XOR. We pay additional 2−5 for the zero difference in the subkey
K1. The rest of the characteristic holds with probability 1. The probability of the whole
boomerang attack is 2−(2·5+2·5+2·5+2·5+5+5) = 2−50. This translates into a boomerang attack in
a class of weak keys that works for 1 out of 230 related-key quartets, with a complexity 220
encryptions/decryptions. Moreover if we relax constraints on the difference in the key we
can increase the size of the weak key class to 1 out of every 28 keys which can be attacked
with complexity of 249 encryptions and analysis steps. In both cases when the boomerang
returns we know the plaintext difference and thus we have a 64 bit filter which allows us to
filter out all the wrong quartets. Returning boomerang provides us with 7 bits of information
about the key byte K02 since we know the input and output difference for the active S-box of
the key schedule and similarly about 7 bits of the key of K06 . One can extend this attack into
a full key recovery attack via auxiliary techniques.
5We have tested the Feistel switch in the key schedule of Khazad, and a related-key quartet, following
the whole 7-round differential characteristic, was found.
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9.4.3 Chosen-key Attack on Full-round Khazad
The 7-round related-key differential characteristic can easily be extended at the top for an
additional round and then used in a chosen-key attack (See Fig. 9.6). Since we control the
exact values of the key and the state, we will use the divide-and-conquer technique, and first
fix the keys satisfying the characteristic in the key, and then find a proper pair of plaintexts
that follow the characteristic in the state. We can use the rebound attack [98] and fix one
round for free in both the key and in the state. For the key, we can fix the round for ∆K4
(or ∆K6), and obtain a characteristic in the key that holds with probability 2−55. In the
state, we will fix the values in the first round, hence the characteristic in the state holds
with 2−10. The S-boxes are non-injective regarding the difference, i.e. if we fix the input
and output difference of the S-box, then there is a solution with probability 1
2
. Therefore,
we introduce a possible one bit difference in each byte of the plaintext so that there will
always be a solution for the S-box input/output differences. The total complexity of the
chosen-key distinguisher is bounded by the probability of the characteristic in the key and
is 255. The input difference is fixed in 56 bits, while the output is fixed in all 64-bits. This
shows that full Khazad has properties which are not present in an ideal cipher. This also
means, for example, that 256-bit Tandem-DM[86] hash function construction initiated with
Khazad cipher, can be distinguished from a random function.
9.5 xAES
In the latest cryptanalytical results on AES [29, 28], it was shown that AES-192 and AES-
256, i.e. the versions of AES with 192 and 256 key bits, do not have the ideal security level
in the framework where related-key attacks are permitted. Despite the fact that so far these
attacks are only theoretical and require a computational power beyond our reach, finding an
efficient fix for AES that will produce a cipher that is ideal by the cryptographic standards,
seems a good open problem. Further, we propose such fix in a form of a new cipher which
we call xAES (x stands for extended security). Since the recent attacks are mostly based on
the property of the key schedule of AES, we tweak only this part of the cipher, while keeping
intact the round function. We introduce only a few additional operations in the key schedule
which result in a cipher that is: 1) resistant against related-key differential attacks, 2) has a
speed close to the speed of AES.
9.5.1 Specification of xAES
Let us give a complete specification of xAES. Similarly to AES, xAES supports three key sizes:
128, 192, 256, denoted as xAES-128, xAES-192, and xAES-256 respectively. Although in the
section on AES we have found that no differential characteristic exist on the full round AES-
128, we introduce xAES-128 to have a complete family of ciphers supporting the standard
key sizes of 128,192, and 256 bits. The number of internal rounds in xAES for different key
sizes is the same as the number of rounds in AES, i.e. 10 rounds for xAES-128, 12 rounds
for xAES-192, and 14 rounds for xAES-256. Each internal round is defined same as in AES –
through the four transformations SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey. The
only difference between AES and xAES is in the key schedule. Yet, the difference is small.
In short, for obtaining each next column of the new subkey, xAES always uses rotation by
one byte up of the previous subkey column, while AES uses a rotation only when obtaining
the subkey column with an index multiple of Nk (Nk = 4, 6,8 for AES-128,-192,-256). Let us
give a formal definition of the new key schedules. We assume that the master key K is given
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as an array K[4][Nk] and the key schedule produces a subkey array W[4][4(Nr + 1)]. The
s-th subkey is given by the columns 4 · s to 4 · (s+1)−1 of W . The round constant RC[i][ j]
is the same as in AES.
The key schedule of xAES-128 is defined as follows. Let K[4][4] be the master key.
Then the subkey array W[4][44] is defined as:
W[i][ j] =
K[i][ j], if j < 4S(W[i− 1 mod 4][ j− 1])⊕W[i][ j− 4]⊕ RC[i][ j/4], if j mod 4== 0
W[i− 1 mod 4][ j− 1]⊕W[i][ j− 4], otherwise
The key schedule of xAES-192 is defined as follows. Let K[4][6] be the master key. Then
the subkey array W[4][52] is defined as:
W[i][ j] =

K[i][ j], if j < 6
S(W[i− 1 mod 4][ j− 1])⊕W[i][ j− 6]⊕ RC[i][ j/4], if j mod 6== 0
S(W[i− 1 mod 4][ j− 1])⊕W[i][ j− 6], if j mod 6== 3
W[i− 1 mod 4][ j− 1]⊕W[i][ j− 6], otherwise
The key schedule of xAES-256 is defined as follows. Let K[4][8] be the master key. Then
the subkey array W[4][60] is defined as:
W[i][ j] =

K[i][ j], if j < 8
S(W[i− 1 mod 4][ j− 1])⊕W[i][ j− 8]⊕ RC[i][ j/4], if j mod 8== 0
S(W[i− 1 mod 4][ j− 1])⊕W[i][ j− 8], if j mod 8== 4
W[i− 1 mod 4][ j− 1]⊕W[i][ j− 8], otherwise
To clearly understand the idea of the additional operations, in Fig. 9.8 we give a pictorial
representation of how the s+ 1-th subkey is obtained from the s-th subkey, for all three key
schedules of xAES as well as for the key schedule of AES-256 so the reader can compare the
changes.
Besides the additional rotations, the difference between AES and xAES is in the 192-bit
key version. We introduce an additional layer of S-boxes to meet our security level.
9.5.2 Efficiency of xAES
Let us compare the speed of xAES with the speed of AES in software. We assume that
both use optimal implementation with table lookups and xors. First let us give a theoretical
comparison of the efficiency. Recall that since the round functions of AES and xAES are
identical, in an environment where the master key is fixed and the encrypted message is
longer (encryption mode), their speed is the same. Now let assume that the master key is
frequently changed (hash mode). One round of AES (and therefore of xAES) has 16 table
lookups and 16 xors.
One out of 10 subkey rounds of AES-128 has 4 table lookups and 8 xors. In xAES one
such round has 4 table lookups, 8 xors and 3 rotations. If we assume that rotations have the
same cost as xors, then for encrypting 16 bytes, AES uses 10 · 16+ 10 · 4= 200 lookups and
10 · 16+ 10 · 8 = 240 operations. In xAES these numbers are 10 · 16+ 10 · 4 = 200 lookups
and 10 · 16+ 10 · 4+ 10 · 3= 270 operations.
In AES-192, one subkey round (out of 8) has 4 table lookups and 10 xors while in xAES-
192 one subkey round has 8 table lookups, 10 xors and 5 rotations. Hence, for 16 bytes,
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Figure 9.8: One subkey round for xAES-128 (top left), xAES-192 (top right), xAES-
256 (bottom-left), and AES-256 (bottom-right). Each k ji is a subkey column – 4
bytes. ≪ (≫) stand for a word rotation on 8 bits to the left(right), S for S-box,
and Rcon for xor of the round constant.
AES-192 spends 12 · 16+ 8 · 4 = 224 lookups and 12 · 16+ 8 · 10 = 272 operations, while
xAES-192 spends 12 · 16+ 8 · 8= 256 lookups and 312 operations.
Finally, AES-256 has 7 subkey rounds and in each it has 8 table lookups and 16 xors.
xAES-256 has the same number of subkey rounds and in each uses 8 table lookups , 16 xors
and 7 rotations. For 16 bytes, AES-256 uses 14 ·16+7 ·8= 280 lookups and 14 ·16+7 ·16=
336 operations, while xAES-256 uses 14·16+7·8= 280 lookups and 14·16+7·16+7·7= 385
operations.
These numbers indicate that one can expect that xAES-128 is around 6%, xAES-192 is
around 12.5%, and xAES-256 is 7% slower than AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 respec-
tively. The actual implementation results obtained based on optimal implementation on C,
together with the theoretical estimates, are given in Tbl. 9.3. In the table, the "Hash mode"
entries indicate the speed of xAES compared to the speed of AES where the master key
is changed on every iteration (16 bytes of plaintext), while the "Encryption mode" entries
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Table 9.3: Comparison of the speed of xAES with the speed of AES. The abbrevia-
tions "tb" and "op" stand for table lookups and operations, respectively.
xAES/AES
128 192 256
Hash mode
Theoretical 200tl+240op
200tl+270op
≈ 224tl+272op
256tl+312op
≈ 280tl+336op
280tl+385op
≈
≈ 94% ≈ 87% ≈ 93%
Implementation 96% 83% 97%
Encryption mode
Theoretical, Implementation 100% 100% 100%
compare the speed when the master key is fixed6. The difference between the theoretical
estimate and the actual implementation comes from the fact that the modern processors in
one clock cycle can perform several xor operations but only one table lookup.
9.5.3 Related-key Differential Attacks in xAES
Since the only difference between AES and xAES is in the key schedule, to implement the
tool for xAES, we have to find method that checks ∆Knew == Subke yRound(∆Kold), i.e. if
the difference in the next subkey can be obtained from the difference of the previous subkey.
Taking into consideration that the subkeys columns are produced one by one (see Fig. 9.8),
this problem is reduced to the problem of checking if the differences in three subkey columns
kij , k
i
j+1, k
i−1
j+1 (where k
i
j , k
i
j+1 are the j and j+1-th columns of the i-th subkey, and k
i−1
j+1 is the
j+ 1-th column of the i− 1-th subkey) are related as:
(∆kij)≪ 8⊕∆kij+1 =∆ki−1j+1. (9.1)
Let us focus on the compact representation of a difference in the subkey column. This differ-
ence is described with an 8-bit vector c˜ = (a˜, b˜) = (a1, . . . , a4, b1, . . . , b4), ai , bi ∈ {0,1}. The
compact c˜ describes (is a set of) all subkey column differences ∆d˜ = (∆d1,∆d1,∆d2,∆d3),
∆di ∈ Z28 , such that:
∆d˜T = MC · (x1, x2, x3, x4)T ⊕ (y1, y2, y3, y4)T = MC · x˜ T ⊕ y˜ T , (9.2)
where MC is the matrix of the MixColumns transform, x i , yi ∈ Z28 and x i > 0 iff ai > 0,
yi > 0 iff bi > 0. Note that for example the vector (0˜, b˜) is a simple truncated representation
of a difference. In our implementation we will use the same compact representation for the
differences in the subkey columns. To check (9.1) we have to deal with the rotation of the
key ∆kij since in the key schedule of AES there is no such rotation. Let us see how this
6For short messages in the encryption mode, refer to the speed of "Hash mode".
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rotation influences the compact representation. If the difference ∆kij in the subkey is ∆d˜
(see (9.2)), then the rotation of this difference is:
∆d˜T ≪ 8= (MC · x˜ T ⊕ y˜ T )≪ 8= (MC · x˜ T )≪ 8⊕ y˜ T ≪ 8 (9.3)
The matrix MC has the property (MC · X ) ≪ 8 = MC · (X ≪ 8). Hence (9.3) can be
rewritten as:
∆d˜T ≪ 8= MC · ( x˜ T ≪ 8)⊕ y˜ T ≪ 8 (9.4)
Therefore, if the initial difference ∆kij had a compact representation c˜1 = (a1, a2, a3,
a4, b1, b2, b3, b4) then the rotation of this difference ∆kij ≪ 8 has a compact representa-
tion c˜1 = (a2, a3, a4, a1, b2, b3, b4, b1). Hence, all the differences in (9.1) have a compact
representation and this condition can easily be checked7.
We have implemented the tool in practice and we searched for the best round-reduced
related-key differential characteristics. To prove the resistance of r-round xAES against
related-key differential attacks, these characteristics have to have certain properties:
1. No two characteristics exist with probability 2−p1 , 2−p2 on r1 and r2 rounds such that
r1 + r2 ≥ r − 2 and 2p1 + 2p2 ≤ k, where k is the key size. This restriction was
introduced to stop the boomerang attacks on the full r rounds. We assume that two
rounds can be obtained for free by various techniques, but the rest r1+ r2 rounds are
part of the boomerang.
2. No characteristics exist on r/2 rounds with probability higher than 2−k/2. Obviously,
this was introduced to stop the related-key differential attacks on the full r-round
cipher which always can be seen as a concatenation of two r/2-round ciphers.
Each characteristic found by the tool is presented in a compact form. To find the probability
of a characteristic one has to count the number of active bytes, i.e. the position of the bytes
with 1 that go through the S-boxes. For example, a characteristics with s active bytes has a
probability at most 2−6·s because the maximal differential propagation of an S-box in AES is
2−6. In table Tbl. 9.4 we give the probabilities (in terms of active bytes) of the best related-
key differential characteristics for xAES-128, xAES-192, and xAES-2568. Using these results
we can prove the differential resistance of xAES.
In case of xAES-128, to have a valid differential characteristic9, the number of active
bytes in the differential attack should not exceed b 128
6
c= 21 (because the key size is 128 bits
and the maximal differential propagation of the S-box is 2−6). In a boomerang attack (recall
that since xAES-128 has 10 rounds, we try to build a boomerang on 10− 2 = 8 rounds), at
least one of characteristics (upper or lower) has to be on 4 rounds, for which the attacker
has to pay at least 2 · 10 = 20 active S-boxes. Hence, he has only 21− 20 = 1 active S-box
left which is insufficient for a boomerang on 8 rounds and therefore xAES-128 is resistant
against boomerang-type attacks. Now let us try to build a differential characteristic on all 10
rounds. Note that the characteristic on 5 rounds has more than 11 active S-boxes, hence the
characteristic on 10 rounds would have more than 2 · 11= 22, and therefore no related-key
differential characteristic exist on all 10 rounds of xAES-128.
In xAES-192, the number of active S-boxes in a valid differential characteristic is bounded
by b 192
6
c = 32. For a boomerang attack, in case one of the characteristics has 6 or more
7Note that now checking (9.1) is reduced to checking for the case where all three subkey columns
have a compact representation, which was solved for AES.
8For example, the best differential characteristic for xAES-192 on 5 rounds has 9 active S-boxes – in
Tbl. 9.4 the intersection of row 5 and column xAES-192 is 9.
9A valid characteristic has a probability higher than 2−128.
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Table 9.4: The number of active S-boxes in the best round-reduced related-key
differential characteristics in xAES-128, xAES-192, and xAES-256.
rounds xAES − 128 xAES− 192 xAES− 256
2 1 0 0
3 5 1 1
4 10 4 3
5 > 11 9 7
6 > 11 > 16 13
7 > 11 > 16 18
8 > 11 > 16 > 21
rounds, the number of active S-boxes becomes greater than 32, hence the attack does not
work. When both characteristics have 5 rounds, then this number is 2 · 9+ 2 · 9 = 36 which
is again higher than 32, and therefore the boomerang with 10 rounds has lower probability
than 2−192. Similarly, any differential characteristic on 12 rounds (which can be seen as 6+6
rounds), has more than 16+ 16= 32 active S-boxes, hence its probability is less than 2−192.
In xAES-256, the number of active S-boxes is bounded by b 256
6
c = 42. Regarding the
boomerang attack, when one of the characteristics is on at least 8 rounds, the attacker
only for this characteristic has to pay more then 2 · 21 = 42 active S-boxes. When the
characteristics are on 7 and 5 rounds, then the attacker pays 2 · 18 + 2 · 7 = 50, while
when both are on 6 rounds, he pays 2 · 13+ 2 · 13 = 52 active S-boxes. In each of these
cases, the total probability of the boomerang is less than 2−256. The best characteristic on
7 rounds has only 18 active S-boxes. Hence, we cannot trivially prove that it does not exist
a characteristic on 14 rounds (because 18+ 18 = 36 which is less than 42). That is why
we have to take a different approach. Any characteristic on 14 rounds, is composed of two
7-round characteristics, one of which has to have no more than 21 S-boxes (otherwise the
total sum will be more than 42). First, we build all characteristics on 7 rounds that have
no more than 21 active S-box. Then, we try to extend upward and downward each such
characteristic for 7 additional rounds. Our search did not find any good candidate, i.e. no
characteristic on 7 rounds with at most 21 active S-box can be extended to a characteristic
on 14 rounds (with no more that 42 active S-boxes) and therefore no related-key differential
characteristic exists on 14 rounds in xAES-256. This concludes our proof for the related-key
differential resistance of full-round xAES.
The search for the best related-key differential characteristics for different version of
xAES, i.e. running the tool in practice and obtaining the results of Tbl. 9.4, required differ-
ent amount of computational effort. While finding the probabilities and the actual values for
the round-reduced characteristics in xAES-128 and xAES-192 was performed in a few hours,
in xAES-256 the search required a few days on a single core. The search for all good charac-
teristics on 7 rounds of xAES-256 with no more than 21 active S-boxes produced around 215
candidates and required two weeks on 8 cores. Extending these 7-round characteristics to
14 rounds, as mentioned before, did not give any good candidate, and required a few days
on a single core.
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Chapter 10
The Search in DES-like ciphers
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) [104], adopted by the U.S. National Bureau of Stan-
dards in 1977, was a block cipher standard for several decades. Some of the design princi-
ples of DES were fully understood by the public only after the first cryptanalysis presented
by Biham and Shamir [22]. They introduced the idea of differential analysis and differential
characteristics, and showed that if one encrypts with DES a pair of plaintexts with a spe-
cific XOR difference, then the pair of corresponding ciphertexts will have some predictable
difference with a probability higher than expected.
In [93] Matsui showed that the differential characteristics found by Biham and Shamir
were indeed the best, i.e. they have the highest probability among all characteristics. He
was able to prove this fact by running a full search on the space of all possible character-
istics, using a special algorithm that speeds up the search. Matsui’s algorithm was adopted
and applied for search of the best characteristics in LOKI and s2DES [135], Twofish [131],
FEAL [3], and others. In all these cases, the search was targeting only single-key charac-
teristics, i.e. the characteristics that have a difference in the plaintext, but not in the master
key.
We present algorithms for finding the best (with the highest probability) round-reduced
related-key differential characteristics in DES and DES-like ciphers. We show that instead of
trying all differences in the key and in the plaintext, which would result in a search space of
size 2120, it is computationally more efficient to try only a reduced set of input-output differ-
ences of three consecutive S-boxes layers. Based on this observation, we are able to propose
two algorithms for automatic search of related-key differential characteristics in DES-like ci-
phers – the first is based on Matsui’s approach, while the second is in line with the technique
of divide-and-conquer. We apply our algorithms to DES, DESL [88], and s2DES [82] and
find either the probabilities of the best round-reduced related-key differential characteris-
tics, or the upper bounds on these probabilities. Interestingly, although for lower number
of rounds these probabilities are much higher than in the case of single-key characteristics,
for higher number of rounds, the best characteristics are single-key characteristics. We ob-
tain an interesting result regarding DES. By providing the probability of the best related-key
characteristic on 13 rounds, we show that Biham-Shamir attack cannot be improved if one
uses related-key characteristic (instead of single-key). Moreover, the low probabilities of the
best related-key characteristics on higher rounds indicate that NSA did not introduce any
weakness (or trapdoor) in the key schedule of DES with regard to differential attacks. Al-
though in this paper we apply our algorithms only to the DES-like ciphers, we believe that
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our approaches can be used as well to search for high probability related-key differential
characteristics in any bit-oriented ciphers with linear key schedule.
10.1 Description of DES-like Block Ciphers
DES [104] is 64-bit block cipher with 56-bit key1. It is 16-round Feistel cipher with addi-
tional permutations I P, I P−1 at the beginning and at the end. The 64-bit plaintext, after the
application of the initial permutation I P is divided into two halves L0 and R0 - each half has
32 bits. Then, the halves are updated 16 times with the round function:
Li = Ri−1
Ri = Li−1 ⊕ f (Ri−1, Ki),
where i = 1, . . . , 16 and Ki are 48-bit round keys, obtained from the initial key K with some
linear transforms (rotations that depend on the round number and bit selection function
PC-2). The ciphertext is defined as I P−1(R16||L16).
The round function f (R, Ki) takes 32-bit state R and 48-bit round key Ki and produces
32-bit output. First it expands the 32-bit value of R to 48 bits with the linear function E
and then it XORs the values of E(R) and Ki to produce some intermediate result, which we
further denote as fi . This 48-bit value is divided into 8 six-bit values, and each of these
values goes through a separate 6x4 S-box. Finally, the 32-bit output of the S-boxes goes
through a bit permutation P and the output f˜i of the round function is produced.
The DES-like block ciphers DESL [88] and s2DES [82], differ from DES only in the
definition of the S-boxes and the initial and final permutations. Since these permutations
have no cryptographic values, we can assume that the only difference among the ciphers of
the DES-family is in the S-boxes.
10.2 Automatic Search for Related-key Differential
Characteristics in DES-like ciphers
The best characteristic on r rounds, i.e. the best r round-reduced characteristic, is the
one that has the higher probability among all characteristics on r rounds of the cipher. In
this section we propose two methods for building efficient automatic search algorithms for
finding the best round-reduced related-key differential characteristics in DES-like ciphers.
When constructing these algorithms, the main problem that has to be tackled is how to deal
with the enormous search space. There are 64 bits in the state and 56 bits in the key, hence
in total there are 2120 starting values for differential characteristics. However, in general,
this number can be reduced significantly. Our first method is based on Matsui’s search tool
applied for finding the best single-key round-reduced characteristics in DES. The second
method, which we call the split approach, can be used when Matsui’s approach fails – to find
characteristics on high number of rounds when not all the characteristics on lower number
of rounds are known.
Due to the complementation property of DES, there are related-key characteristics (in-
cluding round-reduced) that hold with probability 1. Further, we do not consider these
characteristics.
1Officially, the key has 64 bits, but 8 bits are only used to check the parity, and then discarded.
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Considering the different rotation amounts in the key-schedule, the probability of the
best round-reduced related-key characteristic depends on the rounds covered by the char-
acteristic. For example, the best 5-round related-key characteristic covering rounds 0-4,
can have different probability from the best characteristic that covers rounds 1-5. The best
related-key characteristics in our paper, always cover the last rounds, e.g. the characteristic
on 7 rounds, covers the rounds 9-15.
10.2.1 Matsui’s Approach for Single-key Characteristics
The search for the best single-key differential characteristics in DES was successfully per-
formed by Matsui in [93]. Note that even in this case, when there is no difference in the
key, the search space is rather large – 264 starting differences. However, Matsui presented
several useful approaches how to deal with a large number of starting differences and how
to significantly reduce the search space.
A naive approach to search for the best n-round characteristic would be to try all possible
starting differences in the plaintext and try to extend each of them to n rounds. The non-
linearity of the S-boxes will introduce branching, and a k-round characteristic (k < n) is
extended for an additional round only if its probability is higher than the probability P∗n of
some known characteristic on n rounds.
Matsui’s approach on the other hand, cuts out a large number of round-reduced char-
acteristics in the early stage. Given the probabilities P1, . . . , Pn−1 of the best characteristics
on the first n− 1 rounds, and some estimate2 P∗n for the probability of the characteristic on
n rounds, the algorithm produces the best characteristic on n rounds. Hence, the attacker
can sequentially produce, starting from 1 or 2-round reduced, characteristics on all rounds
of DES. In short, the attacker, as in the naive approach, tries all possible starting differ-
ences3. For each of them he produces 1-round characteristic (there can be many one-round
characteristics, and the following procedure is repeated for each of them) that holds with
probability P1. Then, he tries to extend it to two rounds only if P1 ·Pn−1 > P∗n . This is because
in order to extend 1-round characteristic to n rounds, one should use an additional (n− 1)-
round characteristic. Since the best one has probability Pn−1, the total probability of the
n-round characteristic will be at most P1 · Pn−1 and this value should be better than the prob-
ability P∗n of the best known characteristic on n-rounds. Similarly, if the attacker has built
k-round characteristic with probability Pk than he tries to extended for an additional round
only if Pk · Pn−k > P∗n . Note that in the naive approach, the attacker only checks if Pk > P∗n .
Therefore, Matsui’s approach stops the extension of many round-reduced characteristics and
that way speeds up the search.
Now let us take a closer look how to reduce the number of possible starting differences.
Interestingly, the same approach as above can be used. First note that a characteristic on
the first two rounds (assuming this 2-round characteristic is part of the best n-round char-
acteristic) has a probability P2 such that P2 < P
∗
n/Pn−2. The following observation is used to
explore this property of 2-round single-key characteristics.
Observation 1 Given the input and the output differences (∆ f1,∆ f˜1), (∆ f2,∆ f˜2) of the S-
boxes layers in the first two rounds, one can find the difference in the plaintext ∆P and the
difference (∆L2,∆R2) in state at the beginning of the third round.
Proof. From the Feistel construction it leads that ∆R0 = E−1(∆ f1) and ∆L0 = ∆ f˜1 ⊕
E−1(∆ f2). Then the difference ∆P in the plaintext is ∆P = I P−1(∆R0||∆L0). Similarly,
2For example, the attacker can use the probability of the already known characteristic on n rounds
as an estimate.
3We will see later, that this requirement can be omitted.
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for the difference at the beginning of the third round we get ∆R2 = ∆R0 ⊕∆ f˜2 and ∆L2 =
∆L0 ⊕ E−1(∆ f2). 
Therefore, instead of fixing all possible differences ∆P in the plaintext one can fix only
the input and the output differences to the S-boxes in rounds 1,2. But, since the active
S-boxes of the first round have to hold with a probability of at least P∗n/Pn−1, and in the
first and the second round with at least P∗n/Pn−2, the number of 2-round characteristics is
significantly reduced. For each such characteristic, one can proceed with Matsui’s technique,
and try to extend it to n-rounds (since the difference at the beginning of round 3 is fixed).
10.2.2 Applying Matsui’s Approach for Related-key Characteris-
tics
One can easily reconstruct Matsui’s algorithm to search for related-key characteristics. Note
that for a fixed difference in the key, the algorithm still works and it finds the best char-
acteristic with this specific difference. However, since the key has 56 bits, this search has
to be repeated 256 times and hence this naive approach is not feasible. We can still run a
so-called limited search for related-key characteristics, by allowing low Hamming difference
in the key. For example, to find the best characteristic that has at most 2-bit difference in the
key, we have to rerun Matsui’s algorithm 1+ C156 + C
2
56 = 1597 times.
Indeed, finding the best related-key characteristic using Matsui’s approach can be done
efficiently. We only have to find a way to efficiently limit the number of possible differences
in the key and in the plaintext. We want to reduce the search space, yet to perform a full
search of all possible related-key differential characteristics. The following observation can
be used for that purpose.
Observation 2 Given the input and the output differences (∆ f1,∆ f˜1), (∆ f2,∆ f˜2), (∆ f3,∆ f˜3)
of the S-boxes layers in the first three rounds, one can find the difference in the plaintext ∆P,
the difference (∆L3,∆R3) in state at the beginning of the fourth round, and all 28 values for
the difference ∆K in the master key.
Proof. Again we use the property of the Feistel construction and the linearity of the key
schedule. From the definition of DES we get:
∆ f1 = E(∆R0)⊕∆K1 (10.1)
∆ f3 = E(∆R0 ⊕∆ f˜2)⊕∆K3 (10.2)
Since E is linear, we get:
∆K1 ⊕∆K3 =∆ f1 ⊕∆ f3 ⊕ E(∆ f˜2)
The key schedule is linear, and both K1 and K3 are obtained from the master K with some
linear transformation. Therefore ∆K1 ⊕∆K3 can be expressed as L (∆K), where L is a
linear transformation. On the other hand, the input-output differences of the S-boxes are
given, and therefore, the value V = ∆ f1 ⊕∆ f3 ⊕ E(∆ f˜2) is known. Hence, the master key
difference ∆K can be found as ∆K =L −1(V ). However, the key is 56 bits, while V only 48
bits. Therefore we get an underdefined system of linear equations with 28 solutions. If we
fix a particular solution for the system, and thereby the difference in the key K , we can easily
find ∆K1,∆K3 (and ∆K2). Then ∆R0 = E−1(∆ f1 ⊕∆K1) and ∆L0 = E−1(∆ f2 ⊕ K2)⊕∆ f˜1.
Similarly can be found the differences ∆L3,∆R3. 
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The above observation clearly indicates how to reduce the search space. Instead of trying
all possible differences in the key K and running Matsui’s algorithm for each of them, one
should only fix the input and the output differences to the S-box layers in the first three
rounds. Due to restrictions on the probability, all the active S-boxes in first, in the first and
second, and in the first, second and third round, should have a combined probability of
at least P∗n/Pn−1, P∗n/Pn−2, P∗n/Pn−3, respectively. Once the active S-boxes for the first three
rounds are fixed, one can easily find all 28 candidates for the difference in the master key
and the difference in the state after the third round and hence produce 3-round differential
characteristic with a fixed difference in the master key. Further, Matsui’s approach can be
used, and this characteristic can be extended to any number of rounds. The pseudo-code of
the whole algorithm is given at Alg. 4.
10.2.2.1 On the complexity and optimization of the search.
Calculating the exact time complexity of the whole search is complex and probably impos-
sible. However, some estimate can be given, under a certain assumption. Our experiments
indicate that once the difference in the state (after the third round) and in the key is fixed,
extending the characteristic to n rounds becomes fairly easy and computationally cheap
task. The main complexity lies in generating all 3-round related-key characteristics that
have a certain probability. More precisely, from observation 2 it follows that one should
generate all active S-boxes in the first round that hold with a combined probability P1 of not
less than P∗n/Pn−1, then all active S-boxes in the second round with a combined probability
not less than P∗n/(Pn−2 · P1) and all active in the third round with probability of not less than
P∗n/(Pn−3 · P2) (where P2 is the probability of the active S-boxes in the first two rounds).
Therefore, the number of all 3-round related-key characteristics depends only on the values
P∗n/Pn−1, P∗n/Pn−2 and P∗n/Pn−3 – higher the values, less characteristics exist, and the search
is faster.
The complexity of creating all these 3-round characteristics is not the same (or pro-
portional) as the number of such characteristics. This comes from the fact that the linear
transform E is not a surjective, since it has 32-bit input and 48-bit output. For example, after
∆K1 is found (see the proof of the observation 2), the value ∆R0 = E−1(∆ f1 ⊕∆K1) exists
only with a probability 2−16. Similar holds for ∆L0. Hence, the optimal strategy for creating
the 3-round characteristics would be to:
1. Fix the probabilities of the first four active S-boxes in the first and the third round and
all the active S-boxes of the second round (that have the above limitations ), without
fixing the exact input-output differences. This can be done by fixing only the possible
values from the difference distribution tables of the S-boxes.
2. Fix the input differences to the four S-boxes of round 1,3, and the output differences
of the S-boxes of round 2 (that correspond to the previously fixed distribution values).
3. Find 28 bits of ∆K , then find 28 bits of ∆K1 and check if there exist preimage of 24
bits of ∆ f1⊕∆K1 for E. This can be done, since the left and the right 28-bit halves of
the key are independent.
4. If exists, fix the probabilities of the last four active S-boxes in the first and the third
round.
5. Fix the input differences to these 8 S-boxes.
6. Find the rest 28 bits of ∆K , then of ∆K1 and check if there exist preimage of last 24
bits of ∆ f1 ⊕∆K1 for E.
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Algorithm 4 Search for RK differential characteristic
FullSearch()
{
// The first three rounds
for all ∆ f1→∆ f˜1|P(∆ f1→∆ f˜1)Pn−1 > P∗n do
for all ∆ f2→∆ f˜2|P(∆ f1→∆ f˜1)P(∆ f2→∆ f˜2)Pn−2 > P∗n do
for all ∆ f3 → ∆ f˜3|P(∆ f1 → ∆ f˜1)P(∆ f2 → ∆ f˜2)P(∆ f3 → ∆ f˜3)Pn−3 > P∗n
do
V =∆ f1 ⊕∆ f3 ⊕ E(∆ f˜2)
for all ∆K |L (∆K) = V do
∆K1 = PC2(rot(∆K , 1))
∆K2 = PC2(rot(∆K , 2))
if E−1(∆K1 ⊕∆ f1) and E−1(∆K2 ⊕∆ f2) then
∆R0 = E−1(∆K1 ⊕∆ f1)
∆L0 = E−1(∆K2 ⊕∆ f2)⊕∆ f˜1
∆R3 =∆L0 ⊕∆ f˜1∆ f˜3
∆L3 =∆R0 ⊕∆ f˜2
Call NextRound(∆L3, ∆R3, ∆K , P(∆ f1 → ∆ f˜1)P(∆ f2 →
∆ f˜2)P(∆ f3→∆ f˜3), 4)
end if
end for
end for
end for
end for
}
NextRound(∆L,∆R,∆K , p, round)
{
∆Kr = PC2(rot(∆K , round))
∆ f =∆Kr ⊕ E(∆R)
for all ∆ f →∆ f˜ |P(∆ f →∆ f˜ ) · p · Pn−round > P∗n do
∆Lnew =∆R
∆Rnew =∆L⊕∆ f˜
if round == n then
if P(∆ f →∆ f˜ ) · p > P∗n then
P∗n = P(∆ f →∆ f˜ ) · p
end if
else
Call NextRound(∆Lnew ,∆Rnew ,∆K , P(∆ f →∆ f˜ ) · p, round + 1)
end if
end for
}
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7. If exists, find ∆K2, fix the input difference to the S-boxes in the second round and
check if there exist a preimage of ∆ f2 ⊕ K2 for E.
8. If exists, fix the output differences for the S-boxes of round 3 (it is not necessary to
fix the outputs of S-boxes of round 1).
Although we cannot give a precise estimate for the complexity of creating all 3-round char-
acteristics, we can give such estimates for some particular fixed values of P∗n ,Pn−1,Pn−2, and
Pn−2. For example, when P∗n/Pn−1 = 2−3, P∗n/Pn−2 = 2−6, P∗n/Pn−3 = 2−9, then steps 1-8
are repeated 216.7, 228.9, 232.9, 227.3, 230.8, 234.9, 227.6, 220.3 times, respectively, leading to
a total complexity of around 235. On the other hand, when P∗n/Pn−1 = 2−3, P∗n/Pn−2 =
2−7, P∗n/Pn−3 = 2−10, then steps 1-8 are repeated 218.7, 232.4, 236.4, 230.8, 234.3, 238.4, 230.9,
222.6 times, respectively, and hence the complexity is around 239, while there exist around
222.6 (step 8) good 3-round related-key characteristics.
10.2.3 The Split Approach
To build the best n-round characteristic Matsui’s approach requires first to build the best
characteristics on 1, 2, . . . , n−1 rounds because it uses the probabilities of these characteris-
tics. One may be able to skip building the characteristics on some rounds and to assume that
they have the same probability as the characteristic on lower number of rounds. Under this
assumption, the algorithm still works and finds the best characteristic on n rounds, however
the time complexity usually suffers significantly.
Avoiding building all round-reduced characteristics can be done with a different ap-
proach. Let us assume we search for characteristic on n rounds that has a probability of
at least P∗n . This n-round characteristic can be seen as a concatenation of two n/2-round
characteristics, with a combined probability of at least P∗n . Therefore, one of these two char-
acteristics has a probability at least
p
P∗n . Indeed we can split the n-round characteristic on
any (reasonable) number of k characteristics, each on n/k rounds, and claim that at least
one of them has a probability of k
p
P∗n .
Now, let us assume that n = 3k, and the n-round characteristic has been split into k
three-round characteristics. One of these characteristics (we do not know exactly which),
has to have a probability of at least k
p
P∗n . Since it is on three rounds, and it has a bound on its
probability, we can use our previous method (observation 2), to build all such characteristics.
However, unlike in Matsui’s approach, where each of the three rounds has some bound on
probability, now we build 3-round characteristics that only have the bound on the combined
probability (of all three rounds). Once we have built all such the 3-round characteristics
we try to extend them to n rounds (recall that if the difference in the state and in the key
is fixed, then it is easy to extend it to more rounds – the difficulty lies in creating all such
3-round characteristics). Interestingly, when extending the three round characteristics, we
can use the bounds from Matsui’s approach.
For example, let us assume we want to build a characteristic on 9 rounds with a probabil-
ity at least 2−24. Then we know that one of the three 3-round characteristics has a probability
of at least 2−8. First we assume that this is the characteristic on the first three rounds. We
build all first 3-round characteristics with probability at least 2−8, i.e. P3 ≥ 2−8, and then try
to extend them 6 rounds forward, thus obtaining a characteristic on 9 rounds. If we have
the probabilities P1, . . . , P6 for the best characteristics on the last 6 rounds, then for rounds
4-9, we can use Matsui’s approach, e.g. for 4 rounds we take only those with P4 such that
P4 · P5 ≥ 2−24, for 5 rounds P5 · P4 ≥ 2−24, etc. If we do not have the best probabilities than
for each round i (i ≥ 4) we only check if Pi ≥ 2−24. Then we assume the characteristic on
rounds 4-6 has a probability at least 2−8. Again, we build all 3-round characteristics with
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at most 2−8 and extend them three rounds forward and three backwards (by using Matsui’s
bounds). Finally, we assume this is the 3-round characteristic on the last three rounds (7-9).
We build all such characteristics and extend them 6 rounds backwards (again we can use
Matsui’s bounds if we have the best probabilities for the first 6 rounds). Among all 9-round
characteristics we have produced in these three iterations, we take the one with the highest
probability. If such characteristic exist than it is the best characteristic on 9 rounds and it
has a probability at least 2−24. If it does not exist then it means all the characteristics on 9
rounds have probability lower than 2−24.
What is the real advantage of this approach compared to related-key Matsui’s approach?
To find this out, we have to compare the number of possible 3-round related-key character-
istic built in the two approaches. In Matsui’s algorithm, this number depends on the values
P∗n/Pn−1, P∗n/Pn−2 and P∗n/Pn−3, while in the split approach, the number depends only on P∗n .
Hence, when the probabilities Pn−1, Pn−2, Pn−3 are really high, then it is computationally
cheaper to build the n-round characteristic with the split approach.
10.3 DES
The notion of (single-key) differentials and differential characteristics was introduced in
the seminal paper of Biham and Shamir [22] on cryptanalysis of DES, where the authors
presented characteristic on 15 rounds of DES with a probability higher than 2−56. Later
in [23], the authors used 13-round characteristic to give the first attack on all 16 rounds of
DES. By performing a full search, Matsui [93] has shown that the characteristics found by
Biham and Shamir were actually the best round-reduced single-key characteristics for DES.
It is well known that S-boxes and the permutation used in the round function of DES are
very carefully chosen to avoid single-key differential cryptanalysis and even subtle changes
in them can weaken the cipher [23]. Our study of related-key attacks on DES is motivated
by the fact that differences in the subkeys could violate some of the design principles and
this could lead to new attacks on DES.
We would like to run a full search of the space of all related-key differential character-
istics in DES by using the approaches of the previous section. We start with the related-key
version of Matsui’s algorithm and try to find the best related-key characteristics on as many
rounds as possible. Although our search will always find the best characteristics, we should
keep in mind that we have a limited computational power. For example, if we try to find
the best n-round related-key characteristic that holds with a probability at least P∗n , then the
time complexity of the search mostly depends on the probability Pn−3 of the best characteris-
tics on (n− 3) rounds (but also depends on Pn−1, Pn−2). Our experimental results show that
when P∗n/Pn−3 < 2−12 ∼ 2−14 we do not have the resources to perform the search, hence if
for some n this holds, then we will switch to the split approach and continue further with
this approach. Note that even in the case of single-key characteristics a similar limitation
holds when for some n the ratio P∗n/Pn−2 is too low.
We start the search by finding the best related-key characteristic on 3 rounds (we as-
sume that P0 = P1 = P2 = 1). We fix P∗3 (the probability of the best related-key 3-round
characteristic) to 2−1 and then gradually decrease by a factor of 2−1 if we do not find a char-
acteristic that holds with this probability. There is always a lower bound on this probability
– the case of the single-key characteristic (our tool does not make distinction between these
two cases, and searches for both). Hence, we can be sure that P∗3 cannot be lower than 2−4
(this is the probability of the best single-key characteristic on 3 rounds). Having found the
highest P∗3 , we fix P3 = P∗3 , and then search for P4. We fix P∗4 to P3, i.e. we assume that the
characteristic on 4-rounds has the same probability as the best characteristic on 3 rounds,
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and then gradually decrease this probability by a factor 2−1 each time when we cannot find
4-round characteristic with such probability. Up to P6 we could easily perform the search.
However, when searching for P7 we could not find anything even when P
∗
7 was set up to
2−18. We knew that P7 could not be lower than 2−23.6 (the probability of the single-key char-
acteristic on 7 rounds), however if we set P∗7 = 2−23.6, then P∗7/P4 = 2−19 which is lower
than our maximal computational limit of 2−12 ∼ 2−14. Therefore, we switched to the split
approach for finding the best 7-round related-key characteristic. We started with all possible
3.5-round characteristic (with the first 3.5 rounds and the last 3.5 rounds) with probability
of at least 2−11 and tried to extend it to 7 rounds, thus we allowed a probability of 2−22. The
split approach found that the best related-key characteristic on 7 rounds has a probability of
2−20.38.
The results of the split search on 7 rounds can be used to find if 8-round characteristic
with 2−22 exist, which in our case was negative. If we try to apply the related-key Matsui’s
approach for 8 rounds and allow P∗8 = 2−22, then P∗8/P5 = 2−22/2−7.6 = 2−14.4, which is low.
Hence, for 8 rounds we could not use neither Matsui’s nor the split approach. However, we
noted that the best characteristics of the first 7 rounds have a difference only in a few bits of
the key. Hence, we ran a limited search for 8-round characteristic by allowing only a few bit
difference in the key. The limited search gave us a characteristic with a probability 2−29.75 –
better than the best single-key characteristic with 230.8.
For higher rounds, the related-key Matsui’s approach could not work because of the low
probabilities (P∗n/Pn−3 < 2−12 ∼ 2−14). However, if we assume that the 8-round characteristic
found by the limited Matsui’s approach is the best, then we can still run related-key Matsui’s
algorithm for the characteristic on 11 rounds. We found that if this holds, then the best
related-key characteristics on 11 rounds is the best single-key characteristics.
For finding the best related-key characteristics on 9, 12, and 13 rounds we used our
split approach. For 9 rounds, we allowed the 3-round characteristics to have at least 2−10.55
(because (2−10.55)3 = 2−31.65 and the best single-key on 9 rounds has 2−31.48). The search
found that the best 9-round related-key characteristic is the best single-key characteristic.
For 12 and 13 rounds, we allowed the starting 3-round characteristics with probability at
least 2−11.85 (because (2−11.85)4 = 2−47.4 and the best single-key on 13 rounds has 2−47.22).
Again, we obtained similar results – the best related-key characteristics on 12 and 13 rounds
have no difference in the key, i.e. they are the single-key characteristics.
The result for the 13-round4 related-key characteristic is especially interesting since
Biham-Shamir analysis uses it for the attack on the whole DES. This means that if the attacker
uses related-key characteristics, he cannot improve the complexity of Biham-Shamir attack.
The summary of our findings is presented in Tbl. 10.1. The related-key characteristics
for 7 and 8 rounds are given in Fig. 10.1, 10.2.
10.4 DESL
DESL [88] uses a single S-box instead of eight different S-boxes as in DES. This S-box has
a special design criteria to discard high probability (single-key) differential characteristics.
Indeed, our initial analysis for single-key differential characteristics in DESL confirmed this
result. Moreover, we could not find the best single-key differential characteristics (using
the original Matsui’s tool) for DESL for higher rounds (the absence of the probabilities
for the best round-reduced single-key differential characteristics in the submission paper
4We rerun the search for characteristics that cover rounds 1 to 12.
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Table 10.1: Comparison of the probabilities of the best round-reduced differential
single-key and related-key characteristics for DES.
rounds Single-key Related-key Method used
3 2−4.0 20 RK Matsui’
4 2−9.6 2−4.61 RK Matsui’
5 2−13.21 2−7.83 RK Matsui’
6 2−19.94 2−12.92 RK Matsui’
7 2−23.60 2−20.38 Split
8 2−30.48 2−29.75 ≤ P8 < 2−22 Limited Matsui’
9 2−31.48 2−31.48 Split + Matsui’
10 2−38.35 ≤ P9
11 2−39.35 2−39.35 if P8 = 2−29.75 RK Matsui’
12 2−46.22 2−46.22 Split + Matsui’
13 2−47.22 2−47.22 Split + Matsui’
14 2−54.09 ≤ P13
15 2−55.09 2−55.09 RK Matsui’
16 2−61.97 ≤ P15
of DESL [88] seems to confirm our findings). Therefore, even the original Matsui’s tool can-
not be used (it is infeasible) for finding single-key characteristics, when they hold with low
probabilities.
Our related-key Matsui’s search algorithm, however, did find the best related-key charac-
teristics for up to 7 rounds. Interestingly, the probabilities of these related-key characteristics
are higher in DESL, than in DES (see Tbl. 10.2). For more rounds, we used the split approach
as well. Nonetheless, for these characteristics, we were able to find only the upper bounds
on their probabilities. For example, for 9-round related-key characteristic we used the split
approach with 3-round probability of 2−10. After running the search for the first, middle, and
third three rounds, the algorithm did not return any characteristic. This means, there are no
related-key characteristics on 9 rounds with probability at least 2−30. Similarly, we used the
split approach for finding the upper bound on the probability of the best characteristics for
12-rounds, and the related-key Matsui’s approach for the bounds on 10,13, and 15 rounds.
Our findings are presented in Tbl. 10.2.
The related-key characteristics that we have found can be used to launch boomerang
attacks on the round-reduced cipher. For example, we can launch a related-key boomerang
attack on 12 rounds (from round 4 to round 15), with two characteristics on 6 rounds – the
first on rounds 4-9, the second on 10-15. The probability of the first characteristic is 2−14.68
(it is lower because we consider rounds 4-9), while the probability of the second is 2−12.09.
Therefore, the probability of the whole boomerang is 2−2·14.68−2·12.09 = 2−53.54.
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Figure 10.1: The best related-key differential characteristic (with probability
2−20.38) on the last 7 rounds of DES.
10.5 s2DES
Another variant of DES called s2DES was proposed in [82]. The search for the best single-key
differential characteristics in s2DES was performed in [135]. For this purpose the authors
used Matsui’s tool. This analysis showed that the best round-reduced differential character-
istics in s2DES have higher probabilities than in DES.
We ran our search for related-key characteristics using only our related-key approached
based on Matsui’s algorithm. We noted that for each single-key characteristic on n-rounds,
the value Pn/Pn−3 is at least 2−12.75 (for n = 8, see Tbl. 10.3), hence building all 3-round
related-key characteristic might be feasible. However, the values Pn−3 for different n could
be updated, because they were the probabilities in the single-key scenario (the probability
in the related-key scenario is not less than in the single-key). Indeed, the probabilities of
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Figure 10.2: Related-key differential characteristic (with probability 2−29.75) on the
last 8 rounds of DES.
the round-reduced related-key characteristics for the first 6 rounds, were higher than the
probabilities of the single-key characteristics. This made P5 to be 2
−8 instead of 2−9.22 as in
the single-key case. Hence, for the related-key characteristic on 8 rounds, we had to allow
P8/P5 = 2−22/2−8 = 2−14 for the active S-boxes in the three rounds, instead of the previous
2−12.75. However, we were able to perform the search for this 7-round characteristic but with
a significant computational cost – the search took around 3 weeks on 64 CPU cores.
After the sixth round, we found that all the best related-key characteristics have the
same probability as the single-key (indeed they are single-key). The probabilities of the best
single and related-key round-reduced characteristics are given in Tbl. 10.3.
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Table 10.2: Probabilities of the best round-reduced related-key differential charac-
teristics for DESL.
Round Probability
3 20
4 2−4.67
5 2−7.24
6 2−12.09
7 2−19.95
8 ≤ P7
9 < 2−30
10 < 2−31
11 ≤ P10
12 < 2−40
13 < 2−41
14 ≤ P13
15 < 2−50
16 < 2−51
Table 10.3: Comparison of the probabilities of the best round-reduce differential
single-key and related-key characteristics for s2DES.
rounds Single-key Related-key
3 2−4.39 20
4 2−6.8 2−5.19
5 2−9.22 2−8.0
6 2−14.35 2−12.61
7 2−17.03 2−17.03
8 2−21.96 2−21.96
9 2−22.71 2−22.71
10 2−27.35 2−27.35
11 2−28.39 2−28.39
12 2−34.07 2−34.07
13 2−34.07 2−34.07
14 2−39.75 2−39.75
15 2−39.75 2−39.75
16 2−45.42 2−45.42
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Part V
Distinguishers and Preimage
Attacks on Hash Functions
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The last contribution is devoted to rotational attacks on cryptographic hash functions
and ciphers, and meet-in-the-middle attacks on cryptographic hash functions. The rotational
attacks can be seen as distinguishers for the primitives (usually compression functions, or the
block ciphers in the open-key/secret-key mode). On the other hand, the meet-in-the-middle
attacks are exploited to launch preimage attacks on the whole hash function constructions.
The presented attacks are on SHA-3 candidates Skein (and the underlying cipher Threefish),
Blue Midnight Wish, Boole, Edon-R and Sarmal. The analysis given here is available in the
following papers:
• [77] Rotational Cryptanalysis of ARX, FSE 2010
• [78] Rotational Rebound Attacks on Reduced Skein, ASIACRYPT 2010
• [113] Rotational Cryptanalysis of (Modified) Versions of BMW and SIMD, unpub-
lished
• [80] Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on SHA-3 Candidates, FSE 2009
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Chapter 11
Rotational Distinguishers
Rotational analysis is a relatively new type of attack. In differential analysis, for a pair of
inputs (X , Y ), the adversary follows the propagation of the difference X ⊕ Y . On the other
hand, in rotational analysis, the adversary examines the propagation of a rotational pair of
inputs (X , X ≪r).
A pair of n-bit words (X , Y ) can be fully rotational, i.e. X ≪r ⊕Y = 0, or only in t bits,
i.e. hw(X ≪r ⊕Y ) = n− t, where hw is the Hamming weight function. Basically, we require
the output pairs of all internal transformations to be fully rotational. We make an exception
for the last transformation, where it is enough to have t rotational output bits as they can
be used to build a distinguisher.
For some transformation, instead of taking rotational input pairs, it is better to intro-
duce correction by XOR-ing (or adding modularly) some low Hamming weight word to the
second input, i.e. instead of (X , X ≪r), we take (X , X ≪r ⊕δ). If X is input to another
transformation, then the correction most likely has to be canceled (often by XOR-ing the
same correction to some other input). Otherwise, a non-rotational input pair may signifi-
cantly decrease the probability of a rotational output pair for the second transformation.
Since most of the transformations preserve the rotational property only with some prob-
ability, we can observe errors in the cases when the property does not hold. A rotational
error eF of a transformation F is defined as eF = F(X )≪r −F(X ≪r). Depending on the
actual value of X , different values for the rotational error may be produced. The errors
may cancel each other as well. For example, let the output pairs of two distinct transforma-
tions have the same rotational errors, but with opposite sign, i.e. F1(X )≪r −F1(X ≪r) =
e, F2(Y )≪r −F2(Y ≪r) = −e. If the outputs of F1, F2 are inputs to an addition, then the
output pair of the addition will be rotational (with the rotational probability of addition),
since (F1(X ) + F2(Y )) ≪r= F1(X ) ≪r +F2(X ) ≪r= F1(X ≪r) + e + F2(Y ≪r) − e =
F1(X ≪r) + F2(Y ≪r).
The primitives we analyze have only a reduced set of operations – XORs, additions,
substractions, rotations, and shifts. The rotational probabilities pF of these transformations
are given in the following lemmas:
Lemma 5 (Addition,[46]) For n-bit words x , y, and a positive integer r
P((x + y)≪r= x ≪r +y ≪r) =
1
4
(1+ 2r−n + 2−r + 2−n).
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Lemma 6 (Rotation) For n-bit word x and positive integers r, r
′
P((x ≪r)≪r′= (x ≪r′ )≪r) = 1.
Lemma 7 (XOR) For n-bit words x , y, and a positive integer r
P((x ⊕ y)≪r= x ≪r ⊕y ≪r) = 1.
Lemma 8 (Subtraction,[46]) Given a pair of n-bit words x , y and a positive integer r, then
P((x − y)≪r= x ≪r −y ≪r) = 14 (1+ 2
r−n + 2−r + 2−n).
Lemma 9 (Shifts,[113]) Given an n-bit word x and two positive integers r, s, then
P((x s)≪r= (x ≪r)s) = 2−2t ,
P((x s)≪r= (x ≪r)s) = 2−2t ,
where t = min(r, s, n− r, n− s).
Lemma 10 (Boolean function,[113]) Given a bitwise Boolean function f , then
P( f (x)≪r= f (x ≪r)) = 1,
where x is a n-bit word and r is some positive integer.
Now let us focus on multi additions and multi substractions. For this purpose let define
Nk(i, t) as:
Nk(i, t) =
b it+1 c∑
j=0
(−1) j

k
j

i− j(t + 1) + k− 1
i− j(t + 1)

.
Then the following lemmas hold.
Lemma 11 (Multi additions,[113]) Given n-bit words x1, . . . , xk and a positive integer r,
then
P((x1 + . . .+ xk)≪r= x1 ≪r + . . .+ xk ≪r) =
=
1
2nk
b k−1
2n−r c∑
j=0
Nk+1( j2
n + 2r − 1,2r − 1) ·
b k−12r c∑
j=0
Nk+1( j2
n + 2n−r − 1,2n−r − 1).
Lemma 12 (Multi additions and substractions,[113]) Given n-bit words x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yl
and a positive integer r, then
P((x1 + . . .+ xk − y1 − . . .− yl)≪r= x1 ≪r + . . .+ xk ≪r −y1 ≪r − . . .− yl ≪r) =
=
1
2n(k+l)
b k−1
2n−r c∑
j=−d l
2n−r e
Nk+l+1( j2
n + (l + 1)(2r − 1), 2r − 1) ·
b k−12r c∑
j=−d l2r e
Nk+l+1( j2
n + (l + 1)(2n−r − 1), 2n−r − 1).
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The use of constants, which may not form a rotational pair, does not restrain our anal-
ysis, but makes it more sophisticated. An addition of a constant may generate a rotational
error (the exact probability depends on r, the constant value, and which type of addition
is used — modular or XOR). On the other hand, a modular addition of variables also may
generate an error, and with some probability these errors compensate each other. The prob-
ability is higher if the constant has low Hamming weight and if its positions of ones (in
the binary representation) are concentrated close to the positions where addition errors ap-
pear. It may also happen that a constant is added by XOR and is invariant of the rotation:
C = C ≪r . Then the rotation property passes the addition of a constant for free. The
subkey indices in Threefish are examples of low-weight constants. However, they are not
compensated by a single addition, only by two previous additions, which leads to an error
in the adjacent key addition.
11.1 Rotational Cryptanalysis of Threefish and Skein
In this section we attack the block cipher Threefish and the compression function of Skein
with rotational cryptanalysis. We demonstrate that a rotational pair of Threefish ciphertexts
can be obtained faster than for a random permutation, which provides both a distinguisher
and a key recovery attack. A similar result is obtained for Skein.
11.1.1 Specification of Threefish and Skein
Skein is a family of hash functions, based on the block cipher Threefish of which the follow-
ing versions are relevant for the SHA-3 proposal: Threefish-256 — 256-bit block cipher with
256-bit key and Threefish-512 — 512-bit block and key. The cipher family Threefish has
one more member – Threefish-1024 with 1024-bit block and key. Both the internal state I
and the key K consist of Nw (Nw = 4,8, 16 for Threefish-256,-512,-1024, respectively) 64-bit
words. The Nw words of the s-th subkey K
s are defined as follows:
K sj = K(s+ j)mod (Nw+1), 0≤ j ≤ Nw − 4;
K sNw−3 = K(s+Nw−3)mod (Nw+1) + ts mod 3;
K sNw−2 = K(s+Nw−2)mod (Nw+1) + t(s+1)mod 3;
K sNw−1 = K(s+Nw−1)mod (Nw+1) + s,
where s is a round counter, t0 and t1 are tweak words, and
t2 = t0 + t1, KNw = b264/3c ⊕
Nw−1⊕
j=0
K j .
The formal description of internal rounds is as follows. Let Nr be the number of rounds
(Nr = 72 for Threefish-256,-512, and Nr = 80 for Threefish-1024). Then for every 1 ≤ d ≤
Nr
• If d mod 4= 1 add a subkey by setting I j ← I j + Kd/4j ;
• For 0≤ j < Nw/2 set (I2 j , I2 j+1)←MIX((I2 j , I2 j+1));
• Apply the permutation pi on the state words.
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At the end, a subkey KNr/4 is added. The operation MIX has two inputs x0, x1 and produces
two outputs y0, y1 with the following transformation:
y0 = x0 + x1
y1 = (x1 ≪R(d mod 8)+1, j )⊕ y0
The exact values of the rotation constants Ri, j as well the permutations pi (which are different
for each version of Threefish) can be found in [53].
The compression function C(Hi−1, Mi) of Skein is defined as:
C(Hi−1, Mi) = EHi−1 ,Ti (Mi)⊕Mi ,
where EK ,T (P) is the Threefish cipher, Hi−1 is the previous chaining value, Ti is the tweak,
and Mi is the message block.
11.1.2 Attacks on Simplified Versions of Threefish
There are two places in the key schedule of Threefish where we encounter constants: 1)
KNw is obtained with a XOR of all key words and the constant C5 = b264/3c, and 2) the last
subkey word K sNw−1 has a modular addition of the round counter s. Hence, in addition to
the original Threefish, we can obtain three simplified versions by discarding these constant
XOR and counter additions. Our attacks are in the related-key scenario, where all the key
and plaintext words compose rotational pairs, i.e. if the first key and the plaintext have the
values (k0, . . . , kNw ), (p0, . . . , pNw−1) then the second (related) key and the plaintext have the
values (k0 ≪r , . . . , kNw ≪r), (p0 ≪r , . . . , pNw−1 ≪r).
The simplest version of Threefish is without the XOR of C5 and the additions of the
round counters. We can fix the rotation amount in the rotational pair to 1 in order to get
the best probability — 2−1.415 per addition. A simple MIX has only one addition, hence a
round of Threefish-256 has only two additions. The 59-round version of Threefish-256 has
2 · 59 = 118 additions in the MIX of the rounds and 4 · 15 = 60 additions of the subkey
words, so the probability that a rotational pair of key/plaintext (with a rotation equal to 1)
will produce a rotational pair of ciphertexts is 2−1.415·(118+60) = 2−252, which is higher than
for a random permutation. Every right pair also provides information on leftmost key bits
of each key word, so we get a valid key recovery attack with a complexity of about 2252
encryptions. The same reasoning is applicable for 59-round distinguishers for Threefish-512
which has a complexity of 2504 and to Threefish-1024 and 21008, because these ciphers differ
from Threefish-256 only in the size of the state and the key.
When the XOR of C5 is present, then the only difference is that we cannot use the
rotation amount 1 because C5 ≪ 1 6= C5, i.e. the constant C5 is not invariant of rotation 1.
Instead we can use rotation 2, and get attacks on 50 rounds. The complexity of the attack
on Threefish-256 is 21.67·(2·50+4·13) = 2253.8. For Threefish-512 and Threefish-1024 they are
2507.6 and 21015.2.
For the version of Threefish without the constant C5 and the round counters, we get
much better results if we consider a weak key class, for which it is unlikely to get errors
during the modular addition. Let the three leftmost bits of each key word be zero, and
consider rotation to the left by one bit. Then the rotational probability of addition is equal
to 2−0.28, and therefore the total probability for the full 72-round Threefish-256, the version
without C5 and round counters, is 2
−1.415·2·72−0.28·4·18 = 2−224. The size of the weak key class
that we attack is 261·4 = 2244, so we get a valid attack on a very large key class. Analogously,
we can attack a weak key class with 2488 keys of Threefish-512 with complexity 2448, and
Threefish-1024 with a complexity 2950 (the complexity is slightly higher because Threefish-
1024 has 80 rounds).
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11.1.3 Attacks on Threefish by XORing Corrections
Let us try to apply rotational analysis to the original version of Threefish. This means we
have to deal with the round counters – low weight constants. In order to bypass them we
introduce corrections in the key pair. Let K be the first secret key. Then the second key K ′ is
defined as follows:
K ′i = Ki ≪r ⊕ei
The use of rotational pairs with corrections is illustrated in Fig. 11.1.
We have found experimentally, that the values of the corrections ei should not be larger
than 16 (otherwise they do not cancel the round counters). For Threefish-256 and Threefish-
512 it is feasible to find by brute force the exact values for the corrections that cancel the
counters with maximal probability. For Threefish-1024 we took the values that were good in
Threefish-512.
The corrections forbid to obtain clear formula for the probability of addition of a ro-
tational pair. Hence, we have found these probabilities empirically. We have grouped two
rounds with a subkey addition (round – subkey addition – round), and by Monte Carlo
method found the probability that a rotational pair of states at the input of these two rounds
and a rotational pair of subkeys with corrections will produce a rotational pair of states at
the output. Based on these values, we have produced the probabilities of the best round-
reduced rotational pairs. The explicit round-by-round values of the probabilities are given in
Tbl. 11.3. The results are given for the original versions as well as for the versions without
the C5 (except in the case for Threefish-1024 where the probability of the version without
C5 is lower than for the original Threefish-1024).
We can break 39, 42, and 43.51 rounds of the original versions of Threefish-256,-512,
and -1024 with complexity of 2252.4, 2507, 21014.5 encryptions respectively. The attacks proce-
dures follow the same algorithm:
1. Generate a random plaintext P and encrypt it on K;
2. Compute P ′ and encrypt on K ′;
3. Check whether (EK(P), EK ′(P ′)) is a rotational pair.
A rotational pair discloses information about leftmost key bits of every key word. The plain-
text P ′ is computed by the following rule:
P ′i = Pi ≪r ⊕di .
The plaintext and the key corrections are defined separately for all the three versions of
Threefish in Tbl. 11.1.
For the versions with counters but without C5, again we only change the rotation amount
to 1, and obtain attacks on 44 and 51.5 rounds of Threefish-256, -512 with a complexity of
2252 and 2506.7 encryptions.
11.1.3.1 On the Probabilities of Rotational Characteristics for Threefish
One part of the probabilities of the trails presented at Tbl. 11.3 is computed theoretically,
and one part practically.
When the rotational pair does not have corrections, then we use the probability of addi-
tion defined by Lemma 5. In the original versions (with C5) the rotation amount is 2, so the
1.5 means without the last subkey addition.
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Table 11.1: Corrections in the plaintext pairs (di) and the key pairs (ei) in Three-
fish.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Threefish-256
di 3 10 3 15
ei 6 10 6 15
Threefish-512
di 0 6 3 6 3 6 3 6
ei 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Threefish-1024
di 0 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6 3 6
ei 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
probability of addition is 2−1.676. When C5 is absent then we use a rotation amount 1, and
the probability of addition becomes 2−1.415. Two consecutive rounds of Threefish-256 have
4 MIX and each MIX has one addition. Hence, two rounds with no subkey additions have
a probability of 2−6.6. Analogously, for Threefish-512 and Threefish-1024 we get 2−13.3 and
2−26.6, respectively. These numbers translate into 2−5.7, 2−11.3, 2−22.6 for the versions without
C5.
When there are corrections in the rotational pair, we find the probabilities of two rounds
(one round + subkey addition + one round) experimentally. The probabilities for the round
1 (key addition + one regular round) are also computed experimentally.
We have used to following corrections:
• for Threefish-256 without C5 in the key: 7, 2, 2, 6; in the plaintext: 2,2,7,6;
• for Threefish-512 without C5 in the key: 2, 1, 3, 1, 7, 1, 7, 3; in the plaintext:
7,1,6,1,2,1,2,3
11.1.4 Attacks on Skein by Adding Corrections
We follow the idea of the previous section, and introduce corrections in the Threefish keys.
But unlike in the previous attack, we consider modular corrections, i.e. we define the related-
key pair by (KA, KB), where KB = KA ≪2 +e, e is a low-weight correction, "+" is modular
addition and the rotation amount is fixed to 2. Each 64-bit word w in Skein can be seen
as a concatenation of two words w1, w2, i.e. w = w1||w2 where w1 represent the two most
significant bits of w and w2 the rest 62 bits.
To obtain a high number of rounds in the outbound phase, we carefully choose optimal
corrections and fix some of the key bits. More specifically, we found the best values of key
bits with the optimized exhaustive search. Now we explain how to optimize the search in
Skein-256 (Figure 11.1.4).
We consider two rounds of Skein-256 with a subkey addition in between (rounds 4-5, 8-
9, etc.). Note that the outer double rounds (6-7, 10-11, etc) simply keep the rotational pairs,
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Round index
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Round d
Round d+ 1
Key addition
Figure 11.1: Rotational corrections in the key addition layer of Threefish. Dashed
lines contain rotational pairs with errors.
Table 11.2: Attack complexities for different versions of Threefish; the weak key
class on full-round Threefish.
Cipher Round Constant Rounds Complexity
index b264/3c
Threefish-256 no no 59 2252
no yes 50 2253.8
yes no 44 2251.4
yes yes 39 2254.1
(weak key of 2244) no no 72 2224
Threefish-512 no no 59 2504
no yes 50 2507.6
yes no 51.5 2505.5
yes yes 42 2507
(weak key of 2488) no no 72 2448
Threefish-1024 no no 59 21008
no yes 50 21015.2
yes yes 43.5 21014.5
(weak key of 2976) no no 80 2950
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Table 11.3: Probabilities for the rotational pairs of different versions of Threefish.
Rounds Threefish-256 Threefish-512 Threefish-1024
original without C5 original without C5 original
1 −13.1 −10.5 −22.8 −21.6 −45.6
2− 3 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
4− 5 −17.57 −12.56 −29.47 −25.92 −61.48
6− 7 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
8− 9 −15.33 −13.95 −31.33 −22.68 −63.32
10− 11 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
12− 13 −15.60 −12.05 −29.73 −27.99 −61.68
14− 15 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
16− 17 −21.08 −14.17 −34.35 −25.81 −66.44
18− 19 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
20− 21 −18.46 −14.6 −37.25 −29.43 −68.82
22− 23 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
24− 25 −21.47 −17.41 −34.38 −26.89 −66.34
26− 27 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
28− 29 −21.55 −13.44 −36 −25.61 −67.31
30− 31 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
32− 33 −21.74 −16.64 −37.63 −26.74 −69.28
34− 35 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
36− 37 −22.96 −17 −38.17 −25.12 −67.79
38− 39 −6.6 −5.7 −13.3 −11.3 −26.7
40− 41 −17.74 −36.24 −31.34 −69.64
42− 43 −5.7 −6.6 −11.3 −26.7
44− 45 −18.89 −30.60 −13.3
46− 47 −5.7 −11.3
48− 49 −2.8 −33.19
50− 51 −11.3
52 −5.7
Total 39 44 42 51.5 43.5
rounds
Total −254.1 −251.4 −507 −505.5 −1014.5
probability
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[
a2 + b2 + k
′
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] ∣∣∣∣[a1 + b1 + x1 + k′1]
[a1 + b1 + k1 + x1 + Ca2,b2,k2,x2 ]
∣∣∣∣[a2 + b2 + x2 + k2]
2
Figure 11.2: Rotational pair through two rounds with key addition of Skein-256.
so the probability does not depend on the number of round. The outer rounds probability is
2−8.5 for Skein-256 and 2−17 for Skein-512.
We denote the four words of the internal state before the double rounds by (A, B, C , D).
Therefore, we have
(A, B, C , D) = (a1||a2, b1||b2, s1||s2, t1||t2);
(A≪2, B ≪2, C ≪2, D≪2) = (a2||a1, b2||b1, s2||s1, t2||t1).
Similarly, we denote by
KA = [k1||k2, k3||k4, k5||k6, k7||k8]; KB = [k′2||k′1, k′4||k′3, k′6||k′5, k′8||k′7].
the rotational pair of subkeys. Then the corrections ei can be defined as
ei = k
′
2i+1||k′2i+2 − k2i+1||k2i+2.
In Figure 11.1.4 the pairs are presented one a top of another with the symbol "- - - - - - -"
between them. By Cz1 ,...,zk we denote the carry from the sum z1 + . . .+ zk, i.e. when zi < 2
r ,
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then Cz1 ,...,zk = (z1 + . . .+ zk)≫r . The variables r, v,D,U , x , f are introduced to maintain
the 2+62 bit representation of the words. With i = i1||i2 we denote the round counter. Since
the rotation preserves the rotational property, we can omit the rotations in the second round
of the double subkey rounds, and only require rotational output pairs after the additions in
this round. To obtain such pairs for the first output, the following conditions have to hold:
a1 + b1 + k1 + x1 + Ca2 ,b2 ,k2 ,x2 = a1 + b1 + x1 + k
′
1
a2 + b2 + x2 + k2 = a2 + b2 + k
′
2 + x2 + Ca1 ,b1 ,k′1 ,x1
Similarly, for the rest 3 outputs, we get the following conditions:
w1 + k3 +U2 + Cw2 ,k4 = w1 + k′3
w2 + k4 = w2 + k
′
4 +U1 + Cw1 ,k′3
s1 + t1 + k5 + f1 + Cs2 ,t2 ,k6 , f2 = s1 + t1 + k
′
5 + f1
s2 + t2 + k6 + f2 = s2 + t2 + k
′
6 + f2 + Cs1 ,t1 ,k′5 , f1
e1 + k7 +D2 + Ce2 ,k8 ,i = e1 + k′7 + i2
e2 + k8 + i = e2 + k
′
8 + i1 +D1 + Ce1 ,k′7 ,i2
The above 8 equations, can be reduced to:
k′1 − k1 = Ca2 ,b2 ,k2 ,x2 (11.1)
k′2 − k2 =−Ca1 ,b1 ,k′1 ,x1 (11.2)
k′3 − k3 = Cw2 ,k4 +U2 (11.3)
k′4 − k4 =−(Cw1 ,k′3 +U1) (11.4)
k′5 − k5 = Cs2 ,t2 ,k6 , f2 (11.5)
k′6 − k6 =−Cs1 ,t1 ,k′5 , f1 (11.6)
k′7 − k7 = Ce2 ,k8 ,i +D2 − i2 (11.7)
k′8 − k8 = i− i1 − (Ce1 ,k′7 ,i2 +D1) (11.8)
This system gives as a hint how to choose the corrections ei and the values of some of the
subkey bits. For each carry Cz1 ,...,zk it holds 0 ≤ Cz1 ,...,zk < k. Yet the probability that a
carry will take a specific value in this range, when zi are randomly chosen, is not uniformly
distributed. When the carries come from sums with 4 terms, the probability is highest for the
values 1 and 2. Therefore, for our brute force, we limit the differences k′1 − k1, k2 − k′2, k′5 −
k5, k
′
6 − k6, only to these two values.
The variables U1,U2,D1,D2, are determined as follows:
U1 = ((s2 + t2 + Cs1 ,t1)⊕ v2)− ((s2 + t2)⊕ v2)
U2 = ((s1 + t1 + Cs2 ,t2)⊕ v2)− ((s2 + t2)⊕ v2)
D1 = ((a2 + b2 + Ca1 ,b1)⊕ r2)− ((a2 + b2)⊕ r2)
D2 = ((a1 + b1 + Ca2 ,b2)⊕ r1)− ((a1 + b1)⊕ r1)
These variables can take only odd values and a zero. Since Cw2 ,k4 can take 0, 1 and U2 can
take 0, 1 it means that k′3 − k3 (see (11.3)) can also take 1 and 2 (the same values as the
one for the subkeys discussed above). A similar reasoning is applicable to the difference
k4 − k′4. The differences k′7 − k7, k8 − k′8 that are left, are the only one that actually depend
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on the round counter. Yet, since Ce2 ,k8 ,i can take the values 0,1
2, i.e. it is not fixed but rather
flexible, the whole expression Ce2 ,k8 ,i+D2− i2, for any i2 can take the values 1,2 (recall thatD2 can be any odd value). Therefore the difference k′7 − k7 can be 1 or 2 (with probability
that depends on the round counter i2). Finally, let us focus on the difference k
′
8−k8 which is
determined by the expression i− i1−Ce1 ,k′7 ,i2−D1. For a specific counter i, when k′7+ e2 = 0,
the carry Ce1 ,k′7 ,i2 is fixed. Hence in this case, the whole expression can take only one value,
1 or 2, but not the both. This limits k′8 − k8 to only a single value.
Now recall that ki , k
′
i are the values of the particular subkey words, and not the key
words. Once we fix all of the differences in the subkey words of some round, then in the
next round, practically the same differences will appear shifted by one index. Also, since
the value of the difference in the last key word K4 is determined from the other words, we
would have to fix the values of k1, k3, k5, k7 and the two least significant bits of k2, k4, k6, k8
so that the difference in K4 will be as expected. We fix only two bits because we choose the
initial difference to be 1 or 2.
In our brute force search, first we find good values for the differences and the two most
significant key bits of each key word. We try all possible differences 1 or 2, and then we fix
the key bits values, such that the difference in the two most significant bits of K4 will also
be 1 or 2, and we take into account the limitation on k′8 − k8 for each counter. Then, we
try all possible differences 1 and 2 in the least 62 bits of the each key word. We choose the
differences that pass with highest probability through the double subkey rounds. Also, we
fix the 2 least significant bits in each key word, so that the difference in the least 62 bits
of K4 will also be 1 or 2. Finally, to increase the probability we fix the values of the bits
60,61 (the next two bits after the 2 most significant bits). This results in fixing the two most
significant bits of k2, k4, k6, k8 which in return increases the probability that the carries take
the expected values.
Rather than finding the above values through a theoretically small brute force, we have
tested our approach on a real double subkey rounds Skein-256. That is, most of the values,
were found and confirmed to be good by taking rotational input pairs of states and rotational
input pair of key words with corrections and testing the probabilities on double subkey
rounds. In some cases the theoretical probabilities did not coincide with the empirical. This
is because there are some hidden dependencies. For example, bothU1 and k′5−k5 depend on
s2, t2. Once we had the optimal corrections (and some bit values) of the keys for the double
subkey rounds, we found the probability for 4 consecutive rounds. We start with a random
rotational input pair of states and go through three rounds. Then we add the subkeys (with
the particular counters) and then we go for an additional round.
We fix 6 bits in KA: 4 MSBs and 2 LSBs, and 6 bits in KB: 2 MSBs and 4 LSBs. The values
of these bits are given at Table 11.4. In Skein-256 the probability to pass rounds 3–42 (i.e.
10 key additions) is 2−244. Round-by-round probabilities are given at Table 11.5.
Optimal values for the differences and some key bits can be obtained for Skein-512 as
well. A property of the double subkey rounds Skein-512 that helps to run the brute force
search is that these two double subkey rounds can be split into two non-intercepting halves
(see Fig.11.3). Then, for each half, the optimal differences can be found independently.
Note that this simply speeds up the brute force for optimal differences and values, but has
no impact on the actual probability of the inbound phase. Unlike Skein-256, in Skein-512
we could not find empirically the probabilities for 4 consecutive rounds because they were
too low. Hence, we considered each 4 rounds as double round + double subkey round and
simply multiplied the probabilities of these two. The values for the optimal 6 bits of each
2It can take the value 2 as well, but the probability is really low because the counter i is only 4-5
bits.
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Table 11.4: Pre-fixed values of key bits in Skein-256. The middle 58 bits of ki
coincide (with regard to the rotation) in KA and KB.
k0 k1 k2 k3 k4
KA 0111..10 0100..11 0011..10 0000..11 0101..01
KB 11..0011 00..1010 11..0110 00..1001 01..0011
Table 11.5: Round-by-round rotational probabilities for Skein-256
Rounds 1-2 3-5 6-9 10-13 14-17 18-21
Prob. log2 − −15.13 −21.97 −21.84 −24.44 −24.69
Rounds 22-25 26-29 30-33 34-37 38-41 42
Prob. log2 −23.83 −26.09 −23.44 −31.75 −27.09 −3.3
key word in Skein-512 are given in Table 11.6. In Skein-512 the probability to pass rounds
3–46 is about 2−494 (details in Table 11.7).
<<< <<< <<< <<<
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Figure 11.3: Double subkey round in Skein-512 divided into two nonintersecting
halves – red and blue.
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Table 11.6: Pre-fixed values of key bits in Skein-512
k0 k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 k7 k8
KA 0111..01 0100..01 0011..01 0000..01 0111..10 0000..01 0011..01 0000..01 0001..10
KB 11..0011 00..0010 11..0010 00..0001 11..0011 00..0010 11..0010 00..0001 01..0101
Table 11.7: Round-by-round rotational probabilities for Skein-512
Rounds 1-2 3 4-5 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15
Prob. log2 − −6.7 −26.35 −17.05 −26.21 −17.05 −24.26 −17.05
Rounds 16-17 18-19 20-21 22-23 24-25 26-27 28-29 30-31
Prob. log2 −28.26 −17.05 −28.29 −17.05 −23.79 −17.05 −23.56 −17.05
Rounds 32-33 34-35 36-37 38-39 40-41 42-43 44-45 46
Prob. log2 −27.18 −17.05 −32.23 −17.05 −35.17 −17.05 −31.86 −6.7
11.2 Rotational Cryptanalysis of BMW-512
In this section we present rotational distinguishers for the compression functions of the sub-
mitted to the SHA-3 competition [105] BMW-512 [59], further denoted as BMWv1, and for
the second, tweaked by the designers, version of BMW-512 [60], denoted as BMWv2. Thom-
sen in [134] described pseudo-collision and pseudo-preimage attacks on BMWv1. Practical
differential distinguishers on BMWv2 were presented in [5, 63]. Our attack on BMWv1 is on
the original design, while the attack on BMWv2 is on a modified version of the compression
function, where one byte of the constant used in the internal function f1 has been altered.
11.2.1 Analysis of BMWv1-512
BMWv1 takes two 1024-bit inputs: the message M and the chaining value H and produces
an 1024-bit output. The compression function is constructed using three functions f0, f1
and f2. Next, we give a short description of each function fi . A complete specification of the
functions can be found in [59]. All words in BMW-512 are 64 bits long. Assume that the
message is M = (M0, . . . , M15) and the chaining value is H = (H0, . . . , H15).
The function f0 takes as its input the pair: message M and chaining value H and pro-
duces an output (Q0, . . . ,Q15) as follows.
1. First intermediate words W0, . . . , W15 are obtained as a bijective transformation of
M ⊕H defined below as
Wj = (M j1 ⊕H j1) ∗ (M j2 ⊕H j2) ∗ (M j3 ⊕H j3) ∗ (M j4 ⊕H j4) ∗ (M j5 ⊕H j5),
where ∗ ∈ {+,−}, j = 0, . . . , 15 and j1, j2, . . . , j5 ∈ {0, . . . , 15}.
2. The words Wi undergo a bijective transformation and the output of f0 are produced,
i.e. Q j = s j(Wj), where s j(x), j = 0, . . . , 15, are XORs of shifts and rotations of x (see
Table 11.11).
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The function f1 takes as its input the pair: message M and output of f0, and produces
words (Q16, . . . ,Q31) on its output. For j = 16,17, Q j are defined as:
Q j = ex pand1( j) = s1(Q j−16) + . . .+ s0(Q j−1) + AddElement( j− 16),
while for j = 18, . . . , 31, they are defined as:
Q j = ex pand2( j) =Q j−16 + . . .+ s5(Q j−1) + AddElement( j− 16),
where sk(x) are the same functions as in f0, and AddElement( j) = M j + M j+3 − M j+10 +
K j+16. The constants K j are obtained from the initial constant C = 0x0555555555555555
by multiplication, i.e. K j = j · C .
The last function f2 produces 16 words of the new chaining value. It takes as its input
the message M and (Q0, . . . ,Q31) (the outputs of f0, f1). First, it produces the words X L =
Q16 ⊕ . . .⊕Q23 and X H = X L ⊕Q24 ⊕ . . .⊕Q31. Then, the first 8 words (out of 16) of the
new chaining value are defined as3:
H j = (SH L
i j (X H)⊕ SHRk j (Q j+16)⊕M j) + (X L⊕Q j+24 ⊕Q j),
where j = 0, . . . , 7 and SH Lk, SHRk are shifts to left and right by k bits.
We will build a rotational distinguisher for BMWv1 such that the input pairs of chaining
values and message words will compose a rotational pair, but with some corrections. The
output pairs of f0 and f1 will be rotational for all 1024 bits, while the output pairs of f2 will
be rotational for at least 384 bits.
11.2.1.1 Analysis of f1, f0, f2
We start from f1 because that is the only function that applies additions of constants. Note
that in general, we cannot create a rotational pair for constants since their values are fixed.
To overcome this technical difficulty, either constants have to be rotational, i.e. K j = K j ≪r ,
or the errors from the constants have to be canceled with some other errors. In our attack,
we will use the fact that the constants are almost rotational, and we will use small errors,
coming from other words, to make the outputs fully rotational. Recall that the outputs
Q j , j = 16, . . . , 31 of f1 are defined as4 Q j = AddElement( j−16)+s1(Q j−16)+ . . .+s0(Q j−1).
Let T j = s1(Q j−16) + . . .+ s0(Q j−1) and T˜ j = s1(Q j−16 ≪r) + . . .+ s0(Q j−1 ≪r). To obtain
rotational outputs Q j , we have to find an input message pair (M , M˜)) for the following
system of 16 equations:
[M j +M j+3 −M j+10 + K j+16 + T j+16]≪r= M˜ j + M˜ j+3 − M˜ j+10 + K j+16 + T˜ j+16, (11.9)
j = 0, . . . , 15. If we take into account the distributive properties of addition and rotation,
then with some probability (that will be estimated later) this system can be rewritten as:
M j ≪r +M j+3 ≪r −M j+10 ≪r +K j+16 ≪r +T j+16 ≪r= M˜ j + M˜ j+3 − M˜ j+10 + K j+16 + T˜ j+16.(11.10)
If we denote M
′
j = M j ≪r −M˜ j , then we obtain the following system:
M
′
j +M
′
j+3 −M ′j+10 = K j+16 − K j+16 ≪r +T˜ j+16 − T j+16 ≪r , (11.11)
for j = 0, . . . , 15. When the amount of rotation is 2, then the words K j+16 − K j+16 ≪2,
j = 0, . . . , 15 have zeroes in all bytes except for the first and the last (the exact values
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Table 11.8: Rotational properties of the constants of f1 in BMWv1 and BMWv2
i Ki Ki ≪2 Ki − Ki ≪2
BMWv1
16 5555555555555550 5555555555555541 000000000000000f
17 5aaaaaaaaaaaaaa5 6aaaaaaaaaaaaa95 f000000000000010
18 5ffffffffffffffa 7fffffffffffffe9 e000000000000011
19 655555555555554f 955555555555553d d000000000000012
20 6aaaaaaaaaaaaaa4 aaaaaaaaaaaaaa91 c000000000000013
21 6ffffffffffffff9 bfffffffffffffe5 b000000000000014
22 755555555555554e d555555555555539 a000000000000015
23 7aaaaaaaaaaaaaa3 eaaaaaaaaaaaaa8d 9000000000000016
24 7ffffffffffffff8 ffffffffffffffe1 8000000000000017
25 855555555555554d 1555555555555536 7000000000000017
26 8aaaaaaaaaaaaaa2 2aaaaaaaaaaaaa8a 6000000000000018
27 8ffffffffffffff7 3fffffffffffffde 5000000000000019
28 955555555555554c 5555555555555532 400000000000001a
29 9aaaaaaaaaaaaaa1 6aaaaaaaaaaaaa86 300000000000001b
30 9ffffffffffffff6 7fffffffffffffda 200000000000001c
31 a55555555555554b 955555555555552e 100000000000001d
BMWv2
16 5555555555555550 5555555555555541 000000000000000f
17 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa5 aaaaaaaaaaaaaa96 000000000000000f
18 fffffffffffffffa ffffffffffffffeb 000000000000000f
19 555555555555554f 555555555555553d 0000000000000012
20 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa4 aaaaaaaaaaaaaa92 0000000000000012
21 fffffffffffffff9 ffffffffffffffe7 0000000000000012
22 555555555555554e 5555555555555539 0000000000000015
23 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa3 aaaaaaaaaaaaaa8e 0000000000000015
24 fffffffffffffff8 ffffffffffffffe3 0000000000000015
25 555555555555554d 5555555555555535 0000000000000018
26 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa2 aaaaaaaaaaaaaa8a 0000000000000018
27 fffffffffffffff7 ffffffffffffffdf 0000000000000018
28 555555555555554c 5555555555555531 000000000000001b
29 aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa1 aaaaaaaaaaaaaa86 000000000000001b
30 fffffffffffffff6 ffffffffffffffdb 000000000000001b
31 555555555555554b 555555555555552d 000000000000001e
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are given in Table 11.8). On the other hand, for random Q j , j = 0, . . . , 15, the difference
T˜ j+16 − T j+16 ≪2 takes the values 0x16,0x17 with probability 2−8.4 when ex pand1( j) is
applied, and 2−5.6 when ex pand2( j) is applied (this result is obtained experimentally, with
227 trials). Hence, we can assume that the constant terms of System (11.11), have only
two non-zero bytes – the first (MSB) and the last (LSB). For specific values of these terms
(different values can be obtained since T˜ j+16 − T j+16 ≪2 takes two values, and there are 16
equations, therefore one can get 216 systems), the words M
′
j of the solution also have only
two non-zero bytes, i.e. M
′
j can be represented as M
′
j = msb j ·256+ lsb j , where msb j , lsb j <
256. The exact values of these bytes are given in Table 11.9. Once we have M
′
j , we can
Table 11.9: Constant terms and solutions for the systems in f1 of BMWv1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
T˜ j+16 − T j+16 ≪2 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 17 16 16 16 16 17 16 17
LSB of R ja 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2e 2d 2e 2f 30 32 32 34
MSB of R ja 00 0f 0e 0d 0c 0b 0a 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01
msb j 59 18 e7 76 c5 d4 93 52 21 d0 cf ce ad fc 0b ea
lsb j 28 28 29 29 30 32 31 28 25 22 2c 32 34 32 2f 2d
aR j = K j+16 − K j+16 ≪2 +T˜ j+16 − T j+16 ≪2
find the message pair. We choose the message words M j , M˜ j such that M˜ j = M j ≪2 ⊕δ j
(rotational with corrections δ j). Since all M
′
j were fixed by the system, we get the following
equations:
M j ≪2 −M j ≪2 ⊕δ j = msb j · 256 + lsb j , j = 0, . . . , 15. (11.12)
We would like to find many solutions (that we will use later) for this system. To do that, we
fix the MSB of M j ≪2 and δ j to msb j and the LSB to lsb j , i.e. (M j ≪2)MSB = (δ j)MSB =
msb j , (M j ≪2)LSB = (δ j)LSB = lsb j . If we fix the middle 6 bytes of δ j to 0, then the message
words M j ≪2= msb j · 256 + X j · 28 + lsb j , where X j < 248, are solutions of (11.12). It is
important to notice, that δ j have only two non-zero bytes and therefore the input pairs of
message words are rotational for 6 bytes. Hence, we can easily find 216·6·8 = 2768 input
rotational pairs of messages such that if the inputs Q0, . . . ,Q15 of f1 are rotational, then the
outputs Q16, . . . ,Q31 are rotational as well.
Let us estimate the total probability of obtaining these rotational outputs. First, let us
find the probability that System (11.9) is equivalent to System (11.10). For one equation
the probability (obtained experimentally) is 2−3.8 and hence for the whole system it is 2−61.
Now, let us concentrate on the transformations in f1. Since there are 2 applications of
ex pand1( j) and 14 applications of ex pand2( j), the probability of obtaining the required
differences T˜ j+16 − T j+16 ≪2 for all 16 outputs is 2−2·8.4−14·5.6 = 2−95.2. Therefore, the total
rotational probability (obtained heuristically) of f1 is 2
−61−95.2 = 2−156.2.
The function f0 uses the words (Mi⊕Hi) as inputs. Since the message pair is (Mi , Mi ≪2⊕δi), instead of taking simply rotational inputs for the chaining values Hi , we will also
introduce corrections. To obtain a fully rotational input for f0 we will take the chaining
value pairs (Hi , Hi ≪2 ⊕δi). Then the input pair for f0 is (Mi ⊕ Hi , Mi ≪2 ⊕δi ⊕ Hi ≪2⊕δi) = (Mi ⊕ Hi , (Mi ⊕ Hi)≪2), hence it is rotational. Now let us find the probability that
the outputs Q0, . . . ,Q15 are also rotational. These words are produced in two phases:
3We will use only these 8 words in our attack. Therefore we omit the definition of the next 8 words.
4The case when ex pand2( j) is used can be analyzed similarly.
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1. the words W0, . . . , W15 are generated as linear combinations of five terms of a type
Mi ⊕Hi or −(Mi ⊕Hi),
2. each Q i is obtained from Wi as Q i = si(Wi).
The rotational probabilities of the words Wi are given in Table 11.10.
Table 11.10: Rotational probabilities of the words in f0 of BMWv1 and BMWv2
W0 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7
log2 -3.82 -1.68 -3.82 -1.68 -1.68 -1.68 -3.82 -10.01
W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 W13 W14 W15
log2 -3.82 -1.68 -3.82 -3.82 -1.68 -10.01 -3.82 -3.82
The theoretical basis for these numbers is provided by the Lemmas 11 ,12. Note that
since we consider rotation amount r = 2 and the number of additions and substractions in
Wi is limited to 4, the counter j of the sums in the lemmas takes only the value 0, hence the
formulas for the probabilities can be significantly simplified for these specific values. The
total probability of the first phase is 2−60.8. To compute the probability of the phase 2 of f0
we only have to find the rotational probabilities of the functions si (see Table 11.11). There
Table 11.11: Rotational probabilities of the functions si used in BMW
Function Definition Prob. log2
s0(x) SHR1(x)⊕ SH L3(x)⊕ ROT L4(x)⊕ ROT L19(x) -4
s1(x) SHR1(x)⊕ SH L2(x)⊕ ROT L8(x)⊕ ROT L23(x) -4
s2(x) SHR2(x)⊕ SH L1(x)⊕ ROT L12(x)⊕ ROT L25(x) -4
s3(x) SHR2(x)⊕ SH L2(x)⊕ ROT L15(x)⊕ ROT L29(x) -4
s4(x) SHR1(x)⊕ x -2
s5(x) SHR2(x)⊕ x -4
are 4, 3, 3, 3, 3 applications of s0, s1, s2, s3, s4 respectively. Therefore, the probability of phase
2 is 2−4·4−3·4−3·4−3·4−3·2 = 2−58, and hence, the total rotational probability of f0 is 2−118.8.
The function f2 takes the message M and the words Q0, . . . ,Q31 (outputs of f0, f1) as
input, and produces the next chaining value. We can assume the words Q0, . . . ,Q31 to be
rotational with some probability (the combined rotational probabilities of f0 and f1). The
terms X L and X H are rotational with probability 1 since they are produced as XORs of
rotational words. We require rotational outputs from the shifts of X H and the shifts of
Q j , j = 16, . . . , 23. The rotational probability of all the shifts of X H is 2−4−4−4−2−4−4−4−4 =
2−30, while for the shifts of Q j we pay 2−4−4−4−4−4−4−4 = 2−28 (see Table 11.11). Since
the message pair words are rotational in 6 bytes, it follows that the words SH L jk (X H) ⊕
SHR jl (Q j) ⊕ M j are also rotational in 6 bytes (all bytes except MSB and LSB). Let Pj =
SH L jk (X H) ⊕ SHR jl (Q j) ⊕ M j and R j = X L ⊕ Q j+24 ⊕ Q j . Then the chaining values are
defined as H j = Pj + R j . Note that Pj is rotational for 6 bytes, and R j is fully rotational. For
the error of the new chaining value we have (Pj + R j)≪2 −[(Pj ≪2 ⊕δ j) + R j ≪2] 2
−1.68
=
Pj ≪2 +R j ≪2 −(Pj ≪2 ⊕δ j)− R j ≪2= Pj ≪2 −(Pj ≪2 ⊕δ j), hence the error can be
only in the MSB and LSB if there are no carries (with probability 2−1) in the LSB. Therefore,
for the rotational properties of the first 8 chaining values in 6 bytes we have to pay in total
2−8·(1.68+1). If we take into account the previous probabilities of the shifts, we get the total
rotational probability of f2, which is 2
−30−28−21.5 = 2−79.5. The output pair is rotational in at
least 8 · 6= 48 bytes, or 384 bits.
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11.2.1.2 The Attack on the Full BMWv1
The relations between the pairs of input message words and the chaining value words are
fully fixed. For the first input, the message words M j are chosen randomly, except their MSB
and LSB which are fixed as explained above. The chaining values H j are chosen randomly
as well. Then, the message M˜ and the chaining value H˜ of the second input are defined
as M˜ j = M j ≪2 ⊕δ j , H˜ j = H j ≪2 ⊕δ j . The probability that such input pair will produce
output pair of chaining values, rotational in 384 bits, is the combined probability of f0, f1, f2
which is 2−156.2−118.8−79.5 = 2−354.5. On the other hand, the same probability for a random
function is 2−384, hence BMWv1 can be distinguished from a random function.
Note, we can obtain non-random properties for the last 8 chaining values H8, . . . , H15
as well5. We only have to take into account the terms ROT L( j+1)(Hk) which are rotational
in 6 bytes. Also, the complexity of the whole attack can be reduced to 2223.5 compression
function calls by using more advanced techniques.
11.2.2 Analysis of Modified Version of BMWv2-512
The compression function BMWv2 is similar to the one of BMWv1, but a few tweaks are
introduced by the designers. We will describe only the differences between these two func-
tion. The first tweak is in f0, where the words Q j are produced as Q j = s j(Wj) + H j+1. The
second tweak is in f1. Now this function takes the chaining value H as an additional input.
The tweak of f1 is in the AddElement function, which is defined as follows
AddElement( j) = (M j ≪ j+1 +M j+3 ≪ j+4 −M j+10 ≪ j+11 +K j+16)⊕H j+7.
We attack a modified version of BMWv2, denoted as BMWv2C , where the above round
constants K j+16 are obtained by multiplying the round indexes ( j + 16) by the constant
C = 0x5555555555555555. In the original version the value of the constant is C =
0x0555555555555555.
11.2.2.1 The Attack on BMWv2C
We will take different approach for producing rotational pairs in BMWv2C although the
analysis uses the results of the previous section. The input pairs of messages and chaining
values will be fully rotational, while the output chaining values will be rotational in the first
8 words (512 bits).
Let us fix random a message (M0, . . . , M15) and a chaining value (H0, . . . , H15) for the
first input of f0, and the pair (M0 ≪2, . . . , M15 ≪2), (H0 ≪2, . . . , H15 ≪2) for the second.
Since f0 in BMWv2 differs from f0 in BMWv1 only in the extra additions of H j in BMWv2,
in order to find the rotational probability of f0, we only have to consider these 16 additions.
Thus, the probability of rotational output pair for f0 is 2
−118.8−16·1.68 = 2−145.7.
Now, let us focus on f1. When the constant C is fixed to 0x5555555555555555 then the
values of the differences K j+16 − K j+16 ≪2 are only one byte (see Table 11.8).
On the other hand, all of these differences (rotational errors of the constants) can be can-
celed since addition and rotation are not fully distributive. For example, for some x , y the
following holds (x + y)≪2= x ≪2 +y ≪2 +1. When more terms are added, these errors
can be larger, i.e. for some x1, . . . , xk it holds (x1+. . .+ xk)≪2= x1 ≪2 + . . .+ xk ≪2 +e+,
where e+ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. We have found that all differences K j+16 − K j+16 ≪2 can be can-
celed with these errors coming from the additions/rotations. When the input pairs of words
5We omit the description since we already have an attack.
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Q0, . . . ,Q15, M0, . . . , M15, H0, . . . , H15 are rotational, then the probabilities of rotational out-
put pairs for ex pand1( j), j = 16,17 and ex pand2( j), j = 18 . . . , 31 (obtained experimen-
tally) are given in the Table 11.12. The total probability of obtaining all 16 rotational outputs
Table 11.12: Rotational properties of the words in f1 (without the shifts) in BMWv1
Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23
log2 -2.37 -2.38 -3.93 -3.95 -3.97 -3.97 -3.98 -4.00
Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 Q28 Q29 Q30 Q31
log2 -4.00 -4.02 -4.03 -4.03 -4.03 -4.03 -4.03 -4.04
from these transformations, i.e. the rotational probability of f1 is around 2
−61.
Finally, let us analyze f2. We require rotational outputs only for the first 8 new chaining
values, i.e. H0, . . . , H7. Similarly as for BMWv1, the probability can be estimated simply by
counting the number of shifts and additions required for producing these 8 values, i.e. the
probability is 2−30−28−8·1.68 = 2−71.5. Note that now there are no corrections in the message
words, hence the 512-bit output is fully rotational.
For the whole BMWv2C , the probability that rotational inputs of messages and chaining
values will produce rotational outputs in the first 8 words is 2−145.7−61−71.5 = 2−278.2. On the
other hand, a rotational input in a random function, will produce a rotational output in 8
words (512 bits) with probability 2−512. The probability of our distinguishers most likely can
be raised if message modification technique is applied. Then the first phase of f0 (probability
2−61) can be passed for free.
The low attack complexity allows us to launch rotational distinguishers for the 384-bit
version of BMWv2C as well. Note that, increasing the number of applications of ex pand1( j)
(which is considered to be stronger) from 2 to all 16 does not stop the attack because
the rotational probability of ex pand1( j) is higher than the one of ex pand2( j). Also, the
probability of rotational output pairs, does not seems to change significantly, when the order
of s j in f0 and f1 is changed.
149
Chapter 12
Meet-in-the-middle Attacks on
SHA-3 Candidates
Since most of the attacks on hash functions have been differential-based collision attacks,
the majority of the SHA-3 designs claimed resistance against differential cryptanalysis while
less attention was given to the resistance against other attacks. The subject of this analysis
is meet-in-the-middle attacks and their application to preimage search.
A meet-in-the-middle attack on a cryptographic primitive is applicable if the execution
can be expressed as a sequence of transformations all of which have at least one input that
is independent of the other transformations. Providing the invertibility of the last transfor-
mation, the full execution can be divided into independent parts, which are connected using
the birthday paradox.
One of the first such attack was the attack on Double-DES [48]. Double-DES, being
composed of two consecutive iterations of single DES with different keys, was found to be
vulnerable to the following meet-in-the-middle attack: given a pair (plaintext, ciphertext)
one can find a Double-DES key (a pair of single DES keys), which is valid for this pair, with
complexity of about 232 encryptions. A full attack on Double-DES, which gives the real key,
is based on this approach as well and it is faster than the brute-force.
Meet-in-the-middle attacks on hash functions based on the Merkle-Damgård construc-
tion are hard to apply since the compression function is usually assumed to be non-invertible.
The alternative sponge construction [15] allows invertible transformations, but requires the
internal state to be large so that the meet-in-the-middle approach would have a complexity
higher than the complexity of the simple brute force.
Surprisingly, several SHA-3 proposals are vulnerable to this type of attack. In this section
we describe meet-in-the-middle based preimage attacks on Boole [122], Edon-R [61], and
Sarmal [138]. Two ideas are common for all the attacks. First, all the functions have
invertible (or partially invertible) transformations, which allows us to execute the meet-in-
the-middle. Secondly, we reduce the intermediate state space exploiting the non-random
behavior of the round transformations.
The analysis presented further is composed as follows. First, we describe the meet-
in-the-middle preimage attack in general and remind how it can be maintained with little
memory. Then we show how preimages for Boole, Edon-R, and Sarmal can be found. We
also discuss possible computation-memory tradeoffs.
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Table 12.1: Complexity of the preimage attacks described in this section.
Computations Memory
Boole-384/512 2288 264
Edon-R-n 2n−s + 2n−k+s 2s + 2k
2n−s + 2 n2+s+32.5 2s
Sarmal-512 2512−s + 2256+s 2s
12.1 Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on Hash Functions
Hash functions with invertible compression functions become susceptible to preimage at-
tacks if the size of the internal state is too small. Preimages can be obtained by performing a
meet-in-the-middle attack on the compression function. In this section we will describe this
generic scenario in more details.
Let F : D → D and G : D → D be two permutations and H = G ◦ F the composition of
these permutations. In our setting, the function H is the hash function, F is defined as the
compression function with a fixed IV and G is the inverse of the compression function for a
fixed target value. Furthermore, we define auxiliary functions pi1,2 : D × D → D that map
tuples to their first, respectively second component.
Assume we want to perform a meet-in-the-middle attack on h. The standard technique
is to compute two sets
S1 =

(F(x), x) : x ∈R D	 and S2 = ¦G−1(y), y : y ∈R D©
such that |S1| · |S2|= |D|. Either sorting these two sets in their first component or computing
them in such a way that they are already ordered in this component allows us to easily find
colliding values
pi1 ((F(x), x)) = pi1

(G−1(y), y)

by comparing the elements of the two sets in linear time. Each collision gives us a pair (x , y)
such that H(x) = y . How to balance the size of the sets S1 and S2 depends on the relative
cost of the function G−1 compared to an evaluation of the function F . It may for instance
be that G is easily invertible, meaning an evaluation of G−1 costs about the same number of
operations as an evaluation of the function F . In this case we choose the sets S1 and S2 to be
of equal size
lp|D|m. However, if the evaluation of G−1 is k times more expensive than the
evaluation of F , we should choose the set |S1| to be of size
p
k · |D| and S2 of size
p
k−1 · |D|
to obtain a minimum number of overall operations. The memory complexity of this naive
approach is non-negligible however: We need to store a total of 2 ·
p|D|(pk+pk−1
elements of the domain D to carry it out. Storing both sets is not really necessary: Only the
smaller should be stored, the values of the larger can be computed on the fly and compared
against the elements of the smaller set.
In some cases the memory requirement can be completely eliminated by a technique
based on Floyd cycle finding first described in an article by Morita, Ohta and Miyaguchi
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[101]. Although several works on hash functions refer to memoryless variants of meet-
in-the-middle attacks [117, 96], all of them cite either one or both papers by Quisquater
and Delescaille on collision search for DES [120, 119]. These two papers however do not
directly deal with meet-in-the-middle attacks, but describe the technique of using distin-
guished points for collision search. Oorschot and Wiener describe the same technique for
memoryless meet-in-the-middle later in [137].
12.1.1 Eliminating the memory requirement
Assume we are given another function r : D → {0, 1} which maps elements of the domain
D to a single bit in a random fashion. Using this switching function we can define a step
function s that evaluates x either to F(x) or to G(x), depending on the value of x:
s : D→ D, x 7→

F(x) if r(x) = 0
G(x) if r(x) = 1
This function s can then be used in a Floyd cycle finding algorithm: We start from a random
value x ∈ D and use just two elements a = s(x) and b = s2(x). In each step we then update
a by applying s to it and b by applying s2 to it. Upon finding a cycle, we must check whether
we really have found a pair F(x) = G−1(y) or whether we have found a cycle in F or in G.
If the output of r is equidistributed, for each cycle we find Pr(F(x) = G−1(y)) = 0.5. In case
of encountering a cycle in F or G we restart the algorithm with another random element
x ∈ D.
Significant problems can arise if the output of r is not equidistributed, for instance if G
is very costly to compute relative to F and we want to simulate the case of |S1|= k · |S2| with
k large.
For the hash functions that we attack we define two functions F and G that are used
in the memoryless approach. The F function is used for the forward direction and the G
function is used for the backward one. The switching function r is defined as the parity of
x .
12.1.2 Reduced state principle
The meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attack needs a collision in the intermediate state. However,
the state may be so large that a straightforward application of the MITM approach would
require more than 2n computations for a n-bit hash digest. Thus the generic principle we
use further is to generate intermediate states only from a smaller subspace (where some bits
are fixed to zero) thus reducing the birthday dimension and the complexity of the attack.
The generic framework is defined as follows. A hash function with an n-bit digest has
an internal state of size k bits. We manage to get intermediate states with t bits fixed to 0.
Then to get a MITM connection we need to get two states that collide in (k− t) bits so that
the birthday space D has size 2k−t . This implies that we must get two sets S1 and S2 such that|S1| · |S2|= 2k−t . The exact ratio between S1 and S2 is defined by the complexity of inverting
the compression (round) function.
For the memoryless version of the MITM attack, we need to tweak the attack slightly
such that we can define the functions F and G. Each of the functions is a composition of
two functions, first projecting the birthday space into the state space, the second mapping
the state space into the birthday space again (fixing some bits to zero). In other words, let
F = f ◦µ and G = g ◦ν . When memoryless meet-in-the-middle is possible in our attacks we
will define these functions accordingly.
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12.2 Boole
Boole is a family of hash functions [122] based on a stream design. Internally, Boole has a
large state σt = (Rt[0], Rt[1], . . . , Rt[15]) of 16 words plus 3 additional word accumulators
denoted by lt , x t , and rt (t is the time). The words are 64 bits each. Hashing a message in
Boole is done in three phases: 1)Input phase, where the whole message is processed word by
word, and for each input word the state and the accumulators are updated, 2)mixing phase,
where only the state is updated depending on the values of the accumulators, 3)output
phase, where the output is produced.
The update of the state, referred to as a cycle, is defined as:
Rt+1[i]← Rt[i+ 1], for i = 1 . . . 14
Rt+1[15]← f1(Rt[12]⊕ Rt[13])⊕ (Rt[0]≪ 1)
Rt+1[0]← Rt+1[0]⊕ f2(Rt+1[2]⊕ Rt+1[15]),
where f1 and f2 are some non-linear functions, intended to simulate random functions.
Let wt be a message word. The update of the accumulators is defined as:
temp← f1(lt)⊕wt
lt+1← temp≪ 1
x t+1← x t ⊕wt
rt+1← (rt ⊕ temp)≫ 1
The whole message is absorbed in the input phase. Sequentially, for each message word
wt the following is done:
1. update the accumulators
2. Rt[3]← Rt[3]⊕ lt+1
3. Rt[13]← Rt[13]⊕ rt+1
4. update the state (cycle)
The mixing phase is invertible and its description is irrelevant in our attack.
Each iteration of the output phase produces one output word. One iteration is defined
as:
1. cycle
2. Output the word v = R[0]⊕ R[8]⊕ R[12]
For example, the output for Boole-256 is produced in 8 iterations.
Let us present two observations about the invertibility of the update functions of the
state and the accumulators.
Observation 3 The state update (cycle) is an invertible function. If a new state σt+1 is given,
then the stateσt that producedσt+1 in a single cycle can be found from the following equations:
Rt[0] = (Rt+1[15]⊕ f1(Rt+1[11]⊕ Rt+1[12]))≫ 1
Rt[1] = Rt+1[0]⊕ f2(Rt+1[2]⊕ Rt+1[15])
Rt[i] = Rt+1[i− 1], i = 2, . . . 15
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Observation 4 The update of the accumulators can be inverted with probability 1− 1/e. If
the values of the new accumulators lt+1, x t+1, rt+1 and the input message word wt are fixed, the
values of the previous accumulators lt , x t , rt are determined as:
lt = f
−1
1 ((lt+1 ≫ 1)⊕wt)
x t = x t+1 ⊕wt
rt = rt+1 ≪ 1⊕ f1(lt ⊕wt)
Moreover, if the values of lt , lt+1 (or rt , rt+1) are fixed, the value of the message word wt
can be found uniquely:
wt = (lt + 1≫ 1)⊕ f1(lt)
( wt = (rt+1 ≪ 1)⊕ rt ⊕ f1(lt))
In order to invert the function f1 we will use a look-up table (x , f1(x)) with all 264 values
for x , sorted by the second entry. Then, a inversion of f1(x) is equivalent to a look-up in this
table.
12.2.1 Preimage attack on Boole-384 and Boole-512
The intermediate state of Boole has 16 state words and 3 accumulators, hence 19 words
in total. Further, we will show how to fix the values of the state words R[3], . . . , R[12] (10
words in total) to zero in forward and backward directions. This will mean that k = 19·64=
1216 and t = 10 · 64 = 640, and the birthday space D has only 9 words (576 bits). We will
also define f (x) and g(x) for the memoryless MITM attack.
Defining µ - fixing R[3], R[4], . . . , R[12] forwards. From the description of the input
phase it follows that:
R10[3] = R9[4] = . . .= R1[12] = R0[13]⊕ r1
Note that the value of r1 can be controlled with w0 (Observation 3). Hence, if we take
r1 = R0[13], we will get R10[3] = 0. Similarly, for R10[4] we have:
R10[4] = R9[5] = . . .= R2[12] = R1[13]⊕ r2
We can change the value of r2 with w1 such that R1[13]⊕ r2 = 0 holds. Then R10[4] = 0.
The same technique can be applied for fixing the values of R10[5], . . . , R10[12].
Note that we can not fix the values of more than these 10 words. When we control the
value of rt with the input word wt−1, it means that we also change the value of lt (which
is added to Rt[3]). Since we can not control the value of both accumulators with a single
message word, and both of them are xor-ed into the registers R[3] and R[13], it means that
we can not control the values of more than 10 words.
Defining f (y) for the memoryless MITM attack. The birthday space D has 9 words.
Let y = y1||y2|| . . . ||y9, then f (y) can be defined as compression of the input words yi with
1≤ i ≤ 9 in the first 9 cycles. Thus when fixing R[3], . . . , R[12] in forward direction, we first
compress y , and then we start with our technique for fixing these words to zero (function
µ).
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Defining ν - fixing R[3], R[4], . . . , R[12] backwards. Our backwards strategy is the
following: first we invert the output and the mixing phase and obtain one valid intermediate
state. Then, by changing the input words, we fix R[3], R[4], . . . , R[12].
First, let us deal with the inversion of the output phase. In each cycle of this phase one
output word is produced. Hence, the digest is produced in 8 cycles1. The output word vt
is defined as vt = Rt[0]⊕ Rt[8]⊕ Rt[12]. Let H∗ = (h0, . . . , h7) be the target hash value.
We have to construct a state σt = (Rt[0], . . . , Rt[15]) such that h0 = vt , h1 = vt+1, . . . , h7 =
vt+7. First, we put any values in Rt[0], Rt[9], Rt[10], . . . , Rt[15]. The rest of the words are
undefined. Then, we find Rt[8] from the equation Rt[8] = Rt[0]⊕Rt[12]⊕h0. Obviously we
get that vt = h0. After the cycle update we obtain a new state σt+1. Then, we determine the
value of Rt[1] from the equation Rt[1] = Rt+1[0] = Rt+1[8]⊕ Rt+1[12]⊕ h1, and therefore
h1 = vt+1. The values for Rt[2], . . . , Rt[7] are determined similarly. This way we can define
the rest of the words in the state σt , which in the 7 sequential cycle updates produces the
target hash value.
Let us fix the accumulators to any values. Then, inverting the mixing phase is trivial
because the length of the preimage, as shown further, is known and the values of the accu-
mulators are also known.
Now that we have inverted the output and mixing phase, we have the freedom of choos-
ing the input message words. The technique for fixing is rather similar to the one used for
fixing this set in forward direction. But in the backward direction, we control the values of
the lt accumulators (rather then the values of rt as in the forward direction) with the input
words wt (Observation 4). From the description of the input phase we get:
R10[12] = R11[11] = . . .= R18[4] = R19[3]⊕ l20
Therefore if we take l20 = R19[3] we will get R10[12] = 0. Similarly, for R10[11] we have:
R10[11] = R11[10] = . . .= R17[4] = R18[3]⊕ l19
If we take l19 = R18[3] we obtain R10[11] = 0. The same technique can be used to fix the
variables R10[10], . . . , R10[3].
One may argue that for controlling the values of the lt registers when going backwards
we have to pay an additional cost because f1 is not always invertible. But we have to keep
in mind that there are values for which f1 has many inversions. Hence, if we start with a set
of N different values, we can expect to find N different inversions for these values and thus
we do not have to repeat the inversion.
Defining g(y) for the memoryless MITM attack. The function g(y), where y =
y1||y2|| . . . ||y9, is defined as 9 consecutive backward rounds of the input phase with inputs
yi . The starting state of these 9 rounds is the state obtained after the inversion of the output
and mixing phases (as described above). Note that after the application of the function g(y)
a new state is obtained. Then, to this state, we apply our technique for fixing R[3], . . . , R[12]
in 10 backwards rounds (function ν).
12.2.2 Complexity of the Attack
The preimage that we obtained has a length of at least 9+ 9+ 10+ 10 = 38 words. The
memoryless MITM attack requires about 2
9·64
2 = 2288 computations2 and 264 memory (for
inverting f1).
1In Boole-384, the output is produced in 6 cycles.
2One computation is equivalent to one round of the input phase or one round of the mixing phase.
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12.3 Edon-R
The hash family Edon-R [61] uses the well known Merkle-Damgård design principle. The
intermediate hash value is rather large, two times the digest length3. For an n-bit digest the
chaining value Hi of Edon-R is composed of two block of n bits each, i.e. Hi = (H1i , H
2
i ).
The message input Mi for the compression function is also composed of two blocks, i.e.
Mi = (M1i , M
2
i ). Let Edon be the compression function. Then the new chaining value is
produced as follows:
Hi+1 = (H
1
i+1, H
2
i+1) = Edon(M
1
i , M
2
i , H
1
i , H
2
i )
The hash value of a message is the value of second block of the last chaining value.
Internally, the state of Edon-R has two n-bit blocks, A and B. The compression function
of Edon-R consists of eight updates, each being an application of the quasigroup operation
Q(x , y)4, to one of these blocks. With Ai and Bi we will denote the values of these blocks
after the i-th update in the compression function (please refer to Fig. 12.1). Hence, each
input pair (Hi , Mi) generates internal state blocks (A1, B1), (A2, B2), . . . , (A8, B8). The new
chaining value (the output of the compression function) Hi+1 is the value of the blocks
(A8, B8).
A1
B1
A2
B2
A3
B3
A4
B4
A5
B5
A6
B6
A7
B7
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
M1M2
A8
B8Q
H2 H
1
Input message
Input chain value
Output
chain value
Figure 12.1: Outline of Edon-R compression function
Let us present a simple observation that is used in the attack.
Observation 5 The quasigroup operation Q(x , y) of Edon-R is easily invertible, i.e. if A and C
(B and C) are fixed then one can easily find B (C) such that Q(A, B) = C.
3Edon-224 and Edon-384 have 512 and 1024 bits chaining values, respectively.
4The exact definition of the quasigroup operation can be found in [61].
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12.3.1 Preimage attack on EDON-R-n
The internal state of EDON-R-n (the chaining value H = H1||H2) has 2n bits. We will show
how to fix H1 = 0. Then the preimage attack can be mounted using the MITM approach
(Section 12.1), where k = 2n and t = n. The backward step is time-consuming so we will
use the memory MITM attack.
Fixing H1 in forward direction. We need only one message block to get the desired
Hnew1 = 0. Both initial value blocks are fixed as well. We claim that for each M1 we can find
M2 such that this message input and the initial value blocks will produced a zero value in
Hnew1 .
Indeed, let M1 be set to some random value. Then we obtain the value of A6 since
A7 = Hnew1 = 0 and the function Q is invertible. We consecutively obtain the values of
A5, A4, A3, A2, and A1 (keep in mind that the initial chaining value is fixed). Given A1 and
M1, we derive M2 by inverting the first application of Q. Finally we obtain all B’s and thus a
pair (Hnew1 = 0, H
new
2 ).
Fixing H1 in backward direction. We need only one step (one message block) to get
a pair of the form (0, H2) from a given hash value H = Hnew2 .
First, we set M1 to some predefined value m. Then we assign to A8 some random value
and consecutively obtain the values of the following internal variables (in this order): A7,
B7, B6, A6 (using M1), A5, B5, B4, A4, A3, B3. We repeat this step 2
k times for different values
of A8 and store 2
k different pairs (A3, B3).
Now we set M2 to some random value
5 and obtain the values of A1, A2, and B2 using
the value of M1. If we repeat this step 2
n−k+s times then we will find 2s different values of
B2 that coincide with some values of B3 from the stored set. For each of these values we
define H2 such that Q(A2, H2) = A3. The complexity requirements for this part are: 2n−k+s
computations6, where s− k < 65, and 2s + 2k memory.
These 2s pairs can be obtained using the memoryless MITM as well, where the MITM
space is the value of B2. Because of the message padding we should take any n− 65 bits
of B2 so that the input and the output of the MITM function F and G would have the same
size. The (n− 65)-bit input to the function F is padded with the message padding, and the
input to the function G is padded, for example, with zeros. Then, if a (n− 65)-bit collision
between F and G is obtained, the probability that they coincide in the rest of the 65 bits is
2−65. Hence, for constructing 2s pseudo preimages with the memoryless MITM, one needs
2s · 2 n−652 +65 = 2 n2+s+32.5.
12.3.2 Complexity of the Attack
Starting from the initial value, we generate 2n−s different chaining values with H1 = 0.
Note that we do not store these values. Then, with high probability, we can expect that
one of these values will be in the set of the 2s pseudo preimages generated in the backward
direction. Under the condition s− k < 65 the total complexity of the attack when memory is
used in the backward step is 2n−s+2n−k+s computations and 2s+2k memory. If only negligible
memory in the backward step is used the computational complexity is 2n−s+2 n2+s+32.5 at the
same time needing 2s memory.
5The value is not truly random: 65 bits of the last message block are reserved for padding.
6Here and below, one computation is not more than one compression function call.
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12.4 Sarmal
Sarmal-n [138] is a hash family based on the HAIFA design. After the standard padding
procedure, the padded message is divided into blocks of 1024 bits each, i.e. M = M1||M2||
. . . ||Mk, |Mi | = 1024, i = 1, . . . , k. Each block is processed by the compression functions.
HAIFA design implies that the compression function f has four input arguments: the previ-
ous chain value hi−1, the message block Mi , the salt s, and the block index t i . Hence, hi is
defined as hi = f (hi−1, Mi , s, t i). The final chaining value hk is the hash value of the whole
message M . For Sarmal-n the chaining value hi has 512 bits. Let us denote the left and the
right half of hi as Li and Ri respectively, i.e. hi = Li ||Ri . The salt s has 256 bits (similarly let
s = s1||s2), and the block index t i has 64 bits. Then, the compression function of Sarmal-n
can be defined as:
f (hi−1, Mi , s, t i) = µ(Li−1||sl ||c1||t i , Mi)⊕ ν(Ri−1||sr ||c2||t i , Mi)⊕ hi−1, (12.1)
where µ and ν are functions that output 512 bit values, and c1, c2 are some constants. The
exact definition of these functions is irrelevant for our attack.
12.4.1 Preimage Attack on Sarmal-512
We will show how to invert the compression function of Sarmal-512. Note that the inter-
mediate chaining value of Sarmal has 512 bits. Then the preimage attack can be launched
using the MITM approach (Section 12.1), where k = 512 and t = 0. The inversion of the
compression function is time-consuming so we will use the memory MITM attack.
Going forward from the IV. Since we do not fix anything (t = 0), going forward from
the IV is trivial. We simply generate a number of intermediate chaining values, by taking
different random messages as an input for the first compression function.
Going backward from the target hash value. Let us explain how the compression
function can be inverted.
From (12.1) we get:
f ( hi−1, Mi , s, t i) =
= µ (Li−1||sl ||c1||t i , Mi)⊕ ν(Ri−1||sr ||c2||t i , Mi)⊕ hi−1 =
= µ (Li−1||sl ||c1||t i , Mi)⊕ ν(Ri−1||sr ||c2||t i , Mi)⊕ Li−1||Ri−1 =
= µ (Li−1||sl ||c1||t i , Mi)⊕ ν(Ri−1||sr ||c2||t i , Mi)⊕ Li−1||0⊕ 0||Ri−1 =
= (µ (Li−1||sl ||c1||t i , Mi)⊕ Li−1||0)⊕ (ν(Ri−1||sr ||c2||t i , Mi)⊕ 0||Ri−1)
Let us fix the values of Mi , s, and t i . Then, we can introduce the functions F(Li−1) =
µ(Li−1||sl ||c1||t i)⊕ Li−1||0, and G(Ri−1) = ν(Ri−1||sr ||c2||t i)⊕ 0||Ri−1. Let H∗ be the target
hash value. Then we get the equation:
F(L)⊕ G(R) = H∗
If we generate 2256 different values for F(L) and the same amount for G(R), then, by the
birthday paradox, with high probability we can expect to get at least one pair (F(Ll), G(Rm)
that will satisfy the above equation and therefore obtain that h= Ll ||Rm is a preimage of H∗.
A memoryless version of this pseudo-preimage attack can be obtained by introducing
the function F˜(L) = F(L)⊕ H∗, and launching the memoryless MITM attack on F˜ and G.
This would require 2256 computations and negligible memory.
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12.4.2 Complexity of the Attack
Since the backward direction, i.e. inverting the compression function, is time consuming we
will use the memory version of MITM attack. Going backwards from the target hash value
we create a set S2 of 2
s different chaining values. To create this set we need 2256 ·2s = 2256+s
computations. Then, starting from the initial value, we generate 2512−s different chaining
values. Note, we do not store these values, we store only the smaller set S2. Then, with
a high probability, we can expect that these two sets coincide. The total complexity of the
attack is 2512−s + 2256+s computations and 2s memory.
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Appendix A
The SHA-3 Competition
A.1 History of the SHA-3 Competition
The SHA-3 competition [105] has attracted a lot of attention in the cryptographic commu-
nity. In 2006 NIST announced that it plans to replace the current hash function standard
SHA-2 [136], with a more advanced function. The new standard was to be chosen through
a public competition similar to the previous competition held for block ciphers [36], i.e.
designers from all over the world can propose a new hash function, and after a thorough
analysis one function will be chosen as a new standard. To efficiently sieve the weak can-
didates, NIST decided to have three rounds, each to last around a year, and in each round
gradually the number of functions will be reduced by rejecting candidates with weaknesses.
A total of 64 teams submitted a candidate hash function to the NIST’s open call in Octo-
ber 2008, and 51 function advanced to the first round (the other 13 proposals were refused
due to incomplete or irregular submission packages). Most of the design teams came from
academia, however, there were functions proposed by companies, as well as individuals. The
proposed hash functions were based on various underlying transformations. A large group
of functions appeared to be based on the block cipher AES – a primitive with a good security
and efficiency1. Another large group of functions was based on simple software-efficient
transforms – additions, rotations, XORS, and in some cases, shifts. The initial software com-
parison showed that practically these candidates are clear winners in speed, however, they
were yet to withstand all possible attacks. The first round cryptanalysis led to a clear dis-
tinction between secure proposals and functions with some weaknesses. These weaknesses
were ranging anywhere from hand-found collision or preimage attacks to highly theoretical
attacks. Interestingly, the number of first-round secure proposals (i.e. the functions with-
out weakness found) was approximately the same as the number of planned second round
candidates – 14 hash functions advanced to this round in July 2009. The second round
cryptanalysis saw the introduction of distinguishers for hash/compression functions. The
candidates had stronger security level, hence the analysis had to evolve to attacks that show
that (usually) the compression function can be distinguished from a random function. In
December 2010, NIST has chosen 5 candidates for the last, third round. It is worth noticing
that for each of the final round candidates, there exists an attack that shows some type of a
1It was already known that Intel plans to implement special instructions for the round transformation
of AES in the upcoming processors, hence improving ten fold the efficiency of AES in software.
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weakness on at least half rounds of the compression function. NIST plans to choose a winner
in 2012.
A.2 The Hash Function LUX
The hash family LUX [110] was submitted to the SHA-3 competition. However, a weaknesses
was found that led to collision, preimage attacks and slide distinguishers [142, 129, 116,
44]. The attacks were based on a weakness in the output phase of LUX, as well as the self
similarity of the rounds. Further, we propose a simple tweak that resists all the previous
attacks. First, we introduce a round counter (in a form of an XOR of a block index) thus
making the rounds distinct, and discard the output phase (but increase the number of rounds
in the blank-round phase).
A.2.1 Specifications
LUX is a byte oriented stream based hash function. It supports 224, 256, 384 and 512 bit
digests and can hash a message of length up to 264 bits. The only parameter for the different
digests is m which represents the size in the matrices (the number of rows in the matrices)
used for the internal representation of the state of the function. For LUX-224 and LUX-256
the value of m is 4, while for LUX-384 and LUX-512 it is 8.
LUX has an internal state S of m× 24 bytes which can be divided into two parts:
• the buffer (B), which is a matrix of m× 16 bytes, denoted Bi, j where 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1
and 0≤ j ≤ 15
• the core (C), which is a matrix of m× 8 bytes, denoted Ci, j where 0 ≤ i ≤ m− 1 and
0≤ j ≤ 7 .
The internal state is manipulated by the state update function. The message is processed by
small chunks of m bytes each.
Digest size Message block Core Buffer Internal state
(in bytes) (in bytes) (in bytes) (in bytes)
224 4 4× 8 4× 16 96
256 4 4× 8 4× 16 96
384 8 8× 8 8× 16 192
512 8 8× 8 8× 16 192
Table A.1: Parameters for different digests.
A.2.1.1 State Update Function
Important building block of LUX is the state update function Φ. It takes the current state
S (buffer+core) and a message block Mt of m bytes, and the block index t and produces a
new state, i.e. :
Snew ← Φ(Sold , Mt , t).
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This process is defined as one round. LUX is little endian oriented. The input message is
divided into chunks of m bytes. These chunks are treated as little endian words, i.e. least
significant byte comes first. The state update function Φ itself can be decomposed into sev-
eral consecutive steps. Let Bi, j ∈ GF(28) be the elements of the buffer, and Ci, j ∈ GF(28)
be elements of the core. Let us denote by Bi the i-th column of the matrix B, i.e. Bi =
(B0,i , B1,i , . . . , Bm−1,i)T . Similarly, Ci = (C0,i , C1,i , . . . , Cm−1,i)T . Let Mt = (M0,t , M1,t , . . . , Mm−1,t)T
be a message block of m bytes. With "⊕" we will denote vector XOR addition. Then the state
update function, sequentially, does the following steps:
State update function Φ
Input B = B0||B1|| . . . ||B15 C = C0||C1|| . . . ||C7
1. Add the message block to both the buffer and the core.
B0← B0 ⊕Mt
C0← C0 ⊕Mt
2. Update the buffer and the core separately.
B← F(B)
C ← G(C)
3. Add the core to the buffer.
for i = 0 to 7 do
Bi+4← Bi+4 ⊕ Ci
4. Feedforward column of the buffer to the core.
C7← C7 ⊕ B15
Output B,C
In the step 2 of Φ we use functions that transform the buffer and the core. Let us define
these remaining functions F and G.
The function F is used to manipulate only the buffer B. It is a simple cyclic rotation of the
matrix by one column to the right. Therefore F(B), in pseudo code, can be defined as:
Buffer function F
Input B = B0||B1|| . . . ||B15
for i = 0 to 15 doeB(i+1)mod 16← Bi
Output eB
The function G is one round of Rijndael where the core is seen as the state of Rijndael.
This round transformation consists of SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddCon-
stant.
Core function G
Input C
C ← SubBytes(C)
C ← ShiftRows(C)
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C ←MixColumns(C)
C ← AddConstant(C)
Output C
Although these four transformations are well known from Rijndael, below we will give
a brief description of each of the transformations.
SubBytes. This non-linear byte-wise function is defined exactly as in the Rijndael specifica-
tions, i.e. the S-box used in SubBytes is the same as the S-box used in Rijndael.
S(X ) = Y.
Let X = X1||X2, where X1 are the first four bits of the byte X and X2 the last four bits of X .
Then the S-box used in LUX can be defined as:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
0 63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5 30 01 67 2b fe d7 ab 76
1 ca 82 c9 7d fa 59 47 f0 ad d4 a2 af 9c a4 72 c0
2 b7 fd 93 26 36 3f f7 cc 34 a5 e5 f1 71 d8 31 15
3 04 c7 23 c3 18 96 05 9a 07 12 80 e2 eb 27 b2 75
4 09 83 2c 1a 1b 6e 5a a0 52 3b d6 b3 29 e3 2f 84
5 53 d1 00 ed 20 fc b1 5b 6a cb be 39 4a 4c 58 cf
6 d0 ef aa fb 43 4d 33 85 45 f9 02 7f 50 3c 9f a8
7 51 a3 40 8f 92 9d 38 f5 bc b6 da 21 10 ff f3 d2
8 cd 0c 13 ec 5f 97 44 17 c4 a7 7e 3d 64 5d 19 73
9 60 81 4f dc 22 2a 90 88 46 ee b8 14 de 5e 0b db
a e0 32 3a 0a 49 06 24 5c c2 d3 ac 62 91 95 e4 79
b e7 c8 37 6d 8d d5 4e a9 6c 56 f4 ea 65 7a ae 08
c ba 78 25 2e 1c a6 b4 c6 e8 dd 74 1f 4b bd 8b 8a
d 70 3e b5 66 48 03 f6 0e 61 35 57 b9 86 c1 1d 9e
e e1 f8 98 11 69 d9 8e 94 9b 1e 87 e9 ce 55 28 df
f 8c a1 89 0d bf e6 42 68 41 99 2d 0f b0 54 bb 16
ShiftRows. This transformation cyclically rotates to the left, independently, each row of the
core matrix. For LUX-224 and LUX-256, whose core matrix has four rows, the rotation con-
stants are 0,1,3, and 4. Let us denote this vector by ν , i.e. ν = (ν1,ν2,ν3,ν4) = (0, 1,3,4)2.
Then ShiftRows can be defined as:
Ci, j ← Ci,( j+ν j )mod 8
LUX-384 and LUX-512 have core matrix with eight rows, hence the rotation vector has eight
coordinates: ν = (0,1, 2,3, 4,5, 6,7).
MixColumns. The MixColumns operation processes each column of the core matrix in-
dependently. A column is treated as an m-element vector in GF(28) and is multiplied by
a matrix in GF(28). The multiplication is performed modulo the irreducible polynomial3
m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1. For LUX-224 and LUX-256 the matrix that defines this linear
2As in Rijndael-256.
3As in Rijndael.
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transformation is the following4:
Cnewi ← A · Coldi ; A=

02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03
03 01 01 02

For LUX-384 and LUX-512 the following matrix5 is used:
A=

01 04 01 01 02 0c 06 08
08 01 04 01 01 02 0c 06
06 08 01 04 01 01 02 0c
0c 06 08 01 04 01 01 02
02 0c 06 08 01 04 01 01
01 02 0c 06 08 01 04 01
01 01 02 0c 06 08 01 04
04 01 01 02 0c 06 08 01

AddConstant. In hash functions usually constant addition is introduced in order to stop
various slide attacks. Rijndael transformation is very sensitive to symmetric inputs. If all
the elements of the core matrix C are the same, then the previous three transformations
will produce a new state with, again, all elements equal to each other. To destroy this
unwanted property we use the fourth transformation AddConstant. It is a simple XOR of
0x2ad01c64⊕BI to the core column C1. This constant corresponds to the first 8 hexadecimal
digits of e. The value BI denotes the block index (starting from 1 for the first message block).
In the blank round phase, the block index takes the value of 0.
AddConstant
Input C
C1← C1 ⊕ 0x2ad01c64⊕ BI
Output C
A.2.1.2 Initializations and padding
The buffer and the core are initialized by setting all the elements equal to zero. The standard
padding procedure is applied to the message,. First, the message is divided into message
blocks of m bytes (8m bits). If the length of the last message block is less than 8m bits then
this block is padded with one, followed by number of zeros such that the block length be-
comes equal to 8m. If the last block has exactly 8m bits, than additional block is introduced,
with one followed by 8m− 1 zeros. For LUX-224 and LUX-256, at the end two additional
4-byte blocks, containing the binary expression of the length of the non-padded message,
are created. For LUX-384 and LUX-512 only one 8-byte block with the message length is
created. This padded message becomes the input message for the hash function.
4As in Rijndael.
5As in Grindahl-512.
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Rijndael round
Mt I
II
II
III
IV
Ci
Bi
Figure 1: The round function of LUX. I - message addition to the buffer and the core. II -
update of the buffer and the core. III - Addition of the core to the buffer. IV - addition of
one column from the buffer to the core.
A.2.1.3 Hashing and output
The hash function LUX, similarly to the other stream based functions, uses the principle
input message / blank rounds and output hash. These two phases are executed one after
another. Depending on the message length and the size of the digest, the first phase has
different number of rounds.
Input phase After the state is being initialized and the message is being padded the
input message phase starts. In this phase the whole message, block by block, is "absorbed",
without outputting anything. Each message block, starting from the first one, is passed as an
argument to the state update function Φ which transforms the internal state, in one round,
to a new state. The input phase ends when, sequentially, all message blocks are processed.
Obviously the number of rounds of this phase depends only on the size of the message, i.e.
the number of message blocks in the padded message.
Blank rounds phase and producing outputs Blank rounds phase is typically used
to increase the diffusion of the last message blocks. For LUX, this phase consists of 32 rounds.
In each of these rounds the input message block as well as the block index are considered to
be zeros.
After the blank round phase is finished, the words of the core are taken as output. For
LUX-256 and LUX-512 all columns of the core (8 ·32= 256, 8 ·64= 512), for LUX-224 the 7
left-most columns (7 · 32 = 224), while for LUX-384 the 6 left-most (6 · 64 = 384) columns
of the core are the hash value of the message.
From the algorithmic point of view, these two phases do not differ because they are
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Core Buffer
LUX-256 4× 8 4× 16
LUXv1-256 4× 8 4× 12
LUXv2-256 4× 4 4× 16
LUXv3-256 4× 4 4× 12
Table A.2: Reduced variants of LUX-256.
divided into rounds and in each round the state update function gets the three necessary
parameters: the message block, the block index and the internal state. Therefore the same
function Φ can be used in both of the phases. Let the padded message consists of k blocks.
Then the hash function LUX can be defined as:
Hash function LUX-256
Input M = M1||M1|| . . . ||Mk
for i=1 to k
S← Φ(S, Mi , i)
for i=1 to 32
S← Φ(S, 0, 0)
output C1, . . . , C8
A.2.1.4 Reduced Variants
The block based hash function usually takes a high number of rounds to process one message
block. By decreasing this number of rounds, reduced variants of the function are produced.
In the analysis of the hash functions it is common to analyze these variants if the original
function seems to be resistant to attacks. Since LUX uses different design principle (stream
based), obviously, such variants are not possible. Yet, we can propose an alternative with
decreased size of the internal state. Since the internal state of LUX consists of a core and
a buffer, we propose a variants whose core and/or buffer have less number of columns.
Although we claim it is critical to have a buffer that has 4 columns more than the core, in
the front and at the end (in the passive buffer), yet it will be interesting to analyze how the
security margin behaves for the variants with less number of columns in the buffer and the
core. Reduced internal state variants of LUX-256 are proposed in Table A.2.
Different variants can be made by reducing the number of blank rounds, from 16 rounds
to 12 or 8 blank rounds. In the output hash phase in each round one column of output is
produced. A variant, where in each round 2 or 4 columns of output are produced, can also
be analyzed.
We recommend these variants for the research on security margins of LUX but not for
actual use.
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Table A.3: Security levels for LUX.
Attack Complexity
Digest 224 256 384 512
Collision attack 2112 2128 2192 2256
Preimage attack 2224 2256 2384 2512
Second preimage attack 2224 2256 2384 2512
HMAC-PRF distinguisher 2112 2128 2192 2256
A.2.1.5 HMAC and PRF
The LUX hash functions are suitable for a standard construction of HMAC:
HMACK(m) = h
 
(K + c1)||h((K + c2)||m).
The secret key K is padded with extra zeros to have a minimal length divisible by 4m (8m if
LUX-384 or LUX-512 is used). The constants have the following values: c1 = 0x5c5c . . . 5c,
c2 = 0x3636 . . . 36. The inputs K + c1, K + c2 are divided into message blocks of m bytes and
then processed by the hash function.
LUX can be used as a base of pseudo-random function (PRF) under different construc-
tions, e.g., as HMAC-PRF.
A.2.1.6 Security levels
The security levels, claimed for the hash functions of the family LUX, are presented in Ta-
ble A.3. Also, any m-bit subset of the output bits, meets the required levels for collision
resistance and preimage resistance of 2m/2 and 2m respectively.
A.3 The SHA-3 Competition: Lessons Learned (or How
to Design a Secure Hash Function)
The crypto group at the University of Luxembourg has taken an active part in the analysis of
a dozen SHA-3 candidates: Abacus [111], Blue Midnight Wish [59], Boole [80], DCH [75],
Edon-R[79, 80], EnRUPT[80], Hamsi [107], NaSHA [112], Sarmal [80], Skein [77, 78],
StreamHash [76] and others. We would like to share the experience we gathered through
these attacks, as well as the analysis provided by other researchers we would like to raise the
following challenge: how to build a secure hash function? To answer this question, one has
to start from the definition of a secure hash. Indeed, the SHA-3 analysis has taught us that
we should first focus on the security of the underlying compression function6. To be secure
this function has to withstand all possible collision and (second) preimage attacks as well as
all known (and possibly yet to be invented) distinguishers. For none of these attacks there
exist a formal design method that stops the attacks. Hence, to answer the above question – it
is not possible to build a secure function. However, we can try to build the next best thing –
a function arguably resistant to all known attacks. In other words, under certain reasonable
6Or in the case of the sponge construction–the underlying permutation.
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assumptions, we can informally prove that our function does not experience any known
weaknesses. To do so, we have to take into account one-by-one each attack technique, find
the weakness property used by the technique, gather all possible theory on how to stop the
attack, and implement it in the function. The further recommendations can be summarized
as follows:
1. Choose a hash function mode that has provably secure properties
2. To stop various generic attacks, such as the herding attack and the long second-
preimage attack, construct a compression function that is either a wide-pipe or a
single pipe, but with a salt and a block index. If the latter variant is used, then check
the security of the function under the assumption that the attacker fully controls the
values of the block index and the salt
3. The compression function has to have a high security margin against differential at-
tacks, i.e. prove that the best differential trail covers only a fraction of the total num-
ber of rounds
4. If the compression function is invertible, than make sure that the state is larger than
2n+m, where m is the size of the input message block
5. Use constants to stop slide and rotational attacks
6. The algebraic degree of the function has to be sufficiently high. Otherwise various
algebraic attacks, e.g. cube attacks, can be launched
A.3.1 A Secure Hash Function Mode
The mode of a hash function provides a method of turning the fixed input length compres-
sion function into an arbitrary input length hash function. If the mode used in the hash has
severe weaknesses, then regardless of the compression function, the hash function will be
insecure. Therefore, the first and foremost thing is choosing a proper hash mode. There are
several modes that were proven the be secure when the underlying compression function is
secure. Merkle-Damgård construction [100, 45] used in all of the hash functions from MD4
to SHA-2, the sponge [15] used when the compression function is wide-pipe permutation,
and the tree-based mode [50] which provides the opportunity of computing in parallel the
compression functions, were all proven to be secure modes. There exist some other ad-hoc
modes, however, using unproven modes is not recommended. Therefore, the designer is
advised to use one of these modes. In case a new mode is proposed it is crucial to prove the
security of the mode.
Further, we assume that the chosen hash mode is secure. Hence, we can proceed with
the design (and analysis) of the compression function only.
A.3.2 The Choice of Compression Function
Most of the compression functions, with a few exceptions, are based on a permutation. To
make the compression function non-invertible, after the last round of the permutation there
is some type of a feedforward, and the previous chaining value or/and the message is added
to the state (thus making the permutation a function). A list of secure constructions applying
the idea of feedforward is given in [118]. The compression function does not necessarily
have to be a function, i.e. it can stay a permutation, however then the internal state of the
permutation has to be at least 2n bits in order to stop possible preimage attacks. The double-
pipe (or wider) functions in general are more resistant to generic attacks (due to the high
complexity of finding internal collisions), however, we would not like to give any preference
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– we assume that single-pipe constructions (with a careful design strategy) can be as secure
as the double-pipe7.
Standard inputs to the compression function are the input chaining value and the mes-
sage block. Several SHA-3 candidates followed the HAIFA design strategy [19], and took as
additional inputs a salt and a block counter thus preventing several generic attacks on the
Merkle-Damgård [73, 47, 71]. Using the salt and the block index in the compression func-
tion is advantageous and desirable. In analysis, the salt and the block index are assumed
to be regular input variables (just as the message and the chaining value), the attacker can
manipulate their values, hence a special attention has to be taken to assure that they do not
introduce any weakness in the function. For example, XORing the salt (or the block index)
to the input message block or the chaining value, immediately leads to a trivial attack: given
the same difference in the salt and the message, the XOR will produce zero difference, hence
a pseudo-collision attack can be launched.
A.3.3 Collision Resistance
The collision attacks on modern compression functions have been focused on finding a dif-
ferential trail in the function that ends with a zero difference (or with a small Hamming
weight difference, leading to a near collision). This does not have to be the case for all
compression functions. Examples that contradict this assumption are the functions based on
some hard mathematical problems. Nevertheless, almost all compression functions are com-
posed of rounds of simple transforms (rather than structural transforms that mimic some
mathematical function), and therefore the search of differential trails for collisions stays the
main challenge. The trails are important as well for finding differential distinguishers, hence
their probability can be as low as 2−(n−1). So far, these trails were found exclusively by hand
since the big state of the compression function prohibits feasible automatic search.
Only a few SHA-3 candidates had a clear analysis and estimated the probability of the
best differential trails. Interestingly, they were based on unkeyed permutations, i.e. the
message is injected in the state at the beginning of the compression function followed by a
number of similar round transforms (without any input from the message). This significantly
reduces the search space – it becomes sufficient to find the probability of the best trail
only for the unkeyed round transforms. This is done by proving the upper bound on the
probability of the best round-reduced trail, i.e. if the best trail on t rounds has a probability
at most p, then the trail on t · k rounds has probability at most pk. When, p is sufficiently
low, then pk  2−n, giving a high security margin. If one tries to apply the same approach to
keyed permutations, i.e. permutations with message injections in the rounds, he will usually
fail since the probability p of the round-reduced trails is often very high (and therefore
pk > 2−n). One can try to take more rounds in the round-reduced trail, i.e. to increase
t, which will result in lower probability p. However, finding the upper bound p on the
probability of the best trail on a large number of rounds t is often impossible.
The problem of finding the upper bounds on the probabilities usually can be solved for
byte-oriented substitution-permutation (SP) networks. A technique for building SP primi-
tives resistant to differential (and linear) attacks is given in [42]. For byte-oriented com-
pression function, in general, the search for the best (round-reduced) trails is easier (and
usually feasible), particulary for unkeyed permutations. With a brute force (or by taking into
account the properties of the linear layer, such as the branch number), it is possible to find
the minimal number of active S-boxes in a round-reduced trail and from there to compute
the minimal number of the active S-boxes for the full-round function. However, what most
7Each of the five NIST third round candidates is a wide-pipe construction.
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of the SHA-3 designers seem to underestimate is the power of the message modification
technique. They found the upper bound on the probability of the best trail, but did not take
into account the possibility that some rounds can be passed with probability 1 (instead of the
probability defined by the trail), since the attacker has the full freedom to choose all inputs
and to fix some values of the internal state. For many of the SHA-3 function the rebound
attack, exploiting the idea of message modification, was fatal. Therefore, when proving the
resistance of a function against differential attacks, the designer has to keep in mind that
some number of rounds can be passed for free, and hence he should provide much higher
security margin than the total number of rounds. Unfortunately, it is still not clear how high
the margin has to be (even for the above functions) as it is hard to estimate the number of
"free" rounds. If t rounds are required for a complete difusion in the state, then a recom-
mendation would be to have at least 3t rounds margin, i.e. if the function has r rounds, then
the designer has to prove that a function with r + 3t rounds is resistant against differential
attacks.
A.3.4 Preimage Resistance
Preimage and second-preimage attacks are ways to exploit the possibility of inverting the
compression function and launching a meet-in-the-middle attack. Based on this property we
can divide the functions into two categories: invertible and non-invertible.
The invertible compression functions are basically a permutation: keyed or unkeyed.
Invertible functions based on a keyed permutation are rare (for their preimage resistance re-
fer to the following paragraph on non-invertible compression functions), further we analyze
only unkeyed permutations. As mentioned above, in this type of function, at the beginning
of the permutation, the message block is XORed to the state, followed by rounds of trans-
formations. Since the function is invertible, a necessary requirement for the permutation is
to have a state of at least 2n bits. Otherwise, a simple meet-in-the-middle attacks would
make the preimage search trivial. However, a more detailed analysis shows that the size of
the state actually should depend on the size of the injected message block – if the message
block has m bits, then the size of the state has to be at least 2n+m bits (for n-bit preimage
security). If this is not the case, then again it is possible to launch a MITM attack on two
consecutive compression functions. The 2n+m-bit state is sufficient when the underlying
permutation is ideal, i.e. it has no weaknesses on its own. Therefore, it is desirable to have
some type of security margin obtained by taking a state with a size greater than 2n+m bits.
The non-invertible compression functions are usually based on keyed permutation with
the additional feedforward after the last round. For this type of constructions the designer
has to take into account the splice-and-cut technique for producing preimages. Therefore,
the message schedule has to be chosen carefully. It should not be possible to split the set of
expanded message words into two sets with some independent words. In general, when the
state is double-pipe, the splice-and-cut technique should be inapplicable (since the MITM
space becomes 2n-bit wide, and therefore the MITM attack requires 2n), but this is true in
the cases when the function has no known weaknesses.
A.3.5 Resistance against Various Distinguishers
Now let us focus on possible distinguishers for the compression function. Note that the case
of differential distinguishers has been covered in the section on collision resistance.
Slide attacks and rotational cryptanalysis are basically applicable to primitives that do
not use constants (or use some very specific constants). To resist these attacks, the designer
should preferably introduce constants in each round of the function. For each round, the
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constants should be different and non-rotational – the best choice is to use some randomly
generated values. The same constant should not be added (or XORed) to the same message
word, otherwise, the effect of the constant can be canceled. In particular, in unkeyed per-
mutations, the words of the state where the constant is added, should not be the same as
the words where the message block is added.
The designs with a low algebraic degree are susceptible to various algebraic attacks.
Aside from the ARX designs, where the high degree is ensured by the additions, the function
in which the only non-linear transforms are in the form of small S-boxes (usually 4x4), or
low-degree transformations (such as AND and OR), should be carefully examined to ensure
that the degree is the highest possible. For example, when in n-bit permutation one can
find some set of m < n variables in some intermediate state such that in both directions all
bits of the output are functions of degree strictly less than n in the variables chosen, then
it is possible to launch a zero-sum distinguisher (see the work of Aumasson-Meyer [9]).
Therefore, the designs with low-degree rounds, should have much higher number of rounds
to resist the above attacks.
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List of Results
Table A.4: Summary of the results presented in the thesis
Name Type Summary Section
AES-128 cipher Found the best RK characteristic 9.2.1
RK boomerang attack on 7 rounds 9.2.2
AES-192 cipher Found the best RK characteristic 9.2.1
Improved the RK boomerang attack on 12 rounds 9.2.3
AES-256 cipher Found the best RK characteristic 9.2.1
Boole hash Found preimage attacks 12.2
BLAKE32 hash Found boomerang attacks on up to 7 rounds 8.3
cipher Found RK boomerang attacks on up to 8 rounds 8.4
byte-Camellia cipher Found the best RK characteristic 9.3.1
Launched chosen-key RK attack on full-round 9.3.2
DES cipher Found the best RK characteristic for some rounds 10.3
DESL cipher Found the best RK characteristic for some rounds 10.4
BMW hash Rotational distinguishers on (modified) CF 11.2
Edon-R hash Found preimage attacks 12.3
Khazad cipher Found the best RK characteristic 9.4.1
RK boomerang attack on 7 rounds 9.4.2
Launched chosen-key RK attack on full-round 9.4.3
LAKE hash Found (practical) pseudo collision attacks 7.2
s2DES cipher Found the best RK characteristic 10.5
Sarmal hash Found preimage attacks 12.4
Skein-256 hash Rotational distinguishers on 40 rounds for CF 11.1
Skein-512 hash Rotational distinguishers on 44 rounds for CF 11.1
SHA-256 hash Found practical collisions attacks on up to 25 rounds 6.3
Threefish cipher Rotational distinguishers for up to 42 rounds 11.1
xAES cipher Tweaked the key schedule of AES
and proved the resistance against RK attacks 9.5
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